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Abstract 
The first decade of the 21
st
 Century has been described as a “Golden Age” in the 
development of Digital Forensics. Criminals naively used the new technology not realising 
they were leaving easy pickings for the investigators on their trail. The evidence was mostly 
obvious, the software straightforward. Most importantly, the scale of the task was 
manageable. A “Case” was more often, one suspect, one investigator, one computer, one 
hard disk, one piece of analysis software, one report for one Authority. The Golden Age is 
over. Investigations are becoming increasingly multi-jurisdictional, with multiple items 
containing evidence from multiple suspects and ever increasing quantities of data. 
Investigators are struggling to keep pace with the changes and are possibly losing the battle. 
There have been several solutions proposed to regain the upper hand, amongst them is 
using what is collectively known as distributed processing running on clusters of PCs. 
Processing data in a forensically sound manner acceptable to the courts requires special 
measures when handling evidence. Existing systems in this area, like Hadoop and 
HTCondor, are designed for use in cases where users do not have to justify their actions to a 
legal authority. Appropriate procedures to attain a suitable “Chain of Evidence” have been 
developed as new forms of digital evidence have been identified, acquired, processed and 
presented in court. In these, the computer system used for analysis has been treated as a 
single point in the chain of evidence but in a distributed system, there could be hundreds of 
hosts connected via local and wide area networks. Currently no acceptable methods can 
assure “Chain of Evidence” in these ‘new’ distributed architectures.  
Within this thesis, we present a solution to this problem. FCluster and FClusterfs are the 
result of a design research methodology that addresses the problem by setting a design 
criterion, proposing a design, building it and then evaluating it against a number of metrics 
identified in the background. 
We find that, to be a complete solution, FCluster has to extend from the Acquisition of 
evidence through ingestion, distribution to processing. To overcome the latency problems 
common to distributed system we introduce a technique we call Jigsaw imaging and with it 
the prioritisation of data acquisition. It is implemented as a middleware, in a manner similar 
to Hadoop and HTCondor.  
This dissertation makes an original contribution to knowledge in the field of digital forensics 
by developing a technique that ensures the integrity of data as it passes from acquisition 
source, to storage and on to processing within a distributed computer architecture. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The scale of the creation, capture, processing, storage and availability of digital data is now 
beyond all but the wildest predictions of only a working lifetime ago. This has bought great 
changes in our lives. We have huge volumes of knowledge readily available. Media and 
entertainment has been transformed. Communication on a global scale is now as easily as 
communication with our geographic neighbours. There are ‘gadgets’ which were only 
previously found in the realm of science fiction. On the near horizon are intelligent machines 
that will work autonomously of human control. 
Unfortunately, this has not come without a downside. Inevitably, criminal endeavour has 
followed technological developments to establish a new domain - cybercrime. Digital 
information is just a tool and can be used for good or bad. Old crimes, like hate mail, now 
have a digital form and new digital crimes, like hacking, now exist. 
In response to these new crimes, new methods of detection and investigation have been 
developed to identify, gather evidence and prosecute these criminals. This is no small task 
and investigators are becoming overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of data to examine. 
In this dissertation, we present a review of the current literature in the area of processing 
data for forensics. We then argue that the need to process this increase in data volume will 
lead to a move towards the adoption of distributed processing and cloud computing as an 
investigative tool but this will lead to a loss of assurance, specifically Chain of Evidence, and 
so result in the inadmissibility of evidence in court. 
We therefore present a distributed middleware system, FCluster, which incorporates 
methods that provide assurance when handling data in these new architectures. These 
assurance methods are similar to exiting methods used in current analogue and digital 
forensics and so should not be too unfamiliar to what is a deeply conservative domain. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The Start of Digital Forensics 
Digital crime and digital forensics is young. The first law specifically crafted for digital crime 
was the Florida Computer Crime Act in 1978 (HistoryofInformation.com 2014). The FBI 
created its Computer Analysis and Response Team 6 years later in 1984 (FBI 2014a). In 
1999, the Association of Chief Police Officers published the first Good Practice Guide for 
electronic evidence. 
During this period, most of the tools used in an investigation would have been derived from 
the software used by software developers or support staff. Norton Disk Editor was, for a long 
Introduction 
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time, a standard item in the arsenal of the digital investigator. In the mid-1990s and early 
2000s software specifically designed for digital investigation was developed, like EnCase 
from Guidance Software (Guidance Software 2014) and FTK from AccessData (2014). In the 
middle of the first decade of the 21
th
 century, it looked as if equilibrium had been established. 
Broadly, the tools suited the task. Then, it started to change. 
1.2.2 The Information Age  
At the turn of the millennium, probably as the result of the availability of the Internet, what 
had been predicted as the Information Age started to become apparent. It is difficult to 
quantify the information explosion that has taken place and is still in progress. In 1980, a 
business might own one Apple II that had one floppy disk drive. In 2013, an ‘ordinary person’ 
quite possibly owns a desktop computer that may well have a one Terabyte hard disk drive. 
That is an increase of 6 million fold in about 35 years. Many people own multiple devices; a 
Smartphone, a Desktop PC, a Tablet, an MP3 music player, a GPS and multiple USB 
memory sticks and memory cards for cameras and videos. This is not limited to people in the 
‘wealthy 1
st
 World’. People in the emerging markets are not going to wait 30 years to get 
their digital devices. 
When this research started, in 2007, manufacturers were offering 500GB drives for £99 and 
were starting to offer terabyte storage. In 2013, it became difficult to buy a drive under 
500GB and in 2014 a six Terabyte drive retails for £125. While the capacity of the media has 
increased by about 5 million fold, the I/O rate has increased from 5 MB/s with MFM to 600 
MB/s with SATA-III, an increase of only 160 fold (Wikipedia 2013). 
The result of these changes is that accessing all the data on the media, a process almost 
unique to digital forensics, is taking very much longer. 
1.2.3 Recent cases 
During the summer of 2006, when there was the potential for a terrorist bombing campaign 
against transatlantic flights, the security clampdown caused huge confusion for travellers and 
financial loss for the travel industry. By way of explanation for their action, during a televised 
press conference (BBC 2006), DCC Peter Clarke stated that the Metropolitan Police had 
made 27 arrests and subsequently seized 400 personal computers, 200 mobile phones and 
8,500 items of digital evidence (presumably CDs, DVDs, memory sticks etc.). The statement 
went further to estimate this represented 6TB of data. This was huge by the standards of the 
day. If this estimate was true, the devices must have been several years old and most of the 
extra media must have been floppy disks or perhaps CDs. In a verbal statement, broadcast 
on BBC radio on 15
th
 June 2007 after the successful conviction of the terrorists, Peter Clarke 
praised the efforts of the digital investigative team saying that some officers, drawn in from 
the whole of the UK, spent the nights during the investigation in sleeping bags on the office 
floor. Such was the pressure of work to complete a substantial amount of the investigation 
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with 14 days before the suspects had to be charged or released. If the 2007 investigation 
happened today, it could be 600TB of media. 
In 2014, the BBC (BBC 2014b) reported on a Freedom of Information request made by the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children that asked every Police 
Constabulary in the UK about the volume of data seized in connection with child abuse 
investigations. Taken as a national figure, this is approaching 40,000 hard disks each year.  
Figure 1 - Subject Domain Timeline is a compilation of landmarks, often drawn from memory, 
which shows the recent history of relevant items. 
 
Figure 1 - Subject Domain Timeline 
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1.2.4 Growing Timescales from Data to Information to Knowledge 
It is currently expected, as best practice from the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) Guidelines for Digital Evidence (ACPO 2014), that investigators should start by 
imaging the entire storage media and then, as a subsequent task, run some 
analysis/indexing programs on the copy. Ultimately, it falls to an experienced human 
investigator to analyse the data, extract evidence, and form a case. From our own 
experience, in 2013, imaging a 4-terabyte hard disk drive takes about 17 hours and 
subsequent processing of the data from within the image to generate abstracted information 
takes about 4 days depending on the content of the media. AccessData’s FTK can process 
about 2MB/s on a single core, so an i7 processor can process about 14 MB/s and a high-end 
Xeon processer with 32 cores can process about 64 MB/s. How long it takes the investigator 
to analyse that information to gain knowledge about a case is an open-ended question. 
Ironically, the most powerful computer become, it seems the longer it will take us to analyse 
‘the whole of the media’. 
Analysis falls somewhere between two extremes. Sometimes the investigator is asked to 
locate very specific information, for example an email sent at a specific time. In this case, 
they can go straight to the email file and locate the evidence. At the other extreme, the 
investigator is asked to provide all the data relating to ‘drugs’. This requires exhaustive 
sorting, selecting and indexing. It is a more complex search for interrelated information of 
evidential value. With four terabytes of assorted data, this is a formidable task. In these 
circumstances, pre-processing is essential but this could take weeks.  
Current processing is quite basic. At most, current software attempts to recover lost or 
deleted file and then together with the ‘normal’ data from the file-system, organise these files 
into some classification to ease the manual search that follows.  
More advanced processing is starting to appear, AccessData has just introduced an add-on 
to FTK that uses artificial intelligence to assess images for pornographic content but this is in 
its early days.  
Perhaps there is searching with regular expressions and some search software allows 
indexing and fuzzy logic and stemming. Files can be compared using their cryptographic 
hashes but software that analyses images and recognises faces or places in some kind of 
automatic intelligent way, as humans do so easily, is currently only in the development 
stage. There is still sometime before we see the automated semantic machine 
understanding of emails or documents 
During the last decade, there has been a significant shift in our aspirations for data 
processing. Whereas one of the historic skills of data processing was the discerning 
selection of source data and the efficient deployment of computing recourses to match the 
data processing load, there now seems to be a desire to adopt a ‘catch it all’ approach and 
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with the idea that it can be just thrown into an expandable, dynamic processing solution. 
Digital forensic analysis is has not been spared from this thinking. Investigators are often 
expected to satisfy the desire to ‘process everything’. 
1.2.5 Possible Solutions 
A number of solutions have been proposed. It would seem obvious to use computers that 
are more powerful but increasing a ‘single box’ solution to multi processors, large RAM and 
fast RAID type disk arrays does not achieve much more than a 10-fold increase in power but 
may result in a disproportionate 1,000 fold increase in price. Data triage, data reduction and 
machine intelligence are also key areas. 
Digital forensics is not the only domain with this type of problem. The emerging domain of 
Big Data has the same types of problems and seems to have solved them by applying 
Distributed Processing techniques. Using Distributed Processing has been suggested as a 
solution in digital forensics but, as yet, no solutions has addressed all the issues that would 
make the solution acceptable in legal proceedings. AccessData’s FTK4 system does offer 
what they call ‘Distributed processing’. However, this is based on a central file server 
containing an image of the media and so is not truly distributed. This approach is not 
scalable to more than about ten processing hosts.  
What is needed is a distributed platform upon which it is possible to run analysis software in 
a forensically sound environment. New tools need to have large amounts of processing 
power available to them. The platform needs to be able to make processing power available 
of a scale many hundreds, if not, thousands of times greater than the processing power used 
by the suspects.  
1.2.6 Information Assurance 
Users of existing popular distributed systems understand that they need to enforce their own 
standards and methods of assurance in their processing. The user has to check that they are 
using the correct data, that they are using the correct software and that this software is 
appropriate and up to date. Existing distributed systems are generally designed to be flexible 
and open for the user.  
The legal process sets itself standards of assurance higher than those in most other 
domains. Procedures to ensure adequate assurance for Chain of Evidence in analogue 
forensics have been established to everyone’s satisfaction. This model has been extended 
to digital forensics, but the assumption is that the investigator’s computer is singular, at most 
a small network of PCs. Apart from possibly forbidding it, current ‘Best Practice’ in chain of 
evidence does not address the issues arising from the dispersal of evidence across a wide 
area network. 
Introduction 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  6 | P a g e  
1.3 Research Method, Goals and Contributions 
1.3.1 Motivations for Research 
When society or the State, accuses, tries, convicts and enforces a penalty, which could be 
loss of liberty or even death in some jurisdictions, the accused has a fundamental human 
right to expect the evidence to be gathered, processed, presented and assessed with the 
very greatest of care possible. There is a great danger that in the enthusiasm to use the 
apparently impressive evidence revealed by digital forensic science, standards could be 
lowered in its processing. It does not take too much research to uncover important injustices 
that have their roots in inadequate assurance when processing evidence. This research 
strives to provide a universal base in a processing system that, at least, starts to build an 
assurance system that does not rely on individual diligence to maintain standards.  
1.3.2 Problem Summary 
• Various authorities (Parsonage 2009) (Garfinkel 2010) have reported a 
backlog of data requiring forensic analysis; 
• This backlog is a problem as it delays prosecution and most legal 
frameworks have restrictions on the time suspects can be held without 
charge. Additionally, the value of intelligence information gained in an 
investigation usually degrades with time; 
• This backlog is often caused by sheer quantity of data; 
• Currently automation is very basic and most analysis is still manual. 
Sophisticated automation will require greater processing power and further 
extend processing times; 
• This is largely because we are still using computer architectures that are 
limited by a disparity between disk capacities and interface transfer speeds 
and processing and data bus speeds; 
• Many observers expect the backlog to increase; 
• We believe fully distributed storage and processing is the only sustainable 
solution; 
• Current Distributed Storage/Processing platforms do not provide adequate 
assurance for the legal process. 
1.3.3 Scope 
This research addresses the need for an assured process to control and monitor the 
introduction, passage, continued integrity and availability for processing of data introduced 
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into a distributed cluster with the understanding that the results would be used in legal 
proceedings. 
• We will assess the current process for acquiring data and introducing it to a 
computer system; 
• We address the issues of a majority of computer devices that Law 
Enforcement meets regularly. Typically, these are devices running Microsoft 
Windows that use NTFS file system, Apple IOS and OSx that use HDFS, 
Linux that uses EXT3 and EXT4; 
• We address the growing issues that come with large media over, typically 
2TBytes. 
This project focuses on the central, Middleware layer, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 - System layers 
1.3.4 Research Hypothesis 
It is possible to facilitate the timely handling of large-scale digital evidence for professional 
computer forensic investigations, whilst still maintaining an appropriate chain of evidence, 
through the design of a suitable acquisition and processing methodology, implemented 
within a distributed middleware architecture. 
1.3.5 Aims and objectives 
Although there are examples of very highly funded organisations that are capable of building 
huge distributed systems of hundreds of thousands of hosts, this is not representative of the 
bulk of forensic workshops used by local or regional law enforcement. We choose to 
describe our target system by expressing it in terms of a budget that in 2014 might be 
£30,000. This could currently buy a cluster of about 100, i7 machines with 16GB RAM and 
2TB of hard disk space. They would be connected with Gigabit Ethernet networking via a 
switch. 
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This research aims  
1. To derive a set of requirements to enable the development of a distributed 
management system specifically suited to forensic investigation.  
This is evaluated in 8.7.1; 
2. To evaluate some prominent existing distributed management systems and 
assess their suitability to implement a prototype distributed forensic system. 
This is evaluated in 8.7.2; 
3. To classify existing forensic investigation tools and assess the likelihood of 
running them in a distributed environment and if necessary, to derive a 
standard for new tools intended to run within a distributed environment.  
This is evaluated in 8.7.3; 
4. To develop a robust design of a middleware framework to support 
processing digital forensic tools in a distributed environment.  
This is evaluated in 8.7.4; 
5. To evaluate the prototype system using representative case data.  
This is evaluated in 8.7.5. 
It should be emphasised that the project is intend to develop a platform for upon which 
forensic tools can run, not the tools themselves, although we do intended to utilise some 
simple forensic Linux utilities to demonstrate the viability of the architecture.  
1.3.6 Contributions to Research 
The move to distributed processing for forensic analysis has not been as rapid as one might 
have expected a decade ago. It seems that a potential blockage in its development and 
adoption, is that the distributed storage of data, required to enjoy the full advantages of the 
distributed processing, has not been implemented to the satisfaction of the stakeholders who 
would be expected to challenge any change of processing paradigm. This research offers a 
release to this blockage by specifically addressing assurance in a distributed storage 
system. 
1.3.7 Research Methodology 
We have chosen to use ‘Design Research’ as a methodology for this project. It is frequently 
used within engineering and has been growing in popularity in the last few decades because 
of its alignment with a desire to produce a result that can be applied to real world problems. 
The methodology and its implementation are described in detail in chapter 2. 
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1.3.8 Deliverables 
We will produce this dissertation and an implementation of the system as a VMWare image 
based on Ubuntu to enable future researchers and developers to have a base upon which to 
further the work. 
The VMWare image can also be used to generate a LiveCD to enable a cluster to be built 
with the minimum of effort. 
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1.4 Research Map 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
This section contains a roadmap to the rest of the document. During the research phase, it 
became apparent that this subject was multi-disciplinary. It draws together threads from a 
number of initially diverse subject areas and the chain of thought is not always clear. The 
next 7 sections describe the focus of the full section and offer a description of the contents. 
1.5.1 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the subject area and covered that background to the problem. The 
case was made for the research strategy and the motivation, goals and objectives were 
described. 
1.5.2 Chapter 2 – Research Methodology 
In chapter 2 we present an extensive justification of our research methodology. We use a 
framework proposed by Ferris to select a methodology based on a scorecard system. 
Having chosen a Design method, we describe the process and consider the opportunities 
and risks associated with this technique. Agile is selected as a design method framework  
1.5.3 Chapter 3 – A Background to Forensic Soundness 
We start by considering Forensic Soundness in a general form, as it is implemented in both 
Analogue and Digital environments. Procedures considered as to be best practice are not a 
static set of rules. They have evolved over the last century. They continue to evolve, and 
have been influenced by thinking in domains such as quality assurance in the last 50 years. 
They are derived from the competing interests of all those connected with the investigation, 
the evidence and the calibre of the proceedings in legal procedure and so we will, briefly, 
place the current dilemma in the context of history and introduce the stakeholders. No 
solution can be considered complete without an understanding of the needs of the 
stakeholders. We become more specific in our definition of what actions can be taken to 
provide and increase Assurance and we assess the applicability of existing standards such 
as ISO 17025 and 27037, and how they are applied in this domain. 
1.5.4 Chapter 4 – The Technical Perspective 
In chapter 4, we explain the nature of the disruptive forces over the last 10 years and how 
they have caused the need for change. We describe the various solutions to these problems 
and conclude that Distributed Processing is the most promising. 
We then assess some existing Distributed Systems for suitability in processing digital 
forensics. We suggest that in the next few years the current practice of ‘imaging the entire 
media’ will no longer be sustainable. We introduce a solution that moves away from ‘The 
Image’ to adopt Digital Evidence Containers but conclude that these will not attain the levels 
of assurance that have been established over the last two decades without full support from 
the operating system 
Introduction 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  12 | P a g e  
1.5.5 Chapter 5 – Designing an Extensible Digital Forensic Investigations 
Solution 
In our Design criteria, we explain the thought process upon which we base our design. We 
identify 18 specific problems and provide a brief explanation of the reasons for the problem. 
We conclude chapter 5 with a brief outline of the solution. 
1.5.6 Chapter 6 – FCluster and Components 
Chapter 6 introduces our solution FCluster and its component parts, Jigsaw Imaging, 
Prioritisation, FClusterfs. Jigsaw imaging is a novel non-linear imaging process that feeds 
the distributed processing cluster. We describe, in detail, FClusterfs, the middleware FUSE 
file system then how FClusterfs is the controlling force behind the access, movement and 
processing of data in an Assured environment 
1.5.7 Chapter 7 - Implementation and the Test Rigs 
In chapter 7, we describe the development environment and the test/evaluation environment 
that developed as a result. We also describe our selection of test data. 
1.5.8 Chapter 8 - Evaluation 
In Chapter 8, we undertake an evaluation of our proposal. We reject a numeric approach, 
choosing instead a qualitative evaluation of FCluster against a number of measures. Firstly, 
against our own criteria set out in chapter 4. We evaluate against the ACPO guidelines v5 
and ISO 27037. We identified a paper by Daniel Ayers as a key document in our background 
in chapter 3. We consider our design against Daniel Ayers criteria. Finally, we evaluate as a 
candidate for compliance with OAIS ISO 14721. 
1.5.9 Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Further Work 
In chapter 9, we draw together all the previous work into a summary and identify gaps and 
possibilities for future work. 
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2 Research Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This research project is primarily concerned with the technical aspects of high performance 
processing of digital evidence but the solution must be recognised in the context of a larger 
system. The scope of the project has been clearly defined setting the boundaries of the 
project work but it would be negligent to completely ignore the wider implications.  
The core of the work is to design, build and evaluate a system specifically tailored to process 
digital information in a manner that is acceptable to the ultimate users – the legal profession. 
It is all too common for real world IT projects to fail. A report in 2011, produced by Oxford 
University in conjunction the McKinnsey Consultancy (Budzier & Flyvbjerg 2011), reports 
time overruns in 50% of large IT projects and  budget overruns in 7%. Although the report 
accepts figures are highly questionable, being supplied by voluntary participation, it does 
contain figures of complete cancellation rates of 25%. The report highlights so called 
“Optimism Bias and Black Swan Blindness” where unexpected events have a major impact 
and it is argued, with hindsight, that they could have been foreseen if greater care had been 
taken. In a derived ‘Feature Article’ from the McKinnsey Consultancy ‘Software’ projects are 
often prone to 80% benefits shortfall over ‘non-Software’ projects. When IT executives were 
asked for their thoughts on the reasons for the failures ‘Missing Focus’, ‘Unclear Objectives, 
and ‘Lack of Business Focus’ were collectively rated highest at 30%. An ‘Unrealistic 
Schedule’ featured in about 25%. ‘Content Issues’ of ’Shifting Requirements’ and ‘Technical 
Complexity’ were next at about 20%. ‘Skills Issues’ were next with about 13%.  
With this in mind, it would be prudent to at least attempt to plan this project in some detail. 
Clearly, from the above ‘Missing Focus’ is highly significant in the success of any project. It is 
now common for large organisations to have a ‘mission statement’ to act as a focus and 
guiding light to maintain the direction of the enterprise.  
2.2 The selection of an appropriate methodology 
In “On the Methods of Research for Systems Engineering” (Ferris 2009), Timothy Ferris 
draws on classical philosophy to derive a series of questions to help in the selection of a 
research method of a particular project. 
In Table 1- Ferris’ Questions (Ferris 2009), we work though the questions and provide 
answers. 
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Dimension   Questions  Answer 
Meta-dimensional questions What is the subject matter of the proposed project? Digital Forensic Data Processing 
Why will the proposed project be done? To contribute to the subject domain and so attain a 
PhD 
Who will do the proposed project? This is the sole work of the candidate 
For whom will the proposed project be done? For the examiners and the digital forensic 
community 
When are the results of the proposed project required? The Thesis must be submitted by April 2015 
Where will the proposed project be done? At the University of South Wales 
Desiderata D1 - Is the proposed project intended to make a significant 
contribution to the theory of the field? 
No. 
D2 - Is the proposed project intended to make a significant 
contribution to the practice of the field? 
Yes  
Relation to knowledge K1 - Is the knowledge expected in the proposed project 
primarily desired for its intrinsic value? 
No. It is applied research intended to be used to 
create a real world product at a later date. 
K2 - Is the knowledge expected in the proposed project 
primarily desired for its instrumental value as means to 
achieve something else? 
Yes 
Person who benefits P1 - Is the primary beneficiary of knowledge expected in 
the proposed project the researcher? 
No 
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Dimension   Questions  Answer 
P2 - Is the primary beneficiary of knowledge expected in 
the proposed project people other than the researcher? 
Yes, but I might become a developer 
View of certainty of knowledge C1 - Does the proposed project presuppose that the 
knowledge to be developed concerns matters which 
objectively exist? 
Yes, it improves on existing system designs 
C2 - Does the proposed project presuppose that the 
knowledge to be developed concerns matters which are 
constructs of the community? 
No 
View of tradition T1 - Does the proposed project presuppose that the 
existing framework of the field should be used as a 
foundation? 
There are principles, namely, ACPO, that need to be 
respected but it is likely that this will challenge 
existing frameworks as it will most likely change one 
paradigm; that of the need for a single, master 
Forensic image. 
T2 - Does the proposed project presuppose that the 
existing framework of the field should be rejected or 
vigorously challenged? 
No 
Table 1- Ferris’ Questions (Ferris 2009) 
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And so we get < D2, K2, P2, C1, T1 >, which from Ferris’ work describes a Design Project. 
“Design is an engineering research method in which the researcher 
addresses a problem which is important and novel through the activity of 
designing a solution. In a design research project the researcher finds 
means to solve the problem, thereby developing practice, and the 
knowledge developed is primarily developed for practical application with 
the possibility of some theoretical development as an additional outcome. 
The focus of design research is the development of knowledge which 
benefits others. The knowledge developed in design is certain because it 
concerns what does or does not work, in the context of a project seeking to 
deliver means to address a defined goal. The methods and knowledge used 
in design research are normally within the normal patterns established 
within the discipline, with the novelty being in either or both of the 
problem addressed or the exact combination of methods used to satisfy 
the objective.” 
As part of the University of Alberta’s CMPUT Teaching & Research Methods Course in 2007, 
Amaral et al. (Amaral 2007) write that there are several models that could be employed in 
Computing Science Research. Of methodologies listed in the paper, Formal, Experimental, 
Build, Process and Model, the “Build” approach is certainly nearest the spirit of Ferris’ 
classification. Amaral describes it as: 
“A “build” research methodology consists of building an artifact — either a 
physical artifact or a software system — to demonstrate that it is possible. 
To be considered research, the construction of the artifact must be new or 
it must include new features that have not been demonstrated before in 
other artifacts.” 
It then goes on the further define the stages of a build methodology as  
• Design the software System; 
• Reuse components; 
• Choose an adequate programming language; 
• Consider testing all the time. 
Amaral stresses the need for documentation and the need to “think before you build”. He 
also suggests that the use of “text based data and communications formats” simplify testing 
and that “defining small interfaces increases flexibility and reuse potential”. 
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In his course notes on research in Computing Science (Johnson n.d.), Chris Johnson calls 
this “Proof by demonstration” and suggests that it has much in common with accepted 
methods used in engineering practice. He points out “there are many reasons why this 
approach is an unsatisfactory model for research. The main objection is that it carries high 
risks”. This is most certainly true. This project is of a sufficient duration and ambition that it is 
not possible to foresee all eventualities and there could come a point at which an 
insurmountable problem, either because of complexity, resources or internal conflict, it is not 
possible to complete a prototype with sufficient functionality to be subjected to constructive 
evaluation. Johnson writes “The key problem here is that the iterative development of an 
artefact, in turn, requires a method or structure”. 
2.3 The Design Science Research Framework 
Adopting an established research framework would certainly help with attaining ‘Focus’ for 
this project. In “The Design Science Research Process: A Model For Producing And 
Presenting Information Systems Research” (Peffers et al. 2006), Ken Peffers et al. use the 
term Design Science Research to describe a newly emerging research methodology (new in 
2006 when compared with far more established fields of research).  
“We sought to design a design science research process (DSRP) model that 
would meet three objectives: it would be consistent with prior literature, it 
would provide a nominal process model for doing DS research, and it would 
provide a mental model for presenting and appreciating DS research in IS. 
The process includes six steps:  problem identification and motivation, 
objectives for a solution, design and development, evaluation, and 
communication.” 
  
Figure 3 - DSRP framework 
The DSRP model, shown in Figure 3, is highly abstracted and so needs elaboration for this 
project. If this project used the DSRP model, this project would initiate with the “Problem 
Centred Approach” entry point. This would be evident in those chapters within this thesis 
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concerned with “Introduction” and “literature search”. Peffers does not specify at which stage 
a hypothesis is developed or at which stage an evaluation criterion is established. It does 
seem sensible if this was included in the “Objectives of a solution” model. Peffers has one 
large model “Design and Development”. This could be a single high risk area but it is 
included within a larger loop of “Iterate back to design”. Perhaps the model could benefit with 
greater emphasis on this iteration within the model. Peffers gives no indication of the rate for 
Design/Demonstration/Evaluation cycle, presumably leaving it to the individual researcher or 
project to dictate. 
Alternatively, there is a model presented by Pillipp Offermann et al. at DESRIST in 2009 
(Offermann et al. 2009) and shown in Figure 4. This develops on the same sources as 
Peffers. Offermann’s model but splits the literature search into two stages. The first is as part 
of the problem identification and the seconds is as part of the solution design stage. This is 
better in that it suggests that the design could be refined while in progress. This is certainly 
an advantage, if not a necessity, in a rapidly developing domain such as distributed 
processing.  
  
Figure 4 - Design Science Research Process 
From “outline of a Design Science research Process”  
This project will follow a fusion of these two models. 
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2.4 Risk management when building an artefact. 
As Johnson identifies (Johnson n.d.) that when assessing what he calls “Proof By 
Demonstration” as a model for research - “However, there are many reasons why this 
approach is an unsatisfactory model for research. The main objection is that it carries high 
risks”. Having completed the initial literature research stage and an initial assessment of 
possible solutions, it seems likely that risk in this project could be managed, and so reduced, 
by breaking down the system into modules. For example, there is clearly a data acquisition 
stage and a data distribution stage. There are audit requirements and also system 
redundancy requirements. At this stage these seem to be independent of each other and 
could be designed, developed and evaluated independently using some type of software 
maturity model (Various 2013a). This implies some incremental approach to developing the 
individual modules. Perhaps each module could be the subject of independent development 
cycles, shown in Figure 5. 












       
High        
Developed        
Simplistic        
None        
Figure 5 -  Project Module Maturity Model 
Each of the units of work could be the subject of its own development cycle of Design, Build, 
Evaluate and Revue, shown in Figure 6. These loops are based on the Deming cycle of 
Plan, Do, Check Act (Various 2013b) introduced in the 1950s. This cyclical nature does not 
lend itself to heavy-weight programming project styles like Waterfall, introduced in the 1950s, 
which is characterised by a more rigid sequence of “Requirements”, “Design”, 
Implementation”, “Verification” and “Maintenance”.  
2.4.1 Agile programming and project management 
In recent years, a more dynamic, light-weight, style has been used in highly dynamic 
software project. Characterised by ‘Agile’, the approach is highly focused on producing a 
steady stream of valued outputs along the development line. 
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Figure 6 - Spiral Modules 
2.4.2 The scale of the resources and the need for a simple, flexible 
framework 
This may seem to be overly complex for the work of a single person but this is a project that 
represents 4,500 hours of work, a fixed financial budget, and a very specific timeframe. Agile 
is an ideal management model for these micro tasks. 
2.4.3 Agile programming and The Agile Agenda as a research model 
Agile has been evaluated as a model for research in Computer Science by Way, 
Chandraekhar and Murthy (Way et al. 2009). The family of Agile methods are based on 
iterative design processes that stand juxtaposed to the more rigid design and project 
management methods embodies in Waterfall and Prince2 for example. Although iterative 
approaches date back to the 1950s, Agile emerged in the late 1990s and is founded on the 
Agile Manifesto that was published in 2001 (Beedle 2001). There have been many 
popularised forms including Scrum and Extreme programming. Agile focuses on producing 
rapid development and adapting to a changing environment. Agile methodologies have a 
strong emphasis on continuous improvement. Way et al have wide experience of both 
industry and academic research and conclude that Agile has many feature well suited to 
academic research but there are some that are not. As a consequence they publish their 
“Agile Research Penultimatum”. There are 12 principles adapted from the original template. 
1.  Our highest priority is to perform quality research through consistent effort 
and regular publication; 
2.  Welcome the unexpected, although better early than late in the process. 
Agile research processes enable early discovery, so care should be taken to 
minimize change later; 
3.  Maintain research documentation continually, updating a notebook or wiki as 
work is done and discoveries are made; 
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4.  Faculty advisors and graduate students must meet weekly or regularly 
throughout the project; 
5.  Build projects around shared research goals that motivate faculty and 
student alike. Establish a work environment to support their individual needs, 
and trust them to get the job done; 
6.  The most efficient and effective method of conveying information to and 
within a research team is face-to-face conversation, but email, instant-
messaging, wikis and blogs are essential media, as well; 
7.  Published papers, technical reports, literature surveys and working research 
software are the primary measures of progress; 
8.  Agile research processes adapt to the highly variable nature of the academic 
schedule, recognizing that the pace will vary dramatically over the course of 
a project; 
9.  Continuous attention to proper citation, short- and long-range planning, and 
maintaining forward momentum enhances research productivity; 
10.  Simplicity is a worthwhile goal, yet recognizing when complex problems 
often require complicated solutions is essential; 
11.  The best research emerges from self-motivated, highly-organized teams of 
one or more, yet chaos also can be an ally to discovery; 
12.  At regular intervals, individuals reflect on the effectiveness of their 
contribution to the team and adjust their behaviour accordingly;   
Some do not apply to this project, as the team is just one person but most do. 
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2.5 Our finalised project strategy 
The finalised project strategy and methodology is shown in Figure 7. 
  
Figure 7 - Project Strategy 
2.6 Conclusions 
In chapter 2, we considered the issue of choosing an appropriate methodology for this 
research. Using a questionnaire, we were able to deduce that a design research 
methodology was most suitable. We then explored how this could be implemented and 
raised the issue of the risk of project failure and proposed a means of reducing that risk. 
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3 A Background to Forensic Soundness 
In this chapter, we present the non-technical threads that come together to underpin this 
particular problem. We start by taking a broad view of forensic soundness in the analogue 
world. For more than 100 years, forensics has been applied to our analogue world. Suitable 
techniques have been developed to assure high standards of quality when processing 
analogue matter. There are however, significant differences when we consider the nature of 
digital information. Digital information can be copied and modified without detection. We 
consider the standards that have been developed over the last century, with particular 
emphasis on the last 10 years. These standards have been applied within digital forensics 
but are under strain because of the increase in the volume of data needing to be processed. 
We conclude this chapter with a consideration of the consequences on digital forensics’ 
ability to deliver a quality server in the future. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the broadest sense, forensics can be said to be the study and presentation of information 
intended to, or at least assist in, proving or refuting an argument. A frequently used definition 
is that it “involves the preservation, identification, documentation and interpretation of 
computer data” (Kruse & Heiser 2001).  
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) defined computer forensics as 
involving “the scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital evidence in legal 
matters” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 2005). Our interpretation, within this 
text, is that it will be in the context of a legal framework. 
3.2 Forensic Soundness in the Analogue World 
Whereas digital forensics is a relatively new subject, perhaps only 20 years old, analogue 
forensics, has a history of more than a century. Therefore, we start the research into the 
characteristics of assurance within digital forensics by looking at the nature of analogue and 
digital evidence. We then turn to the standards and practices developed in the analogue 
world with a review of the legal view on the presentation of forensic evidence in court. These 
are based on standards and guidelines drawn up within the subject area and so we then 
review the relevant ISO standards. These standards are not static and so we outline the 
changes in thinking that have been used when writing the standards, namely the move from 
audit to assurance in the last 20 years. 
3.2.1 The Analogue World 
We live in an analogue universe. In the analogue world, there is no black and white, only 
shades of grey. Nothing is pure. Although concepts like absolute zero exist, it may never be 
achievable in the real world. In the real world, there is always error and randomness. 
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As an example of information in the analogue world, we could take a painting. 
 
Figure 8 – The Treachery of Images - Rene Magritte – 1929 
This famous painting by Rene Magritte, shown in Figure 8, (Magritte 1929) was used by Dan 
Farmer (2005) as the cover design for “Forensic Discovery”. He gives no explanation within 
his text as to his choice but clearly there must have been some thought process behind its 
selection. 
Magritte was making the point that there is a higher meaning to the arrangement of oil on the 
canvas rather than just a pattern of colours and shades. It is not a pipe; it is a picture of a 
pipe but we take it as a pipe. 
Magritte’s original is owned by the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and is unique. It is an 
oil painting on canvas. Prints have been made and are on display at many galleries around 
the world. No doubt, great care has been taken to reproduce the colours to the same as the 
original but none will succeed in a perfect reproduction in this analogue world. The 
composition of the oil used today will be slightly different to that used in 1929. It is possible to 
recreate something very similar but not identical. In the 80 years since the oil paint was 
made, mixed and applied to the canvas, which was also made in the 1920s, various 
chemical reactions have taken place. In effect, contamination has occurred. In fact, the 
colours in the original painting will have changed. It is likely that the original is stored in a 
climate-controlled environment that is intended to reduce to a minimum of chemical 
interaction within the oil. It would be expected that regular checks be made to ensure that the 
painting is not decaying beyond an expected boundary. In the analogue world, decay is 
inevitable; it cannot be stopped, only controlled. The analogue world is one with entropy. 
3.2.2 Forensic Evidence in the Courts of England and United States 
We now look at the subject from the view of the final customer, the legal system. From the 
late 1800s, increasing amounts of evidence derived from expert analysis was being 
presented in the English and American courts. As it became more common, a more formal 
framework was needed to assess the credibility and admissibility of the evidence and the 
methods behind its derivation. 
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The courts of the United Kingdom, The United states and number of other countries, usually 
ex-British Empire countries, are linked by their use of ‘The Common Law’ system. Within the 
Common Law judicial systems, that of the United States stands out because it has 
formalised the criteria for judging the admissibility of evidence into the proceedings. In a 
similar way as the United States has a written constitution and the United Kingdom has not, 
so the United States has a written code on the acceptance of evidence in court. The 
question of the quality of forensic evidence was raised in the United States nearly a century 
ago. Subsequently, we will assess the United States system first. 
3.2.2.1 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
The ruling in Frye v. United States, in 1923, was concerned with the admissibility of 
polygraph tests as evidence shortly after their invention in 1921 (International League of 
Polygraph Examiners 2014). It established the president that evidence presented in court 
should be based upon scientific techniques. Although a number of States still adhere to the 
Frye standard, from 1923, most have been superseded by the adoption of the Daubert 
Standard in 1993.  
3.2.2.2 The Daubert Standard 
Daubert mostly clarifies the principle set out in Frye. 
The Daubert standard provides a rule of evidence in the US courts based on three United 
States Supreme Court cases (Cornell University 2014). 
• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which held 
that the Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which accepted certain 
types of evidence, for example first hand testimony, as automatically 
admissible, did not apply to scientific expert testimony; 
• General Electric Co v Joiner 522 U.S. 136 (1997) which held that district 
court judge may exclude evidence when there are gaps between the 
expert’s evidence and the judge’s own conclusions; 
• That in Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 U.S. 137 (1999) that the judge’s 
discretion is applicable in all expert testimony including non-scientific 
evidence. 
Daubert establishes the Judge as the gatekeeper on the admissibility of evidence and 
provides a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the reliability of 
scientific expert testimony. 
‘Daubert’ asks: 
• Whether the expert is presenting evidence within their field of expertise; 
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• Whether the experts conclusions are a justifiable conclusion from their 
analysis; 
• Whether the expert can account for alternative explanations; 
• Whether the expert has been rigorous in their application of their expertise; 
• Whether the field of expertise claimed is known to reach reliable results, “is 
it scientific”? 
• Whether Empirical testing has been used, in that the technique is testable, 
refutable or falsifiable; 
• Whether it has been subject to peer review; 
• The degree to which the technique and theory is accepted by the relevant 
scientific community; 
• Whether there is a known or potential error rate; 
• Are there formal standards and controls concerning its operation. 
Daubert does not attempt to set forth explicit procedural requirements for exercising the trial 
court's gatekeeping function over expert testimony. It makes no mention of how evidence is 
handled but it is reasonable to assume that the way in which evidential material is identified, 
collected and stored is part of ‘being rigorous’ in the application of the witness’s expertise. 
It is obvious that a trial judge cannot be an expert in every field of evidence and so we are 
left in a situation where Forensic Soundness becomes an issue of ‘what is acceptable’ in a 
particular case as viewed by the judge. It is a question of what is ‘Best Practice’ in a field.  
3.2.3 Evidence in the English Court 
As in the American Court, the final decision as to the admissibility of expert evidence in the 
English court is made by the judge. However, there are a number of subtle differences in the 
English courts when compared with the American courts. Firstly, expert evidence is not 
admissible if it is on a subject that would be within the expected knowledge of the jurors. For 
example in R v Browning (1995 Crim LR 227) an expert was not allowed to testify on the 
matter of the expect deterioration of memory in ordinary healthy individuals as they age. 
However, expert evidence was accepted as to the reliability of memory from a subject under 
hypnosis (R v Land 1998 1 Cr App 301). The Daubert standard has been acknowledged in 
the English legal system but no similar standard has been formally applied. In R v Gilfoyle 
([2001] 2 Cr App R 5) the court seemed to suggest that where expert evidence could not be 
independently reviewed by any given criteria it would be inadmissible. Later in R v Dallagher 
(2002 EWCA Crim 1903) this was expanded on and evidence was admitted despite not 
being widely accepted as reliable in the expert community. 
The current situation seems to be that after R v Luttrell ([2004] 2 Cr App R 520 ) it is up to 
the judge to decide if the jury is capable of deciding the reliability of the expert and their 
testimony and, if so, allow the evidence with an appropriate caution about weighting. 
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It should be clear that when comparing the practices in the English and United States courts 
that no rigid rules have been created to dictate practices and procedures when analysing 
evidence for presentation in court. Instead, it is up to the judge to oversee reasonableness. 
No doubt, they look to established standards and relevant institutions for guidance in 
drawing up their criteria. 
3.2.4 Standards for Analogue Forensics 
In the UK, the governance of forensic services is overseen by the Forensic Science 
Regulator (FSR) (H M Government 2014). The FSR was created in 2008.  
The FSR recently published the “Codes of Practice and Conduct” (Forensic Science 
Regulator 2011) for forensics expert evidence presented in the English court. The 
introduction of the Code of Conduct is driven by the European Union Council Framework 
Decision 2009/905/JHA on accreditation of forensic service providers carrying out laboratory 
activities concerning DNA analysis. 
This is based upon a number of ISO standards and includes the notification that “Forensic 
Science Laboratories” in the UK will have to conform to ISO 17025:2005 “General 
requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories” (ISO 2005) over 
next few years.  
In his introduction, the head of the Authority, Andrew Rennison, does acknowledge that there 
is still debate as to the applicability of ISO 17025 to particular disciplines but clearly, he 
acknowledges it is a key document.  
The focus on the use of ISO 17025:2005 seems largely driven by the need to attain 
conformance for the activities of scientific laboratories conducting work on analogue 
evidence such as firearms, fingerprints, DNA samples, marks and toxicology. 
Because these standards need to be used in dynamic environments and, in the case of ISO 
standards, in a number of differing jurisdictions, none of these standards is prescriptive. 
They tend to use vague language like “competent” and rarely define exactly what that 
means. Section 5.2.1 – Human Factors, of ISO 17025 is a typical example. 
“The laboratory management shall ensure the competence of all who 
operate specific equipment, perform tests and/or calibrations, evaluate 
results, and sign test reports and calibration certificates. When using staff 
who are undergoing training, appropriate supervision shall be provided. 
Personnel performing specific tasks shall be qualified on the basis of 
appropriate education, training, experience and/or demonstrated skills, as 
required.” 
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3.2.5 ISO 17025:2005 
ISO 17025:2005 is often used as the basis for “Chain of Evidence” procedures in analogue 
forensics labs. This suggests that forensic laboratories are seen as places that conduct 
prescribed tests and produce a set of results. Although ISO 17025 is not prescriptive, it is 
useful to return to it to assess its scope. It includes: 
• Human Factors (section 5.2 of ISO 17025) including competence, provision 
of on-going training, supervision, clearly defined tasks and responsibility; 
• Accommodation and environmental conditions (section 5.3 of ISO 17025); 
the working environment should be adequate to support the analysis work 
undertaken. There should be environmental monitoring. There should be 
separation between areas that have incompatible activities. There should 
be good housekeeping in the laboratory; 
• Test and calibration methods and method validation (section 5.4 of ISO 
17025); There should be appropriate testing and calibration of equipment 
that meets the needs of the customers. These should be based on 
international standards and/or the manufacture’s own standards and 
procedures. Where formal methods do not exist, new methods should be 
established and validated. 
 
Methods used in analysis should be selected to meet the needs of the 
customers and be of a suitably high quality. There is provision for non-
standard tests, in that they must be validated first. 
o Selection of Methods (5.4.2 of ISO 17025) 
o Laboratory-developed methods (5.4.3 of ISO 17025) 
o Non-standard methods (5.4.4 of ISO 17025) 
o Validation of Methods (5.4.5 of ISO 17025) 
o Estimation of Uncertainty (5.4.6 of ISO 17025) 
o Control of Data (5.4.7 of ISO 17025); 
• Equipment (section 5.5 of ISO 17025); the laboratory should have 
equipment which is at least adequate for the job. It should meet the 
required accuracy. Equipment should be uniquely identified. Equipment 
operated outside of the nominal levels should be subject to further 
conformance testing; 
• Measurement traceability (section 5.6 of ISO 17025); Equipment should be 
calibrated as per the manufacturer’s and International System of Units’ 
instructions. The laboratory should use reference standards. 
• Sampling (section 5.7 of ISO 17025); the laboratory should have a 
sampling plan; 
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• The handling of test and calibration items (section 5.8 of ISO 17025). Test 
and calibration sample should be handled and protected in a suitable 
manner; 
• Assuring the quality of test and calibration results (5.9 of ISO 17025); 
• Reporting the Results (5.10 of ISO 17025). 
The words ‘assure’, ‘assuring’ or ‘assured’ appears a number of times in ISO 17025:2005. All 
ISO standards that describe management practices are formed around the concept of 
assurance as distinct from audit. It is important to clarify the difference. 
3.2.6 From Audit to Assurance 
During the 1960s, the Japanese introduced the idea of total quality assurance. The most 
important feature of this was that controls were introduced before an action took place, not 
after. 
The dictionary definitions (Dictionary.com 2014) give a sense of the retrospective nature of 
an audit and the future intent of Assurance. 
Audit (noun) 
  1. an official examination and verification of accounts and 
records, especially of financial accounts.  
  2.   a report or statement reflecting an audit;  
      a final statement of account.  
Assurance (noun) 
  1. a positive declaration intended to give confidence;  
    a promise. 
synonyms: word of honour, word, guarantee, promise, pledge, vow, avowal, oath, bond, affirmation, undertaking, 
commitment 
  2 confidence or certainty in one's own abilities. 
synonyms: self-confidence, confidence, self-assurance, belief in oneself, faith in oneself, positiveness, 
assertiveness,  self-possession, self-reliance, nerve, poise, aplomb, presence of mind, phlegm, level-headedness, 
cool-headedness 
 
Japanese production lines did not produce faulty goods because faulty components were not 
allowed to enter the production line. The effect of this change on the industrial base of the 
western world is a matter of history. During the 1970s and 1980s, products from Japan 
surged leaving their North American and European competition behind, being viewed as 
unreliable. Modern management systems like Total Quality Management and Six-Sigma 
have their focus on controlling inputs and processes during the manufacturing process. 
Increases in quality, and customer satisfaction, are natural consequences of this approach. 
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In its terms and definitions, 3.2.11, ISO 9001:2008 (ISO 2012c) defines quality assurance as 
“A part of quality management focused on providing confidence that quality requirements will 
be fulfilled”. 
Assurance would, more than likely use an audit as a means of establishing faith or belief in 
the system but an audit trail is not assurance. 
3.2.7 Assurance as a 3-tier model 
Assurance is often expressed as a three-tier model, Figure 9, taken from Military doctrine 
(Griffith 1963): 
 
Figure 9 - Strategy Tactics and Operations 
Strategy*: is the high-level plan: from the Greek stratēgía generalship, equivalent to stratēg 
(ós) military commander, general, a plan, method, or series of manoeuvres or stratagems for 
obtaining a specific goal or result: 
Tactics* are a more specific implementation: from the Greek taktikós fit for arranging or 
ordering, implemented as one or more specific tasks, (used with a plural verb) the 
manoeuvres themselves. 
Operations*: from the Latin, operātiōn- (stem of operātiō), equivalent to operāt (us) a 
process, method, or series of acts, especially of a practical or mechanical nature 
Operations are more detailed than tactics, which in turn, are more detailed than strategy. 
ISO management standards focus on the strategic level and leave interpretation of this into 
tactics and operations to the implementer. This is simultaneously an advantage and 
disadvantage. It enables the advantage of flexibility for the implementer but at the same time 
lacks specifics upon which operations can be implemented. 
Having failed to establish a clear criteria for assurance in analogue forensics we now 
complicate it further by revealing that there are significant differences between analogue and 
digital data. 
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3.3 Representing the analogue world in a digital form 
As we saw, briefly in section 3.2.1, that the real world is analogue. The representation of the 
real world in a digital form is a human construct. There are many advantages in this 
representation. Digital data is black or white, ones or zeroes. Unlike analogue material, with 
appropriate safeguards and error checking, digital data can be replicated with the certainty 
that the replica is truly identical. Digital data is distinct from analogue material in that two 
items of digital data can exist in proximity without the risk of contamination.  
We can illustrate the distinction between the storage of data in digital form and the 
information it represents by returning to the work by Magritte. 
Figure 10 - Reworking of “The Treachery of Images”, is clearly not an exact facsimile of the 
original but does convey the same meaning. The colour has been removed and is probably a 
slightly different size. The data is now different but the meaning remains. 
 
Figure 10 - Reworking of “The Treachery of Images” 
Ironically, these images now display another aspect to the information content that Magritte 
could never have realised at the time of painting but may have seen towards the end of his 
life in 1967. As a necessity of the production of this document on a word processor, both of 
these images have been stored in a digital form. As such, they can be reproduced endlessly 
without any change at all to the digital pattern. Both files, the digital representations of the 
images above, co-exist on the surface of this computer, within this document and will be on 
any computer that is used to read this document. Each copy is true to the original digital 
version. It must be noted that although the original digital file will remain unchanged, the 
exact reproduction of both files, on the screen or paper, is dependent on the software used 
to decode the file. 
It was easy to change the file and consequently the image. The original file was loaded into a 
graphics package, a few buttons were clicked and the results saved. If we chose, we could 
try to convince someone that the result was the picture painted by Magritte. There is 
normally nothing in the JPG file format to record that changes have been made to an 
original.  
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When digitising a continuous analogue source, there will always be a degree of error 
because of an effect called quantisation. However, once made, the digital version can be 
reproduced and stored endlessly without any reduction in its integrity. The question of what 
is original has deepened with David Hockney’s recent work on his iPad (Hockney 2015). 
The understanding that the nature of digital data is in some ways fundamentally different to 
analogue data implies the model of assurance drawn-up for analogue forensic needs to be 
different too. 
The differences in the fundamental characteristics of digital when compared with analogue 
means that some criteria that have been applied to build assurance in analogue forensics do 
not apply to digital forensics, some extra criteria are needed in digital forensics and some 
remain present in both. 
3.4 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
The notions of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) are often used as the founding 
principles of information security even ISO 27001:2013 (ISO 2013) defines Information 
Security as “preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information”. Its 
components are defined individually as part of ISO 27001:2013’s definitions of terms. 
There are seven relevant definitions with ISO 27001:2013. 
3.4.1 Confidentiality 
The definition of confidentiality is derived from ISO/IEC 7498-2 (ISO 2014) to be the 
“Property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, 
entities, or processes”. Confidentiality is typically provided by encryption and control over 
access to the data throughout its life cycle. To what degree access control is enforced, 
depends on the nature of the data, the environment in which the data is acquired and stored 
and the nature of the authority given to individuals. In section 1.3.5, our aims and objectives, 
the usage environment was set as a regional crime forensic lab with about 100-host cluster. 
This architecture may be extended off site to include cloud services and could include a 
facility to allow remote access to the system. Subsequently encryption standards should be 
strong, typically AES-256. 
3.4.2 Integrity 
Integrity is derived from ISO 13335-1:2004 (ISO 2004) where it is defined as the “property of 
safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets”. This is, perhaps, the most 
important in our quest for an acceptable solution to support forensic processing in a 
distributed environment. It is essential that the original file remains unchanged from 
acquisition to processing. This is usually achieved by applying combinations of MD-5, SHA-1 
and SHA-256 crypto hashes. 
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3.4.3 Availability 
Availability is derived from ISO/IEC 7498-2 as “Being the property of being accessible and 
usable upon demand by an authorized entity”. Within the context of this thesis, this is mostly 
focused on system failure and redundancy. If the likelihood of the failure of a single device is 
said to be f1 then the likelihood of a failure occurring in n devices is the product of the f1_fn. 
As n increases so does the chance of a failure. In a large cluster, failure of individual 
components is almost certain and so it is common practice to address failure by replication 
of resources.  
3.4.4 Non-Repudiation 
The CIA acronym has been extended to include a new principle – non-repudiation. ISO 
27001’s definition is  
“[The] ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event [..] or action and its originating 
entities, in order to resolve disputes about the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event [..] 
or action and involvement of entities in the event [..]” 
In a system intended for forensic analysis this could mean that logging needs to be 
implemented. 
Three more definitions within ISO 270001 are relevant: 
3.4.5 An Asset 
The previous definitions refer to the properties on an asset. ISO 27001’s definition of an 
asset is “anything that has value to the organization  
NOTE there are many types of assets, including:  
a) information (2.18);  
b) software, such as a computer program;  
c) physical, such as computer;  
d) services;  
e) people, and their qualifications, skills, and experience; and  
f) intangibles, such as reputation and image.” 
3.4.6 An Event 
ISO 27001’s definition is 2.15 - “[An] occurrence of a particular set of circumstances”.  
3.4.7 Information 
ISO 27001’s definition is “knowledge or data that has value to the organization”. This is 
included to highlight the difference between raw data and the results of processing that data 
to produce useful information. 
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Almost all, more complete concepts in information security and assurance can be measured 
against these definitions. 
3.5 Current Standards and Practices applicable in the UK 
The development of standards and best practices is an organic process that, over time, 
represents the changing thoughts and environment in which the activity, in our case digital 
forensics, takes place. In this section, we review the output of various authorities concerned 
with the collection, analysis and presentation of digital evidence in a Court. This is a 
significantly large field in itself and so we focus on literature directly effecting UK.  
3.5.1 Timeline of documents relevant to the UK 
Table 2 contains a chronological listing of the key legislation, guidelines and standards 
published in the UK that are applicable to digital forensics. A number of events or 
publications are included in the table to place the key documents into an historic perspective. 
Year Organisation Document Notes 
1970 Union Dime 
Savings Bank 
First Computer Crime? *included only for 
background 
1984 Louisiana State 
Police 
Computer Incident CERT *included only for 
background 
1990 UK Gov Computer Misuse Act *included only for 
background 
1998 ACPO Good Practice Guidelines v1  
1998 UK Gov Data Protection Act *included only for 
background 
1998 ISO ISO/IEC 17020:1998 General criteria for 
the operation of 
various types of 
bodies performing 
inspection 
1999 ISO ISO/IEC 17025:1999 Testing and 
calibration labs 
1988 UK Gov The Human Rights Act  
2003 ACPO Good Practice Guidelines v3.0  
2005 ISO ISO/IEC 17025:2005 Testing and 
calibration labs - 
update 




2006 UK Gov Amendments to the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 in amended 
within the Police and Justice 
Act 2006 
*included only for 
background 
2007 ACPO Good Practice Guidelines v4   
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Year Organisation Document Notes 




Code of Practice and Conduct  








acquisition of digital 
evidence 








Addition of the Appendix to the 
Codes of Practice and 
Conduct: Digital Forensic 
Services 
 
Table 2 - Standards and Legislation Directly Relevant to the UK 
3.5.2 ACPO Guidelines 
The ACPO Guidelines on Digital Evidence (ACPO 2014), now in its 5
th
 version, has been 
considered to be the principle reference document concerning the handling of digital 
evidence in the UK. From the first version, it introduced four principles that should guide all 
activities and procedures in an investigation. 
Principle 1:  No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed within 
those agencies or their agents should change data that may subsequently 
be relied upon in court.  
Principle 2:  In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data, 
that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions. 
Principle 3:  An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence 
should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be 
able to examine those processes and achieve the same result.  
Principle 4:  The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for 
ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
From Principle 1, that no change should change data, we normally derive a requirement that 
access to the data should be read-only as soon as possible. Principle 2 is typically applied to 
the actions of a DEFR when collecting digital evidence and a DE when examining a “closed” 
device such as a proprietary embedded device as both situations may require devices to be 
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operated as a user as no facility may exist to take a forensic image. Principle 3 clearly 
mandates that an audit trail must be created and maintained to enable a third party to 
achieve the same result. This implies that an audit trail would be expected to include levels 
of detail such as date and time, investigators identification and the version numbers and 
even serial numbers of particular tools used. Principle 4 is typically applied to a case 
management decision to assess the credibility of a particular process, technique or device 
used during an investigation. 
Although all four principles are relevant and important throughout an investigation, within the 
scope of this research and the subsequent design, principles 1 and 3 are particularly 
significant as they affect the design and operation of the equipment used rather than the 
general conduct of the operatives conducting the investigation.  
Further, on the matter of the collection and storage of evidence, the Guidelines specify that  
“In order to comply with the principles of digital evidence, wherever 
practicable, proportionate and relevant an image should be made of the 
device. This will ensure that the original data is preserved, enabling an 
independent third party to re-examine it and achieve the same result, as 
required by principle 3.” 
 and  
“This may be a physical / logical block image of the entire device, or a 
logical file image containing partial or selective data (which may be 
captured as a result of a triage process). Investigators should use their 
professional judgement to endeavour to capture all relevant evidence if 
this approach is adopted.” 
The practice of taking a digital forensic image was one of the first adopted within digital 
forensics. Unlike any analogue forensics, digital forensics has a unique capability of 
capturing an entire crime scene in one object. If properly collected and stored, this object is 
immutable and verifiable as an identical replica of the original. 
Prior to version 5 in 2012, the ACPO guidelines did not refer to any other external standards. 
Version 5 was published in 2011, the same year as the establishment of the Forensic 
Science Regulator. It does include reference to ISO standards 17025 (ISO 2005) and 17020 
(ISO 2012d) but only in relation to the work of external contractors, not the Police 
themselves. 
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3.5.3 ISO Standards 
There are four ISO standards most frequently applied to digital forensics. 
• ISO/IEC 17020:2012 
Conformity assessment -- Requirements for the operation of various types 
of bodies performing inspection; 
• BS EN ISO/IEC 17025:2005 
General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration 
laboratories; 
• BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013/BS 7799-2:2013 Information technology 
Security techniques. Information security management systems. 
Requirements; 
• BS ISO/IEC 27037:2012 
Information technology. Security techniques. Guidelines for identification, 
collection, acquisition, and preservation of digital evidence. 
3.5.3.1 ISO 17020:2012, ISO 17025:2005 and ISO 27001:2013 
ISO 17020:2012 is a wide-ranging standard that covers many aspects of the management of 
organisations conducting inspections. It is concerned with the organisational and 
administrative aspects of the organisation providing a service. 
ISO 17025:2005, “General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration 
laboratories”, previously assessed in section 3.2.5, is specifically referenced in section 7.3.4 
of the ACPO guide v5. It was written with intention of setting standards of operation for 
laboratories engaged in work with subjects in the analogue world, mainly chemistry and 
physics. 
Although these standards are applicable, in the ACPO guide they are used only in reference 
to the operation of external forensic providers providing services to the Police service. 
The inclusion of a reference to ISO 17025 within the ACPO Guidelines is an indication that 
the authors did accept the association of subject areas but its context in a section about 
external contractors could betray the guidelines author’s inability to apply it to the specific 
domain of digital data. 
ISO 27001:2013 is the ISO standard for the management of information systems. This is 
often used as a framework for the operation of digital forensic laboratories but contains 
nothing of assistance on matters of how to handle and process evidential data. 
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3.5.3.2 ISO 27037:2012 
As a response to the difficulty of applying ISO 17025 to digital evidence, ISO 27037 (ISO 
2012b) was published in 2012 to meet the specific needs of digital rather than analogue 
forensics. 
ISO 27037’s full title is “Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for 
identification, collection, acquisition, and preservation of digital evidence”. It was 
published in 2012, and so, to some degree, supersedes parts of the version 5 of the ACPO 
Guidelines in the specific areas specified in the title. As an international standard, it does not 
deal with preparation, jurisdiction or other matter specifically pertaining to the UK Police, as 
does the ACPO guidelines. There are a number of areas of specific interest. 
3.5.3.3 ISO 27037 components 
Many components of ISO 27037 echo ideas already covered in previous standards such as 
ISO 17025 but specifically focus on the features of digital evidence. Here, in Table 3, we 
review the relevant sections and draw out information specific to digital investigations. 
Auditability 
section 5.3.2 
ISO 27037 states that: 
“It should be possible for an independent assessor or other 
authorized interested parties to evaluate the activities 
performed by a Digital Evidence First Responder (DEFR) 
and Digital evidence Specialist (DES). This will be made 
possible by appropriately documenting all actions taken. 
The DEFR and DES should be able to justify the decision-
making process in selecting a given course of action. 
Processes performed by a DEFR and DES should be 
available for independent assessment to determine if an 
appropriate scientific method, technique or procedure was 
followed.” 
Repeatability 
section 5.3.3 and 
Reproducibility 
section 5.3.4 
Are the same as in ISO 17025:2005, in that repeatability is 
the same action on the same equipment should produce 
the same result and reproducibility means the same action 
on different equipment should produce the same result. 
Justifiability  
section 5.3.5 
This requires that the operator must be able to justify their 




ISO 27037 makes an additional distinction in identification 
over ISO 17025 in that digital evidence needs to be 
identified in both its physical and its logical form. For 
example, both the physical media and the data stored 
upon it need separate identification. 
Collection 
section 5.4.3 and 
Acquisition  
section 5.4.4 
Following on from Identification, ISO 27037 makes a 
distinction between collection, which is the physical 
removal of a device, e.g. hard disk, or the acquisition of the 
data on the device by a suitable acquisition method. The 
most common is ‘imaging’. 
The Background to Forensic Soundness 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  39 | P a g e  
Preservation  
section 5.4.5 and 
7.1.4 
Having collected or acquired the evidence it must be 
preserved. This embodies the principle of Integrity from 
section 3.4.2. This is often achieved by calculating a 
cryptographic hash key for the data, either as a whole or in 
parts. 
ISO 27037 does not refer to any archive of digital evidence 
for long-term storage. 
Chain of Custody  
section 6.1 
“The chain of custody record is a document or series of 
related documents that details the chain of custody and 
records who was responsible for handling potential digital 
evidence, either in the form of digital data or other formats 
(such as paper notes)” 
The Chain of Custody record should contain the following 
information as a minimum. 
• Unique evidence identifier;  
• Who accessed the evidence and the 
time and location it took place;  
• Who checked the evidence in and 
out from the evidence preservation facility and when it 
happened; 
• Why the evidence was checked out 
(which case and the purpose) and the relevant authority, if 
applicable;  
• Any unavoidable changes to the 
potential digital evidence, as well as the name of the 
individual responsible therefore and the justification for the 





This largely addresses the volatile nature of some data in 
digital devices, for example the contents of RAM which will 
be lost if the power is removed. The section does 
acknowledge that “time may be a limiting factor during an 
investigation. In these cases, preference should be given 
to potential digital evidence identified as relevant to the 
specific incident.” 
It is notable that the word ‘triage’ does not appear in the 
standard and the standard gives no further indication of 
methods or techniques to implement this prioritisation. 
The standard does not seem to address the need for 
prioritisation due to the length of time required to process 
the data. 
There is no mention of anything like the ‘The Golden Hour’ 
principle, where evidence found very early on in an 
investigation is of greater utility, found in many Police 





This largely deals with the preservation environment in 
terms of physical contaminants like moisture and 
electromagnetic forces. For example, it specifically 
addresses the need to maintain power on some devices. It 
does not address the issues of long-term archival storage. 
In the US retention rules vary state by state but it is not 
uncommon for them to be unlimited for very serious crimes 
(The National Center of Victims of Crime 2014)  
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Transportation 
6.9.4 
The standard includes text concerning the physical 
transportation of evidence but does not give guidance on 
anything concerning the logical transportation 
(communication) of data via a network, 
Documentation 
section 6.6 
The standard states that every activity should be 
documented. This is focused on the crime scene. 
Table 3 - Relevant Sections of ISO 27037 
Within the Chain of Custody, it treats the “evidence preservation facility” as a single entity but 
common sense suggests that if this were an extensive facility, as would be the case in a 
regional facility, records would need to indicate storage in a subdivision of the facility. 
ISO 27037 does not address any matter in the handling of data during processing and 
analysis. It therefore doesn’t acknowledge that a computer system can have parts. 
3.5.3.4 ISO 27037 stakeholders 
The introduction of the term Stakeholders is often attributed to Freeman (1983). Freeman 
proposes that the term stakeholder supersedes the previously used term, stockholders, and 
represents an acknowledgement that the actions of an organisation affect a wider range of 
parties rather than just the direct owners. 
It is surprising that ISO 27037 identifies only four stakeholders. These are all involved, first 
hand, in the acquisition and investigative process.  
• Digital Evidence First Responders (DEFRs)  
This is the person that gathers the evidence. It could be an employee of a 
company, an outside consultant or a Law Enforcer. Importantly ISO 27037 
implies a separation of function by identifying the Digital Evidence 
Specialist as a separate entity.  
“individual who is authorized, trained and qualified to act first at an 
incident scene in performing digital evidence collection and acquisition 
with the responsibility for handling that evidence”; 
• Digital Evidence Specialists (DESs) 
The DES is superior to a DEFR in that they are 
“[an] individual who can carry out the tasks of a DEFR and has specialized 
knowledge, skills and abilities to handle a wide range of technical issues”. 
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The standard also refers to two additional stakeholders but give no other 
information about their skills or tasks. 
• Incident Response Specialists; 
• Forensic Laboratory Managers. 
We can speculate that the former is a DEFR with additional knowledge of incident response 
for dynamic scenarios, for example, where a digital intrusion, hacking, is in progress and 
additional knowledge would aid decisions about whether to terminate a link of let it continue 
to gather further evidence. The latter is most likely an administrator who need have little of 
not knowledge of digital matters as their expertise is in management. 
Good system design should surely acknowledge the views of all stakeholders and be derived 
from the system’s place in its wider operational context. As a result, we feel it important to 
acknowledge the inclusion of five additional stakeholders we observe in the legal process 
and subsequently the processing of digital evidence, and so extend the stakeholders 
presented in ISO 27037 to include six more, in Table 4. 
Legal process (Mediators) The legal process, and those employed by the 
process, has expectations of the evidence 
presented to them. Most of these are embodied 
in the standards we have reviewed. The evidence 
that is presented must achieve the standards set, 
for example by ISO 27037. 
The person in charge of the 
investigation 
In the APCO Guidelines, 3.5.2, principle 4 states 
that the person in charge of the investigation 
must ensure that the ACPO principles are 
satisfied. This implies that any technique, process 
or equipment needs to have been proven to 
achieve a satisfactory level of quality assurance 
to be eligible for use in the investigation. 
Accuser Often overlooked, the accuser has a right to 
privacy in matter other than those specifically 
associated with the accusation. Within digital 
forensics, this is most obvious in the surrender of 
media to the investigation that may contain 
personal data that has no relevance to the 
investigation or accusation. 
Victims The victims also have a right to expect their case 
to be heard in a timely manner and should expect 
respect in terms of their data required for the 
prosecution. In the UK this could be found to be 
embodied in the Human Rights Act 1998 (H M 
Goverment 2014).  
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The Accused – Suspects In a similar sense, the accused has a reasonable 
right to privacy in the evidence they surrender.  
Probably because of a written constitution, US 
Law has the highest affirmation of a right to 
privacy (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2014). 
Society in General 
(Customers) 
Society in general has a right to expect the whole 
proceedings to be carried out in an efficient 
manner that is cost effective but still embodies 
the standards and principles of society. 
Table 4 - Extended list of Stakeholders 
Inclusion of these stakeholder interests somewhat extends the criteria for a forensic system. 
Notably, the ACPO v5 Guidelines do not refer to personal data privacy explicitly. It does 
however mention the European Convention of Human Rights Act,  
“Due regard should also be taken concerning any possible contravention of 
the European Convention of Human Rights.” 
which does have privacy as a basic right as article 8. Article 8 provides a right to respect for 
one's 
"private and family life, his home and his correspondence”, subject to 
certain restrictions that are "in accordance with law" and "necessary in a 
democratic society". 
3.5.4 The Human Rights Act 1988 and 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The Human Rights Act came into force in the UK on the 2
nd
 October 2000. As previously 
highlighted, it is now acknowledged in the latest version of the ACPO Guidelines.  
This parallels the meaning of Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution that 
prohibits unreasonable searched and seizures. Over the brief history of digital forensics, it 
has been common practice for law enforcement officers to be able to acquire a complete 
image of the storage media associated with a case. The creep of the acceptance of digital 
storage in the life of ordinary people has been so rapid that the issue of privacy in this matter 
has only just started to be realised. Challenges to this practice are surely to be expected in 
the UK. In the United Sates Courts, Riley v. California (2014) the Supreme Court ruled that 
earlier Supreme Court decisions permitting searches incident to an arrest without a warrant 
do not apply to modern cell-phones as they are pervasive in our lives and contain a digital 
record of nearly every aspect of our lives. It may be that this restriction will be made more 
constricting in the next few years, if not for the accused but perhaps for the victim and other 
witnesses. Any new architecture for forensic analysis systems must accommodate this 
requirement of selectivity. 
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3.5.5 The Forensic Science Regulator’s  
Code of Conduct on Digital Forensic Services 
The Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Conduct version 1.0, published in 2011, 
obviously makes no mention of ISO 27037:2012 as it was published a year later. The original 
version 1.0 does not really address any of the issues of digital forensics and mainly focuses 
on the problems of analogue forensics. 
It has since been extended with “Appendix: Digital Forensic Services” (Forensic Science 
Regulator 2014) which does refer to IS 27037:2012. 
The appendix includes a ‘Scope’ as: 
“This appendix covers digital forensics work only as it applies to the 
identification, capture, preservation, investigation, evaluation, reporting 
and storage of data on digital data storage devices and mobile phone 
devices.” 
Within the Code of Practice, section 6.1.2 says 
“The [digital forensic service] provider shall take account of the need for 
backup and redundancy when working on cases, to ensure that a single 
technical failure (e.g. a power loss or disk corruption) will not result in the 
loss of data on working copies.” 
whereas the ACPO Guidelines make no mention of backup or the need for redundancy in 
equipment. 
The establishment of the Forensic Science Regulator and the publication of its guidelines will 
presumably not replace the ACPO guidelines, as the ACPO document focuses more on 
operational matters at the acquisition stage of the investigation. 
3.6 Current Implementation 
It may seem strange to think of a forensic analysis as a business process but this is a very 
suitable way of managing the process. It may be high-tech but it still has to operate within an 
organisational environment. Subsequently, many characteristics of the business process are 
shared with general business management but as different businesses have their own 
priorities and focus, so digital forensics has its own. Information assurance is certainly high 
in the list of priorities. Early investigative process models were largely linear. This helped 
clarity and transparency. The more recent models have acknowledged the non-linear nature 
of the investigation. However, in reality our observance of the near ritual of taking a forensic 
image has large consigned us to the original linear practices.  
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3.6.1 Implementation within a typical digital forensic facility 
It is often thought that the Police and other digital forensic service providers have some 
special equipment not available to the general population. Although we acknowledge that 
some agencies will have equipment that is restricted to certain users, the equipment used by 
most facilities would be familiar to most ordinary computer users. 
We believe the characteristics of our local Police service, Gwent Police, are typical of those 
of the 43 constabularies in the UK. Gwent Police have about 1,300 Officers who serve a 
population of about 560,000 over 1,500 sq kms. Gwent is an industrial area with one city, 
Newport, and several slightly smaller urban areas.  
We know, from work with Gwent Police that they have a one Gigabit Ethernet network with 
about 15 PCs and a 70 Terabyte storage server. 
From FOI requests, which are listed in the appendixes, we can see that they have seven 
specialists in the cybercrime unit and that they have been trained on EnCase from Guidance 
Software (Guidance Software 2014), FTK from AccessData (AccessData Corporation 2014), 
Cellebrite (Cellebrite 2014) and .Xry (Systemation 2015). They have a budget of about 
£65,000 pa, excluding salaries. 
3.6.2 Business Controls in Digital Forensics 
We have shown from the ISO Standards, the Code of Conduct from The Forensic Science 
Regulator and the ACPO guidelines that there are several sources of advice on how to form 
an assurance strategy for digital forensics. In assessing the true practical problems of 
implementing assurance in a distributed environment, we now turn our focus on the 
operations level to see how the controls can be designed and implemented.  
“Management control can be defined as a systematic effort by business 
management to compare performance to predetermined standards, plans, 
or objectives in order to determine whether performance is in line with 
these standards and presumably in order to take any remedial action 
required to see that human and other corporate resources are being used 
in the most effective and efficient way possible in achieving corporate 
objectives.” 
(Mockler 1970) 
From conversations with officers in within our local Police service, we know that they keep 
track of work within their High-tech Crime Unit (HTCU) using a mixture of ink on paper and 
Excel spreadsheets. They record serial numbers on paper forms filled in with ink and require 
double signatures and further information is recorded on the Excel spreadsheets.  
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The reason for the difference is that the Excel Spreadsheets are seen as easy to administer 
but are vulnerable to amendment whereas ink on paper is, in practical terms, immutable. 
They have chosen a mix of the two to provide a balance between business efficiency on the 
one hand but non-repudiation on the other. 
There are a number of attributes, or processes, that contribute to a sense of assurance 
within the realm of digital forensics. Many of these are shared with analogue forensics and, 
indeed, other activities like quality assurance. This has a surprising amount in common with 
the way a small business might operate. 
In Table 5, on the next page, we list some typical “Business Controls” found in many 
business processes and some examples of their co-responding implementation in a forensic 
laboratory. 
These are often based on a principle of “Checks and Balances”. The most commonly used in 
digital forensics is when a cryptographic hash is generated from a stream of data, the check, 
and the repeating of the this and comparison of the result to the value previously created and 
stored. If the two hashes ‘balance’, that is, they are identical, then the control is satisfied. 
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Business Controls in a forensic Laboratory - Table 5 
Aspect Description Analogue/Business Digital 
By the Properties of an object: 
This identifies some inherent 
property that can periodically be 
re-assessed to confirm it has not 
changed.  
Ideally, this should be an 
immutable property or if not a 
property of which the change can 
be explained, for example 
evaporation would change the 





A permanent serial number 
A suitably designed  label is attached or is 
inside an evidence bag 
A unique mark or blemish that is not part of 
the original. For example, a cut on the sole of 
a shoe. 
 
*The physical device upon which digital data 
is stored exists within the analogue world.  
Digital data held in the form of a file has a number of properties 
that can be used to ascertain its identity and integrity.  
• Its name! 
• A file obviously has a length. 
• A file has meta-data like creation 
date/time. 
• CRC – is a technique for detecting errors 
in digital data, but not for making corrections where errors are 
detected. CRC-12, CRC-16, CRC-CCITT, CRC-32. CRCs are 
subject to collisions because they are relatively short and so are 
not unique. 12 bit, 16 bit and 32 bit CRCs mean that for any 
data string there can only be 2
32
 =   4,294,967,296 results. They 
are typically be used to test the validity of chunks of data across 
transmissions lines.  
• Cryptographic hash like MD5, SHA-1 and 
SHA-2 family were once thought to be non-collision but MD5 
and SHA-1 have been demonstrated to be broken at a technical 
level. SHA-2 [ref FIPS PUB 180-2] is now considered as a 
reliable standard.  
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Aspect Description Analogue/Business Digital 
By the Position/Location of the object: 
The fact that a file is in a certain 
location further enhances our 
faith that it is the correct one. 
Held in a secure storage locker 
Is at a location which is unmovable e.g. a 
bend in a road 
 
 
File data being part of a forensic image of some media 
obviously fits within the image as a whole. 
 
By similarities and differences 
By cross testing for failure and 
success 
Laboratory equipment is frequently tested for 
both success and failure to establish its 
conformance to design specifications. During 
these procedures, a series of sample are 
tested to see if the results are similar or 
different as are expected. In the analogue 
world, the results are rarely to be expected to 
be the same. 
 
By Loops of Authority and Acknowledgement: 
Proof that something was done 
by providing an order and a 
counter signed acknowledgement 
that it was actioned. 
This could be in the form of instructions to a 
technician to perform a test on a sample. 
This could be written in ink on paper.  
This could be a process triggered by the click of a mouse that 
when completed, generates a report back to the initiator 
containing information about the success or failure of the 
process and the results. 
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Aspect Description Analogue/Business Digital 
By Access control: 
By allowing and denying. Where physical evidence is held in a secure 
storage locker with restricted access.  
Using passwords, swipe cards. Write Blocker devices when 
creating a forensic image. 
By Separation of process: 
having functionality provided by 
more than one program and 
clearly separating stages by 
function 
First responder collected evidence. An 
analyst processes it. An investigator uses the 
information.  
Separation of process within a lab so that 
contamination is 
prevented/controlled/minimised 
The generally accepted practice of ring fencing the system. 
Control over installed software on the system 
By separating DEFR and DES 
By Audit trail: 
An historical record is kept for 
future reference. 
This is achieved by recording actions taken 
in a form that is indelible or verifiable external 
to the task. 
This is achieved by recording actions taken in a form that is 
indelible or verifiable external to the task. 
By Checklist: 
By setting a list of actions or 
tasks that must be addressed 
Checklists provide an aid-memoire to 
repetitive tasks to reduce error. These may 
be in the form of a tick list or as a set of 
workflow diagrams and procedures.  
This is inherent in the procedural nature of a computer program. 
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Aspect Description Analogue/Business Digital 
By Training 
 As appropriate to the task. As appropriate to the task. 
By Calibration and testing 
 See ISO 17035 
 
 
Attempts have been made to map ISO 27035 to digital forensics 
in the form of ISO 27037:2012.  
Table 5 - Business Controls
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3.6.3 The investigative process 
The in late 1990s, being a relatively new subject, digital forensics needed to rapidly establish 
sound principles upon which to base future thinking about approaches, the creating of 
policies, forming procedures and establishing best practice. From this early thinking there a 
two legacies that remain as the basis of the subject. 
Presumably, from the initial need for clarity, many of the yearly models of the investigative 
process were linear, or sequential, in nature. Pollitt (1995) proposed one of the first models 
shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11 - Computer Forensic Investigative Process 
The investigative process was initiated with the Acquisition stage. When acquisition was 
completed, it would be followed by the Identification, Evaluation and Admission phases, one 
after another. After one completed the next would start. At the time, this made sense. When 
an investigation often involved just one computer and subsequently one hard disk this was 
clear, clean, simple and so less prone to error. It was important that the process was clear 
and simple, as it may have to be justified to the court under the scrutiny of the Daubert 
Standard. 
Six years later the 1
st
 Digital Forensics Research Workshop (Palmer 2001) published its 
sequence, shown in Figure 12, with noticeable increases in the detail of early stages but still 
linear.  
 
Figure 12 - DFRWS Investigative Model 
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The text within the paper actually describes it as linear. 
 “The items captured in [Table x] begin to establish the linear process, from 
Identification to Decision, that appears to be used in digital forensic 
analysis.” 
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Audit Analysis  Sampling Hidden Data 
Extraction 
Link   
Etc.  Data 
Reduction 
 Spatial   
  Recovery 
Techniques 
    
Table 6 - Investigative Process for Digital Forensic Science (Gary Palmer 2001) 
Later process models introduce loopback within the flow but it remains a largely linear 
sequence. The Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith 2002), shown in Figure 13, was the 
first to clearly display a loop-back which more realistically modelled the real world. 
 
Figure 13 - Abstract Digital Forensic Model 
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The desire for simplicity and clarity is always a good principle but as, in many jurisdictions, 
the ultimate requirement of the forensic process is that the evidence is presented to a jury of 
laypersons, clarity and simplicity is essential to communicate the results of analysis.  
3.6.4 Our reliance, or over-reliance, on the Forensic Image 
Within the investigation, usually the preparation stage, the practice of imaging the media, 
inherited from the ‘dd’ program in Unix became one of the founding principles. Again, 
Forensic Imaging is a linear process and is easily understood. 
From a chain of evidence or information assurance perspective, the practice of taking a 
forensic image in its current form is highly desirable.  
The imaging process starts by acquiring storage block 0, then 1, then 2, and so on 
sequentially, to the last. This linear sequence also has the advantage that we can use a 
cryptographic hashing technique such as MD5 or SHA-1/256 to record the ‘state’ of the data 
at the time of recording and we are able to verify its integrity by repeating the process at any 
time and comparing the resulting hash, which should not have changed. This clear and 
simple process is robust and resilient to error or misuse. 
Forensic imaging is also fast or last least, as fast as is possible. Typically, hard disks can 
deliver data at about 120MB/sec, this is limited by the rotational speed of the platter inside 
the device. A faster interface makes no different to the rotation speed and so does not 
increase the rate at which data can be delivered. The newer Solid State Devices, because of 
the absence of hardware that has been replaced by electronics, can deliver data at up to 
500MB/sec. 
Conventional forensic imaging is also a gentle process as it gathers data in a linear manner 
with the minimum of seek chatter that flicks the actuator arm mechanism side to side across 
the media. This reduces the possibility of hardware errors while imaging. 
Having taken the image, the evidence, or crime scene, is considered to be preserved, and so 
it is safe. The image is something to which all things can be referenced. It is a datum point. 
All this has combined to establish the practice of forensic imaging as a core activity in the 
investigative process. If members of the public know anything about digital forensics, it is 
likely to be about the practice of making a forensic image. Taking a forensic image is likely to 
be the first activity that students are told when starting to learn about forensics. It could be 
said to be in the DNA of the subject. 
In the early days of digital forensics, imaging time could be expected to be one or, perhaps, 
two hours. It could usually be completed on site at the crime scene but was often left to be 
completed ‘back in the lab’ during the collection stage. This fell comfortably into the 
established investigative process models developed at the same time. 
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As media has become larger, this activity has taken longer and longer. In the next section, 
3.7, 3V – Data Volume, Velocity and Variety, we will see the current trend in data volume 
and its consequence on imaging. 
The technical aspects of forensic Imaging of media are more fully addressed in section 4.6.1. 
3.7 3V – Data Volume, Velocity and Variety 
During the first years, just after 2000, it seems as if researchers and investigators were 
making progress in developing techniques and tools that would enable effective investigation 
of digital information. However, in the same way as the rest of the world was rather surprised 
by the increase in the volume of digital data at the time, so the digital forensic community 
very soon found themselves in a situation where the ground attained in the previous decade 
seemed to be being lost to technical change. 
In 2001 Doug Laney, an analyst working for the META Group, now the Gartner Group, 
described the growth of data he was observing as having three dimensions (Laney 2001). 
He was specifically referring to the accumulation of data in large organisation because of e-
commerce but his observations are equally valid in the wider world. He observed data 
changing in three ways. Figure 14 demonstrates this graphically. 
 
Figure 14 - 3V for Big Data (Soubra 2012) 
3.7.1 Changes in Volume 
Of the three changes, the most apparent is volume. Laney made his observations in 2001 
when the use of the Internet by ‘high street consumers’ was in its infancy. The use of 
electronic point of sale devices was increasing. These devices, as well as dealing with 
monetary transactions were also able to capture data about sales and stock levels. In 2001 
there was speculation that many organisations would soon like to adopt the ‘capture and 
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keep everything’ approach to this data stream. Laney suggested solutions like this would 
result in huge increase in volume.  
In another way, the increase in volume is clearly apparent when we remember that that in 
1980, when the Apple II was on sale, a floppy disk was 160k and could store a 40-page 
document. Today, in 2014, a single digital photographic image, something that did not exist 
in 1980, will be more than 1000k. 
3.7.2 Changes in Velocity 
Laney also observed that there would be increases in the frequency of point-of-sale 
transactions. There would be an increase in electronic transactions via web sites and 
response speed on these sites would be a purchase differentiator. This has been realised as 
the desire the capture data in real time as it is generated at point of sale. Laney’s work 
focused on commercial enterprise but this approach has been adopted across many 
domains. Within digital forensics, this is apparent in the number of cases being brought 
involving digital evidence. Fifteen years ago, digital evidence was rare. Today it is common. 
3.7.3 Changes in Variety 
The third expansion Doug Laney identified was variety. His observation was that many 
diverse and incompatible data structures would represent a problem for commerce, as data 
would need to be converted as it was passed between applications programs. In the forensic 
investigation domain, this translates into an ever-increasing variety of data sources that 
present as potential evidence targets. In 2001, Laney would have no idea that something 
called Social Media would become the force that it has. 
3.8 3V in the real world 
3V is all around us. There are three areas where it is very apparent. 
3.8.1 UHDTV Video 
One current example of data increase, from the consumer market, is the appearance of 
ultra-high definition video. In 2014, we are just seeing the appearance of 4k Ultra High 
Definition video. The specifications can be seen in Table 7 - HDTV data rates. 
Name Lines Relative 
Pixels 
Typical Data Rate Typical Size 
of a Feature 
Film 
HDTV 1080 1x 4 Mbytes/s 25 GB 
4k UHDTV 2160 4x 16 Mbytes/s 100 GB 
8k UHDTV 4320 16x 64 Mbytes/s 500 GB 
Table 7 - HDTV data rates 
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What is notable, from Table 7, is that the data transfer rate is within the capabilities of current 
disk interfaces, local area networks and fast wide area broadband services. The notable 
increase is in the size of the data. A single layer Blue-Ray disk can hold 25GB, a dual layer 
50GB and a BDXL 128GB. There is current no Blue-Ray disk specification that could hold an 
entire feature film in 8k UHTV. 4k broadcasts are happening now and 8k are due very soon. 
In November 2014, the BBC (2014c) reported that the Japanese broadcaster NHK is 
planning to offer 8K UHDTV for the summer Olympics in Tokyo in 2020. Soon, 4k will 
become a normal feature of domestic video equipment; it is already available in some 
equipment, like the GoPro Hero cameras.  
The introduction of UHDTV is likely to drive storage capacities higher but may not have quite 
the same driving effect on data transfer speeds. 
3.8.2 Cloud Computing and Storage 
One of the major changes in computing in the last few years is the introduction of computing 
as a service and cloud computing. In essence, major computer resource users like Google, 
Microsoft and Amazon are renting out their facilities on a per unit basis. This has resulted in 
a number of well-known services like Google Docs, Microsoft SkyDrive and DropBox offering 
storage on their systems on a capacity/time cost basis. 
It seems that, in effect, unlimited storage is now available and surely, usage will follow. 
3.8.3 The Internet of things 
Driven by the advent of System-On-a-Chip devices (SoC), more and more small devices, 
typically domestic white goods, will have local processing. When this is combined with Cloud 
storage and ubiquitous fast Internet access, it seems likely that a client-server approach will 
be increasing adopted for many personal computing applications. Many users, in all market 
sectors are choosing to have their data stored away from their host device with cloud storage 
services. This significantly changes the environment that DEFR will encounter. 10 years ago, 
in 2004, it was likely that a digital crime scene might contain one or two PCs and perhaps a 
notebook computer. It was likely there would have been an Internet connection but it would 
most likely have been no faster than one Mbytes/s. Now, in 2014, it is more likely that they 
will encounter many small devices that, for the most part, have access to data, stored 
remotely, on ‘a need to access’ basis. In the near future there may be many, perhaps dozens 
of devices to consider as candidates for preservation and collection, all with a different data 
storage format. 
3.9 The consequences for Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics exists within a global environment. Data volume growth has had a 
noticeable impact upon the ability of investigators to complete their work. Case numbers and 
volumes have increased along with the multi-nationalisation of crime. This then leads on to 
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the needs to share investigative resources across jurisdictions. The data volume prompts the 
need for more automation. The linear nature of our investigative process is under pressure 
and one of the Holy icons of the domain, the forensic image has found itself under threat as 
it is too time consuming and it blocks further productive work for being undertaken. 
Subsequently, we come to the main manifestation of the problem, in that universally we are 
experiencing a growing backlog of forensic work needing to be done. 
3.9.1 Data Growth in Digital Forensic Analysis 
Within digital forensics, data growth and the need for change was identified more than a 
decade ago; in “Breaking the Performance Wall” (Roussev & Richard III 2004). At the time, 
they gave an example of a 6 GB hard disk examination taking two hours and extrapolating 
that to what was at the time an unfeasibly large 200 GB and the 60 hours it would take to do 
the examination. Two years later, in 2006, they return to the issue in a more broad way in 
“Digital Forensics Tools: The Next Generation” (Richard & Roussev 2006), stating that 
“massive increases in storage capacity are on the horizon” including the word “terabytes” for 
the first time in the domain specific literature. 
There are now real examples of the need to process large datasets. In the summer of 2006 
the London Metropolitan Police revealed that as a consequence of the summer’s 
transatlantic terrorist bombing threat they had impounded 400 PCs, 200 mobile phones and 
8,500 items of digital media presumably USB sticks, CDs, DVDs etc.,(BBC 2006). The 
statement went further to say that this totalled about 6TB of data; if so, they must have been 
old PCs and mostly CDs rather than DVDs. With new computers and DVDs, this could total 
15-20TB. Late in 2006 the Department of Defence seized 60TB of data after a leak of Iraq 
battle plans (ComputerWorld 2005). During the summer of 2014 the BBC(BBC 2014a) 
reported on the UK’s National Crime Agency’s operation Notarise in which 660 arrests were 
made in connection with child abuse investigations. The NCA report “833 buildings searched 
and 9,172 devices, including phones and laptops”. In operation Big Wing (Metropolitan 
Police 2014), the Metropolitan Police arrested 630 suspects in the London area in 
connection with house burglaries with hundreds of mobile phones and laptop computers to 
analyse. This was part of a national operation and in Leeds in 2009 the Yorkshire Police 
arrested 75 people in connection with burglaries in the county (BBC 2009). There were, we 
assume, many more regional operations that were not reported in the media. In October of 
2014 the BBC (BBC 2014b) reported on the results of a FOI request by the NSPCC to all 44 
Police Constabularies in England and Wales about the number of hard disks assessed in the 
previous 12 month period. Twenty-seven Forces responded with reports from, for example, 
Lancashire, Hertfordshire and Avon and Somerset constabularies seizing respectively 745, 
516 and 466 hard disks in the previous 12 months. They employed 3, 4 and 13 staff 
respectively. The BBC report suggests that the Avon and Somerset staff may not all be 
digital forensic staff. The London Metropolitan Police Forensic Unit did not reply to the 
request but an informed source suggests that they may have to assess as many as 10,000 
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disks in a year. As there are fifty Police forces in the UK (Home Office 2014), it is reasonable 
to assume that this might amount to about 40,000 disks in a year in the UK. The NSPCC FOI 
request was specifically about hard disks and probably does not include any other digital 
media.  
These types of operations are becoming more common as Law Enforcement realise they 
can gain more intelligence information from the devices they seize and so seize mode 
devices.  
In the United States, the Regional Crime Forensics Laboratories annual reports (FBI 2014b) 












2003 1,444 987 82 83 
2004 1,548 1,304 229 176 
2005 3,434 2,977 457 154 
2006 4,214 3,633 916 252 
2007 4,567 4,634 1,288 278 
2008 5,057 4,524 1,756 388 
2009 5,616 6,016 2,334 388 
2010 5,985 6,564 3,086 470 
2011 6,318 7,629 4,263 559 
2012 5,060 8,566 5,986 699 
2013 6,040 7,273 5,973 821 
Table 8 - RCFL Annual Reports 2003 – 2013 (FBI 2014b) 
The trend becomes clearer when represented as in graphical form with a logarithmic scale, 
shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 - RCFL Annual Reports 2003-2012 (FBI 2014b) 
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Garfinkel (Garfinkel 2010) makes a number of observations relevant to this research. 
Firstly, 
"Today much of the last decade’s progress is quickly becoming irrelevant. 
Digital Forensics is facing a crisis. Hard-won capabilities are in jeopardy of 
being diminished or even lost as the result of advances and fundamental 
changes in the computer industry:"  
and observers that  
"The growing size of storage devices means that there is frequently 
insufficient time to create a forensic image of a subject device, or to 
process all of the data once it is found." 
Garfinkel also introduces the idea of cross drive forensics or cases with multiple evidence 
items and the growing scale of the problem in this dimension. 
“"Whereas cases were previously limited to the analysis of a single device, 
increasingly cases require the analysis of multiple devices followed by the 
correlation of the found evidence." 
and finally calls for realistic dataset when developing tools 
"Scale is an important issue to address early in the research process. Today 
many techniques that are developed and demonstrated on relatively small 
data sets (n < 100) fail when they are scaled up to real-world sizes (n > 
10,000). This is true whether n refers to the number of JPEGs, TB, hard 
drives or cell phones." 
There is more confirmation of the real world presence of the data size problem from Al Fahdi 
et al. (2013). In their survey of 42 researchers and practitioners, “Volume of Data” and “Time 
Taken” are identified as principle limitations to investigations. The respondents also identified 
the importance of automation to reduce workload. 
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Figure 16 - Principle Limitations to Investigations (Al Fahdi et al. 2013) 
The three categories on the left of the graph in Figure 16 are “Volume of Data”, “Time Taken” 
and “Tool Capability” the next highest is “Automation of Forensic Process”. These are all 
consequences of data growth. 
3.9.2 Sharing evidence between agencies 
The previous data gives an idea of the scale of the task but we also need to ask who will 
access the data? It seems likely that information may be of interest to more than one 
agency. The United Nations Cyber Crime Study 2013 (United Nations Office on Drugs & 
Crime 2013) devotes an entire chapter to “International Co-operation”. From the Study 
cybercrime questionnaire, Q83 more than half of the respondents reported that between 50 
and 100 percent of cybercrime acts involve a ‘transnational element’ - Figure 17 - 
Transnational Component . We notice that the region with the largest reported value is 
Europe. We suspect that the other regions will soon catch up. 
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Figure 17 - Transnational Component. Source - UN Cybercrime Report 
The consequence of this is that is that there will be an increase in the need to share either 
evidence or the results of analysis between investigative partners. These partners may not 
be within the same jurisdiction. 
3.9.3 The need for Cross media Forensics 
Perhaps the most noticeable trend in computing in the last 20 years is the sheer variety and 
number of devices that are now available. In the 1990s, in the UK, we might expect, 
perhaps, one desktop computer per household. Now, in 2014, there could be three or four 
digital devices per person in the same household. The ONS provide broad statistics for the 
last 10 years (Office of National Statistics 2012).  
This trend will surely continue. “The Internet of Things” describes a world where previously 
dumb devices will contain processing power, storage and a connection to the Internet (Lyon 
2013). It seems likely that in the future there may be many more devices that contribute to 
the evidence pool for a specific crime.  
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3.9.4 The need for Automated Analysis 
We believe that automation will be a key part of the solution to processing the vast quantity 
of data needing analysis. The question is, to what degree automation will be used? 
 
Figure 18 - Skill/Complexity/Quantity Pyramid 
From our informal exchanges with Officers within the Gwent Digital forensics unit, we know 
they broadly believe that most of the information, or evidence, can be generated by a large 
number of simple actions each requiring relatively little effort. For example documenting 
thousands of pornographic images found on one hard disk. It is largely simple but very time 
consuming. They observe however, that the remaining evidence can take many times more 
effort to be retrieved by highly skilled officers. This is, perhaps, an example of the Pareto 
principle of 80/20 in that 20% of the effort generates 80% of the results. It then takes a 
disproportionately larger amount of effort to gain the remaining results. The principle is 
recursive in that 80% of the remaining effort is needed to gain the 20% of the remaining 
results and so on. A large amount of the work is simple, while a limited amount is highly 
complex and requires highly trained, skilled investigators, Figure 18. 
3.9.5 The loss of ‘the image’ 
It is becoming more common to need to process multiple multi-terabyte devices. In 2015, 
with a 6TB drive, assuming no errors occur, imaging could take about 30 hours. To verify the 
image taken would require the process to be repeated taking the same time again. Only after 
the collection process is complete can any analysis begin. Roussev (2013) described this as 
resulting in forensics being viewed as “an open-ending, post-mortem analysis” that is 
fundamentally a sequential model”. These devices are becoming too large to be analysed as 
a whole. 
We have been accustomed to using computers where the data is held on local storage 
devices, either usually hard drives or memory sticks formatted with familiar file-systems like 
FAT, NTFS and EXT3/4, or perhaps remote network drives which use the same technology. 
We now have to accept that the data may be stored in completely new formats more suited 
to the needs of the data-centre dealing with issues of load-balancing and power 
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available via a network mount using protocols like CIF, SMB or HTTP. Perhaps they will be 
cached on the local host, perhaps not. 
It seems that effectiveness of ‘the image’, which has been one of the foundations of forensic 
soundness, is being degraded and has a limited life expectancy. There will surely be a move 
to acquisition based on selective rather than whole device techniques. 
The design and use of Digital Evidence Bags or Containers is a progression from the initial 
forensic image taken when preserving evidence. They are covered from a technical 
perspective in section 4.6.2, but here we place their development in a chronological context 
to highlight the evolution of features. 
Phil Turner (2006) introduced the idea of a forensically sound unit of storage, smaller than a 
whole media image. “Selective Imaging” creates files called Digital Evidence Bags (DECs) 
which have a hierarchical structure. The design included extensible meta-tags. One of these 
groups is classified as integrity and could contain an MD5 or SHA cryptographic hash for 
each object within the DEC. 
Turner’s use of the term Bag was appropriate in 2006 as it made a clear distinction from the 
images of whole media in previous designed but now causes confusion. Digital Evidence 
Container (DEC) is a preferred term. Phil Turner does not appear to have continued this line 
of research. 
Garfinkel (Garfinkel et al. 2006) introduced another DEC storage format – Advanced 
Forensic Format (AFF). It is delivered as an imaging command line program, a set of 
manipulation utilities and a set of C APIs. This was further extended by implementing a 
FUSE file system interface to the format with affuse. This allows non-AFF aware programs to 
access the raw data with an AFF file without ‘knowing’ anything about the AFF format. The 
FUSE file system code provides all the decoding functionality leaving the application 
program needing no amendments. FUSE file systems are covered in detail in section 4.5. 
AFF has been adopted as one of the standard digital evidence container formats within the 
domain.  
The bulk of Schatz’s (Schatz 2007) work is focused on the structure of the information 
gained as a result of processing data using Formal Knowledge Representation but there is 
also a new proposal for a ‘Sealable Digital Evidence Bag’ based on Turner’s design. Schatz 
uses a SHA1 digest in combination with meta-data about the source, acquisition tool and the 
investigator to record the integrity of the captured evidence. Schatz leaves the assurance of 
his evidence bags to further research. 
Garfinkel (2009) returned to AFF, with version 3, and introduces four integrity features. There 
are three hashing and parity functions but, most importantly, there is a chain of evidence 
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function. Files can be copied using an AFF function, afcopy that can have an X.509 pem file 
as a parameter.  
Using Public Key Cryptography, the original is decrypted using the current private key and 
copies are ‘issued’ to the public key of the recipient. These can only be decrypted by the 
holder of the private key of the recipient pair. Evidence is unpackaged with the original 
cryptographic hashes and repackaged using the new. A record of the source history is 
included in the newly created DEC. Copy after copy adds more chain of evidence meta-data 
and so a chain of evidence can be established. 
Cohen et al. (2009) developed his own major extension to the AFF format. Cohen refers to 
this as version 4, to mark a distinction from Garfinkel’s branch of the development of AFF. 
Cohen’s AFF4 is based on the original AFF format. In his section 8.1 “Using distributed 
Evidence” and 8.2 “Load Distribution” he alludes to the implementation of AFF in clusters 
and distributed processing but are not complete enough to fully understand how it would 
actually be implemented. 
Richard et al. (2007) and Marziale (Marziale 2009) introduce the Forensic Discovery Auditing 
Module (FADM), which uses a FUSE file system to record all access to a file, thus providing 
an audit trail. This system creates a simple text file that records any file access, be it open, 
read, write or close. 
Moving on to the procedural perspective of digital forensics, Casey (2013) addresses the 
issue of the accepted practices in the investigative process, which we have seen, are largely 
linear, and strives to “dismantle[s] the barriers between steps in prior digital investigation 
process models”. He notes that  
“{a] serial approach is not scalable because the process becomes less 
efficient as the size of storage media grows, particularly given the fact that 
disk I/O is the slowest operation in forensic processing.” 
He suggests that  
“A potential solution to this issue is to combine evidence acquisition with 
the automated extraction of information. Specifically, a forensic acquisition 
method can be augmented to simultaneously feed data into an extraction 
process while creating the forensic duplicate. Performing multiple 
extraction processes in parallel with forensic acquisition reduces the need 
to wait for the acquisition process to finish before performing further 
processing, thus increasing overall efficiency. In addition, to support 
further forensic examination of evidence without expending additional 
time making working copies, forensic duplicates can be stored on a 
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network accessible storage system to provide all forensic processes with 
read-only access to acquired data in a single, centralized location.” 
3.9.6 The loss of immediacy 
In the UK, the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) published “Level 2 Guide to 
Evidencing Competency in Conducting Serious and Complex Investigations” titled “THE 
GOLDEN HOUR A competent investigator knows that time is crucial to an investigation“ 
(National Police Improvement Agency 2007) as an expression of the need for urgent 
analysis, at least in serious and complex crimes. With increasing media size extending the 
time to take an image, we are moving further away from satisfying the need to collect and 
process data in a timely manner. 
A solution could be to do the analysis first, directly from the source media, but this exposes 
the acquisition process to the accusation of tampering with the evidence before it is imaged. 
The ACPO guidelines state, “Wherever practical, an image should be made of the target 
device”. Over the course of this research, Police officers have expressed a general concern 
with failing to conform to this requirement. Some, so much, that they have said that they 
would not present data collected in any other way than imaging as prima-facia evidence in 
court for fear that the cross examination of their methods could undermine the credibility of 
the rest of the prosecution case. 
3.9.7 The Backlog 
Clearly, the effect of this growth in data has serious consequences to the timely analysis of 
evidence for legal proceedings.  
Vassil Roussev predicted this 10 years ago when he said “These trends will very soon 
completely overwhelm digital forensics investigators attempting investigations using a single 
workstation as a platform.” (Roussev & Richard III 2004).  
Harry Parsonage (Parsonage 2009) reported that “At present in 2009, it is commonplace for 
digital forensic units to have a backlog, several as long as twelve months.” 
Gogolin (Gogolin 2010) reports that the scale of the problem is growing exponentially with a 
statement 
“Many law enforcement agencies reported during the interviews 
conducted that 50% or more of their cases have a digital component, and 
most agencies report that this number is increasing. Couple this with the 
fact that many digital crime labs, including the state digital crime labs in 
Michigan, have backlogs approaching or exceeding 2 years.” 
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Nina van der Knaap, of Leiden University, recently presented a work in progress report of 
her survey into work backlogs in forensic analysis at DFRWS Europe in Amsterdam in 2014 
(van der Knaap 2013). She has run a small survey for 2 years and although the general 
trend is down in the most recent year, a significant backlog still exists.  
This supports the consequences of Laney’s observations in 2001. 
3.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we took an historical perspective on forensics in the analogue world to 
establish that digital forensics has inherited some expectations of process. When translated 
into the digital world, some of these processes work but some are found to have an 
uncomfortable fit. Until about 2007, this disjoint was tolerable but the rapid increase in data 
needing forensic analysis has pushed the current framework until it is close to failure. This is 
manifest in the backlog currently experienced by most facilities engaged in processing digital 
data. 
In the next chapter we will review the possible solutions and choose a candidate likely to 
deliver the greatest benefit. 
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4 The Technical Considerations 
In this section, we cover the technical factors that have brought about the disruptive changes 
over the last 10 years. Surprisingly, what most people perceive as universal improvements in 
technology, have caused problems for the digital forensic investigator.  
We have already seen that there has been an increase in data generation in the last 10 
years. In this chapter, we start by describing the architectures commonly found in forensic 
processing and explain why they are faltering. We then describe several solutions and 
choose distributed processing as being the one with most potential.  
We then present our findings on distributed processing and that distributed processing, too, 
has had problems in dealing with very large amounts of data. We introduce Map/Reduce and 
the Hadoop file system and explain why we cannot simply adopt this as our platform. We 
look further afield to gather inspiration from other examples and identify the file system as 
being the component at the heart of a distributed system most likely to provide the controlled 
environment to satisfy our needs. 
We then extend our boundaries of our solution to include imaging and a prioritisation system 
to deliver evidence to processing more promptly.  
Finally, we draw together the subjects covered in chapter 4 and draw some conclusions that 
will be used to form our design criteria. 
4.1 The Current Status of Equipment used for Analysis 
Here we review the equipment commonly used within digital forensics. There may be more 
powerful processing facilities available to the higher security agencies but for the local or 
regional digital forensic facilities, the equipment is surprisingly familiar. Although this 
equipment is powerful, there are a number of mismatches between the component parts of 
the system. This means that they are not always fully utilising the processing power that is 
actually available. 
4.1.1 ‘Conventional’ Processing Architectures 
During the period 1990-2005 digital forensic processing, understandably, adopted existing 
system architectures as the platform for analysis software.  
4.1.1.1 Stand Alone PCs 
The simplest form found in a digital forensic laboratory is a single PC, probably with a 
multicore processor and local hard disk. Overall data transfer rate, I/O, is a combination of 
read speed from the media and data transfer rate through the interface. A typical hard disk 
can sustain reading data at about 80 MB/s while a Solid Sate drive can sustain reading data 
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at about 450MB/s. The SATA III interface can transfer data at about 600MB/s; connecting a 
hard disk via a SATA III interface does not make the read speed faster from 80 MB/s. In our 
experience, programs like FTK 4 can process data at about 2MB/s per core on an i7 
processor with typical options set. In digital forensics, the system becomes constrained by 
the data processing rate of the processor. 
This is confirmed by Roussev’s (2013) ‘File Metadata Extraction’ test. The consequence is 
that with even the biggest, and most expensive, processors, i.e. Dual Xeon with 16 cores in 
each socket only about 64 MB of data can currently be processed every second.  
4.1.1.2 Networked PCs 
One major disadvantage of the single host solution is that one forensic case is restricted to 
one host at any one time. If a host is in use, it blocks access to any other data stored on that 
host. The most obvious solution is to adopt a network of connected hosts for processing and 
have a central file store of forensic images. When this is done, the system bottleneck moves 
to the network connection.  
Even when gigabit networking is used, the data transfer speed over the network becomes 
the constraining factor. Gigabit network data transfer is well balanced with hard disk transfer 
rates when it is used in typical commercial applications but as Gigabit Ethernet transfers 
data at just under 100MBytes/s it is enough to support just to provide data to 50 cores at 
2MB/s per core. Gigabit Ethernet connections can be grouped together to improve the data 
transfer rate. Often referred to as channel bonding or aggregation, this allows up to 16 
Gigabit channels to be joined in one virtual connection. This is a significant improvement but 
now the data transfer rate off the storage device becomes the bottleneck as it can only 
supply data at 100 or 450 MBytes/s depending on whether it is a hard disk or Solid Sate 
device. 
4.1.2 The Processor/Storage/Data Transfer Gap 
The previous section introduced the idea of a balance between the components in a 
computer system. Here we attempt to make sense of the current status of computer 
component performance and using common sense conclude that the current trend will 
continue for some time but at a slower rate of increase.  
A computer system is a collection of sub-systems and components. These have developed 
at different rates. Table 9 contains an indicative guide to the relative capabilities of four 
important subsystems within a computer system. 
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1995 80486DX4 70 Hard Disk 1 100 ATA-1 8 10 (1) 
1996         
1997     2     
1998         
1999 Pentium III 2000   10   ATA-4 33 
2000       ATA-5 66 100 (10) 
2001     30     
2002 Pentium IV 10000   40   ATA-6 100 
2003       SATA-I 150 1000 (100) 
2004     128     
2005 Pentium E4 11000     SATA-II 300 
2006     300     
2007     750     
2008 i7, 4 core 82000 SSD 450 SATA-III 600 
2009         
2010     1000     
2011 i7 Extreme 177700   4000     
2012         
2013         
Table 9 - Comparison of the Relative Speeds and capacities of key computer components since 
1995 
PCs performance is a complex matter and there are many factors that dictate the ultimate 
processing power. There are, however, a number of key components. 
• Processor clock speed; 
• Number of processor cores; 
• Storage media capacity; 
• Storage media read speed; 
• Storage media interface speed; 
• Data bus speed. 
4.1.2.1 Processor Speeds 
In 1965 Gordon Moore (Moore 1965), then a director at Fairchild Semiconductor, speculated 
that by 1975 it would be possible to contain as many as 65,000 components on a single 
silicon chip. The annual rate of increase required to achieve this has varied over the years 
but, generally, held true until about 10 years ago when fundamental laws of physics 
prevented any further growth. It has been reworded to say “computer processing doubles in 
power every 24 months”. This observation has become part of computing folklore as 
“Moore’s Law”. 
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Moore’s Law was true for single core processors. Beyond the development of single core 
processors, the subsequent speed improvement has largely been because of the adoption of 
Symmetric Multicore Processing (SMP) architectures with multiple cores on one chip. 
Essentially the 7i is faster than the i5 because the i7 has eight cores and the i5 only six. The 
i5, in turn, is faster than the i3 because the i3 has only four cores. Beyond this, costs rise 
disproportionately as more cores are added to the processor. 
4.1.2.2 Media Capacity 
From a typical hard disk of 1 Gigabyte capacity in 1995, hard disk have increased so much 
that, in 2014, 3 Terabytes drives are not uncommon with the largest currently being available 
at 6 Terabytes. This equates to an increase in media capacity of about 4000 fold in the last 
20 years. Although data densities may be approaching a limit set by physics, it is likely that 
the increase in capacity will be continued by greater reliance on composite devices such as 
RAID arrays.  
In PhysOrg.com, Mark Kryder (Kryder & Kim 2009) projected that if hard drives continue to 
progress at their current rate we can expect a 2 inch platter will be capable of storing more 
than 40 TB and cost about $40 in 2020. This is in line with Kryder’s earlier prediction (Walter 
2005) , in what has become known as ‘Kryder’s Law’, that storage density will double more 
rapidly than Moore’s Law. It seems that it is unlikely that that prediction will come to pass 
(The Register 2014) but the increase is still significant.  
4.1.2.3 Media data Transfer Speeds 
For most of the last 20 years, media data transfer speeds have largely been dependant on 
the mechanical nature of the components that make up the most commonly used storage 
device, a hard disk. Although small changes are being made, it is unlikely that there will be a 
significant increase in the read speed of hard drives from the current standard of about 100 
Mbytes/s. The consequences of this on the time it takes to image ‘the whole media’ are 
linear. Typically, one terabyte takes 6 hours, so six terabytes, the largest drive currently 
available, takes about 24 hours. The use of light gases such as helium to fill the hard disk 
enclosure will increase operational speeds but not by much.  
Because of the lack of reliance on mechanical components, Solid State devices exhibit much 
better read speeds, currently about 450 MB/sec. This is limited by the speed at which the 
circuits can switch within the devices. 
4.1.2.4 Data interface Transfer Speeds 
The last 20 years have seen a gradual increase from ATA-1 at eight Mbytes/s to the current 
top standard of SATA-III at 600 Mbytes/s. This is limited by either the switch speeds of the 
electronic component that make up the interface electronics or the encoding method such as 
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the change from parallel to serial data transfer. Overall, this represents an increase of about 
100 fold in 20 years. 
4.1.2.5 Bus Speeds 
This is similar to the data interface transfer speed; being limited by the physics of the 
electronic components. The bus speed is of little concern as it so fast beyond the other 
components that it has no constraining effect. 
4.1.2.6 Other devices 
USB memory sticks were available to the public shorty after they were patented in 1999 
(Patent US6148354 Architecture for a universal serial bus-based PC flash disk Amir Ban et 
al".) with capacities of about 8Mbytes via a USB 1.1 connectivity of about 1MByte/s. They 
currently provide up to 512 Gigabytes of storage with USB III connectivity at 600Mbytes/se 
but are limited by the electronics within the memory to about 50 Mbytes/s read speed. DVD 
drives were introduced in the mid-1990s and has remained constant throughout this period. 
In all of these devices, generally, increases in capacity has outstripped increases in data 
transfer speed. 
4.1.2.7 In graphical form 
Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the gap in graphical form. In Figure 19, we see that disk 
capacity and processing power have increased by thousands of times in the last 20 years 
but network speeds and data transfer rates have hardly improved at all by comparison. 
Figure 20 shows this with a logarithmic scale and shows the clear division into two groups. 
Disk capacity and processor speed, in blue and green, have shown improvements noticeably 
better than media and network data transfer rates, in red and purple. 
 
Figure 19 - The Change in power Ratios over 20 years 
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Figure 20 - The Change in power Ratios over 20 years (Logarithmic Scale) 
Finally, Figure 21 (Interxion 2015) shows ‘Moore’s Law’ against ‘Kryder’s Law’ demonstrating 
the trend of media storage growth out-stripping processing Clock speed in Apple products 
between 1985 and 2005. 
 
Figure 21 - Moore's Law v Kryder's Law (Interxion 2015) 
Although there are breakthroughs in electronics and data encoding, both are out shadowed 
by the increase in media capacity. It seems that it unlikely that this differential will be reduced 
in the near future. As ordinary computer users are able to initiate actions that process data to 
satisfy their needs, like watching HD video, the computer industry will not develop and offer 
higher power data transfer at the lower prices consumers will be willing to pay. 
Moore’s Law 
Kryder’s Law 
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There is an ever-increasing gap between quantity of data stored, and therefore needing to 
be processed, and our ability to process it in a timely manner caused by the relatively small 
increase in the ability to move the data around the system. 
4.2 Various solutions 
We can see from the figures of data capacity in 4.1.2.1 and data transfer rates in 4.1.2.3 that 
there is an ever-growing gap in our ability to process ‘all the data’. Here we consider a series 
of solutions, their likelihood of being a reality and their effectiveness. 
In the early 2000s it was possible to ‘image the whole media’ in about an hour and ‘pre-
process all the data’ in a couple of hours, ready for an investigator to analyse it. In 2014, it 
can take 24 hours to image a 4TB hard disk. It can then take another 24 hours to transfer it 
into the system and hundreds of hours to pre-process it. It is not feasible for a single 
investigator to analyse the entire contents in anything like a reasonable time. 
Quick & Choo (2014) provide the best comprehensive review of all the literature associated 
with the issue of data volume in digital forensics. The focus of their research is data 
reduction but they widen this to include a review of Data Mining, Digital forensics As A 
Service, Distributed Parallel, Intelligence, Machine Learning, Triage and Visualisation. 
In reviewing the relevant literature, we can classify solutions into five areas: 
• Scaling UP in which we build bigger single hosts; 
• Scaling OUT in which we build clusters of smaller hosts; 
• Improving programming techniques with data-Mining, Machine 
Intelligence and sophisticated algorithms; 
• Improving Management including by Triage and more people; 
• Data reduction. 
We now review each of these options and chose one that is most likely to yield the greatest 
advantage with the least effort in a reasonable amount of time. We need to find a solution, or 
blend of solutions, that will return us to the status of the early 2000s. 
4.2.1 Scaling UP – higher specification single hosts 
The most obvious solution seems to be, simply increase the power of the individual 
components. 
4.2.1.1 Multi-Core Processors and Multiple Processors 
This is largely what has been adopted over the last 20 years and could be summarised as 
the ‘wait until Intel solve the problem’ approach. As we saw in section 4.1.2.1, processor 
speeds have increased but we would need a many fold increase in power to provide the 
advantage to place us ahead of the demand. Exotic solutions such as quantum computing 
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and processors based on light rather than electricity are, in all honesty, some time away from 
being available as commercial products. Multi-core and multiple processors solutions are 
disproportionately expensive as they increase in complexity. As the register (The Register 
2012) reports an SGI (SGI 2012) 128-core with Xeon E5-4600s and 1TB RAM will cost 
$98,000. If the 128-cores were in 16 x i7 packages, each with 64GB RAM, the system cost 
would be, perhaps, $25,000. 
4.2.1.2 GPUs 
The use of Graphical Processor Units (GPUs) has been proposed (Marziale et al. 2007) but 
has its limitations. GPUs were originally intended to provide a processing platform for very 
fast calculations associated with rendering the 3D graphical images associated with 
visualisation and games. Their typical application is to load a dataset of information about 
objects in the virtual world into the GPU RAM and then process it for display. GPUs are 
particularly optimised for the rotation and translations calculations involved in plotting 3D 
worlds into two dimensions on a display. In addition, they now have optimised circuitry to 
decode video streams into high definition presentation. These devices are ideal for brute-
force password cracking but would not provide much uplift when attempting to mine data 
from a large set of emails as in the Enron email set, as the data transfer rate into the GPU 
RAM is disproportionately slower than the processing. Another disadvantage is that they 
require special programming skills to exploit their architecture with programming 
environments like Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA); existing software will not 
run without extensive modification. 
4.2.1.3 Improve Media and data transfer I/O Rates 
This very much related to the previous section. However, there are a number of factors that 
limit development of storage system solutions. At the current time, the most cost effective 
storage solution is still a hard disk. Solid State Devices are about 10 times as expensive per 
GB. Although SSDs will be increasingly used to extend battery life in portable computing, it 
seems likely that hard disks will be the media of choice for mass storage for some time. Hard 
disks are mechanical devices where the platter spins at a specific rate. Standard disks spin 
at 5,400 rpm, there are high performance disk that spin at 15,000 rpm. SATA 3.2 is 
1.6GBytes/s uses PCI Express. Intel (Intel 2014) currently produce an 800GB DC P3700 
SSD drive with a PCI 3.0 x4 interface but at about $2,500 it is $3.1/GByte of storage. This 
compares with a four Terabyte hard disk that is about $35 and so is about $.0.01/GByte. 
4.2.1.4 Optimising Existing Systems with RAID etc 
This is, in a way, an extension of the previous solution. If individual data transfer rates 
cannot be improved, then by bonding channels together the overall rate can be improved. In 
storage media, this can be seen in RAID arrays and in networking this can be seen in 
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aggregation or bonding of Ethernet wires. These can give an uplift of, typically, fivefold but 
are unable to go further. 
4.2.2 Improving programming and analytical techniques 
Improving processing by data mining, data reduction and machine intelligence is highly 
desirable but does require progress in many areas. Each problem needs a winning solution. 
There are many individual problems and so we need many individual solutions. 
4.2.3 Improving Case Management and Triage 
These usually involve discarding evidence or whole cases that are deemed of lower value or 
consequence or discarding parts of the investigative process. While it does provide some 
reduction in the current figures, it does raise the question of compromising the integrity of the 
investigation. Parsonage (2009) reports that the Nottinghamshire Police have the agreement 
of the Crown Prosecution Service in cases in a limited set of circumstances. This is only 
agreed where the case is one of simple possession of indecent images, the images found 
have been put to the suspect and they have made an unequivocal admission as to 
culpability. Parsonage reports a reduction of 254 to 139 (-42%) outstanding cases and a 
reduction the backlog down from 12 months to 7 months (-45%). 
Although these results are impressive, it is difficult to see further reductions won at anything 
like the same effort. Further reductions are likely to meet serious obstruction with questions 
about the rigour of the investigation. 
As Pollitt (2013) argues, triage approaches are certainly open to criticism.  
4.2.4 Scaling OUT - Distributed processing in a Cluster 
As we have seen, the exponential cost of improving the performance on one box was 
noticed in the mid-1960s. We will explain this further in 4.3.1 but this lead to another strand 
of development, scaling out. In this model, we connect together a cluster of cheaper 
components, using Mass Market Commercial off the Shelf components (M
2
COTS), and 
share work out across the cluster. This is not as powerful as a single box as it requires data 
transfer between nodes within the cluster at the lower speeds associated with local and wide 
area networks but it is far more cost effective. The key to success with distributed processing 
is data dispersal and storage. Here the emphasis is on value for money rather than 
processing power at any cost. 
4.2.5 The need to improve the process 
The combination of the earlier process models and the linear nature of forensic imaging has 
become such a solid founding principle for a new subject that we have been very reluctant to 
move on from these sequential, linear processes to models that are more concurrent and so 
are able to exploit new computer system architectures. However, the success of distributed 
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processing hangs largely on the gains from concurrent processing taking place across the 
nodes of the cluster. 
To clarify this, we can return to Pollitt’s original but modify it slightly it to five blocks, Figure 
22. Each block represents a collection of activities and could represent a considerable 
resource commitment when examining large media. 
 
Figure 22 - Linear Processing 
A real solution would be to move to a much more optimized process, such as that in Figure 
23, where each successive stage starts as soon as it possibly can after the commencement 
of the previous stage. 
 
Figure 23 – More optimised processing 
Figure 23 shows a series of processes that are nearly completely concurrent given there is a 
slight delay on each subsequent stage as administrative tasks need to be completed to 
initiate the task but each task is largely exclusive of other tasks. 
Where multiple tasks are capable of running mutually exclusively of each other’s processing 
it is said that they are “embarrassingly easy to parallelise” by the High Performance 
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Computing community. Each task is never dependant on another task’s results or progress. 
In most cases, forensic data analysis is “embarrassingly easy to parallelise” in that the 
processing, for example of one JPG to extract EXIF information is not dependant on the 
extraction of EXIF information from another. Although we often need to associate resulting 
data between files, the processing of raw data itself rarely needs to cross-reference between 
files. JPGs, TIFs, PDFs and PSTs are all examples of self-contained files without reference 
to external data. The extraction of EXIF information from one photograph is not dependant 
on the extraction of data from any other file. 
Accounting systems and databases often require reference to data outside of a single file but 
within the files that constitute a ‘set’ of data files they, too, are “embarrassingly easy to 
parallelise”. 
4.2.6 Why is distributed processing the best solution in forensic 
processing 
When we consider the previous solutions there are advantages and disadvantages in all of 
them. In section 1.3.5, when we set out the scope of this project, we set ourselves a design 
constraint that the solution must be within the budget of a regional forensic crime facility and 
subsequently set ourselves a hypothetical budget of about £30,000 at 2014 prices. This 
effectively rules out the scaling up solution as being too expensive. In addition, we might see 
speed improvements double every year but it would be preferable to have a solution that can 
be scaled in much shorter time scales. 
Clever programming is clearly desirable but has to be applied to every problem individually. 
There is constant work in a variety of areas for example “On the database lookup problem of 
approximate matching” (Breitinger 2014) but it is piece meal and has limitations because of 
the need for inventive thinking. It may be that many solutions are already at or near their 
optimum and if improvements were made it might be of a small increment. 
Management triage is currently leading the way in reducing the backlog but there is a risk in 
triage that the best triage assessment may be wrong and vital information lost in the cut. 
Scaling out, with Distributed processing, has many advantages. It uses existing technology 
but can utilise new developments in technology like SSDs and GPUs. Because Distributed 
processing is based on the idea of combining large numbers of standard devices running 
standard operating system, it has an advantage of being usable ‘off the shelf’ and has the 
prospect of yielding some useful results in the short term. In addition there is a much lower 
entry cost in its development and it is scalable with regards the size of the problem and the 
budget available to solve it. There is no necessity to purchase expensive new devices as in 
the SGI UV 1000 described in section 4.2.1.1 
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4.2.7 Distributed Processing 
Within digital forensics, the implementation of distributed processing to improve the 
processing of data was first proposed in 2004 with Roussev’s publication (Roussev & 
Richard III 2004) and the DELV system. In it, Roussev asked a key question:  
“In summary, the case for going distributed in forensic analysis is not 
fundamentally different than in any other application domain where high 
performance is needed. The obvious question is: should we try to use 
generic distributed frameworks (GDF) and adopt them for our purposes, or 
are we better off developing a more specialized solution? Our own survey 
of available GDFs (in the Related Work section) leads us to believe that a 
specialized solution is a better choice for a number of reasons:….” 
We shall see that a decade later our own assessment came to the same conclusion. 









Roussev does not mention information assurance within the design of DELV. DELV will be 
the subject of more detailed, technical analysis in section 4.3.2 but at this stage its seems 
that Roussev was relying on the assurance of basing the system on forensic images stored 
on a central file store, as we identified in section 3.6.4. 
The unpublished MSc work (Pringle 2004) has the first building blocks of this research. In it, 
a design for a forensic tool with Client-Server architecture was proposed and built as a 
prototype. The evidence was stored on remote server in the form of an image, with a client 
program that presented a user interface, issued commands to the server in an XML format. 
After the server had parsed the request and processed it, the results, also in XML format, 
were sent back to the client to be displayed. Within the design is a very simple error 
checking function that guarded against data corruption between the processing server and 
the visualisation client. 
The next reference to the use of Distributed Computing to enhance Digital Forensic 
processing was by Golden Richard and Vassil Roussev in “Next Generation Digital 
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Forensics” in 2006. (Richard & Roussev 2006). This was published about 2 years after their 
DELV system. In their book chapter, they firstly reassert that 
“… massive increases in storage capacity for target devices are on the 
horizon. The traditional approach of utilizing a single workstation to 
perform a digital forensics investigation against a single evidence source 
(e.g., a hard drive) will become completely intractable as storage 
capacities of hundreds of gigabytes or terabytes are seen more often in the 
lab.”  
And that 
 “Generally, there are two possible approaches to improve machine 
scalability—improve the efficiency of the algorithms and their 
implementations to get more from the current hardware platforms or 
enable the use of more machine resources in a distributed fashion. These 
two approaches are to a great extent complimentary; however, the former 
is likely to yield only incremental improvements in performance, whereas 
the latter has the potential to bridge the hardware performance gaps 
discussed earlier”.  
It is clear that they see distributed processing as part of a multifaceted approach to solving 
the processing problem. Further, refining their view, they note that  
“Maximizing CPU utilization is a bit more complicated. One approach is to 
scatter the files of a particular type evenly across the processing nodes. The 
rationale is that whenever an operation is issued, for example, a regular 
expression search, all nodes will have a similar amount of work to 
complete and, therefore, CPU utilization will be maximized. However, more 
sophisticated processing that attempts to correlate different objects (such 
as the image classification technique discussed later) may be hampered by 
this file distribution pattern, increasing the need for network 
communication. In this case, concentrating the files in fewer nodes and 
crafting a suitable communication pattern may yield better results”.  
This refers to the classical load-balancing problems that have always been present in the 
design criteria of computer clusters. 
In their conclusions they summarise with  
“The technical challenges facing next generation digital forensics tools are 
dominated by issues of scale. Current single-CPU systems are quickly 
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approaching a point where their poor performance will make them 
unusable, due to a fundamental imbalance between the resources needed 
to process the target and the resources available on a single forensics 
workstation.” 
Pringle and Sutherland (2008) built a Globus 4 GRID cluster (Foster 2005) with the intension 
of testing its suitability as a platform for digital forensics and to test Roussev’s claim in 
“Breaking the Performance Wall” that existing cluster systems were heavy weight and 
difficult to use.  
Creating a Globus GRID from scratch was difficult but this was made considerably more 
easy to setup using the Instant-Grid LiveCD (Instant-Grid 2013). 
Efforts were made to mimic the DELV architecture and the processing tasks in Roussev’s 
2004 prototype as closely as possible. In mimicking DELV, data was stored as an image on 
a central file store and was distributed out to the processing nodes. Batch programs were 
written to control data transfer and initiation of the programs running on hosts within the 
cluster. When configure with no authentication processing times were comparable with the 
reported by Roussev with DELV. 
GRID has the option to use strong security based upon Kerberos authentication. When this 
was used, task initiation became a significant delay in the system. In addition, as with DELV, 
when the data was eventually sent and stored on each processing-node, processing became 
much more efficient and immediate. This was even more apparent when the data was 
cached in RAM on the processing node.  
This largely disproved Roussev’s assertion that existing cluster systems were too bloated to 
be used. However, there are significant differences in the nature of processing needed to 
process different types of data efficiently. Digital forensics processing could be one of two 
very different problems. One extreme, in which a single very large file, a single forensic 
image of a multi-terabyte disk, needs to be processed or the other extreme of needing to 
process perhaps, millions of individual files that make up the original file system. There is a 
more detailed technical assessment of this in section 4.3.3. 
The issues of using distributed processing for forensic data is addressed more 
comprehensively in 2009 by Daniel Ayers in “A second generation computer forensic 
analysis system” (Ayers 2009). Ayers states  
“A set of requirements for second generation tools are proposed. A high-
level design for a (work in progress) second generation computer forensic 
analysis system is presented”.  
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He has made no further publications about the proposed system but has filed three patent 
applications in New Zealand (NZ579120, NZ595049, NZ59052).  
Ayers starts by observing and repeating Roussev’s observation from 5 years earlier that  
“The architecture of existing – first generation – computer forensic tools, 
including the widely used EnCase and FTK products, is rapidly becoming 
outdated. Tools are not keeping pace with increased complexity and data 
volumes of modern investigations” 
and then  
“First generation computer forensic tools are struggling to keep pace with 
modern analysis workloads. Even when deployed on expensive high-end 
workstations with multiple processor cores, large amounts of memory and 
fast disk storage the ability of a single (even multi-threaded) application to 
quickly process evidence data is constrained.” 
Ayers agrees with Richard and Roussev that  
“The greatest improvement in I/O throughput will be achieved through 
efficient design of on-disk data storage and use of parallel processing.” 
Ayers then extends Richard and Roussev’s ideas by observing that  
“The use of parallel processing to provide additional processing capacity is 
an important advance in computer forensic tools. However, this addresses 
only one of the significant limitations of first generation tools, and for that 
reason I describe such tools as ‘‘Generation 1.5’’. Other issues such as tool 
reliability, auditability, data abstraction, efficient data storage and 
repeatability of results must also be addressed if computer forensic tools 
are to truly move into a ‘‘second generation’’. 
Ayers summarises the idea of a series of metrics by which it would be possible to 
judge the efficiency and performance of computer forensic tools under the 
headings of: 
• Absolute Speed: measured by the time elapsed from start to finish 
• Relative Speed: a ratio between the read speed of the storage media and 
the processing speed 
• Accuracy: the proportion of results returned that are correct 
• Completeness: the proportion of evidence found 
• Reliability: that the tool does not crash and recovers from errors 
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• Auditability: that it’s actions can be verified 
He draws attention to a goal objective within forensics reminding us that 
“Analysts must realise that the objective of a computer forensic analysis is 
not to locate relevant files but to identify relevant evidence. The analyst’s 
ability to recognise and analyse certain types of relevant evidence can be 
improved if that evidence is presented at a higher level of abstraction than 
computer files.” 
Ayers identifies the apparent conflict between the established practice of a forensic image 
and the need to store data in a form more suited to distributed processing. 
 “While the raw image of an evidence item is considered to be the 
‘‘original’’ version of the evidence and must be retained, it is often not the 
optimal format to store evidence in for later processing,” 
Ayers does not make a clear distinction between application software, the operating 
environment and any middleware. He refers to ‘the tool’ as a singular entity throughout his 
paper. “The Tool” tackles everything from the processing of data to its storage, distribution 
and work scheduling. 
He defines the term “second generation computer forensics tool” by defining a criterion that 
the tool may or should meet: 
On Parallel Processing. Ayers believes ‘the tool’  
“… [It] must be able to use the computational resources of many separate 
processors (i.e. processors that do not share main memory or I/O bus 
bandwidth) so as to be capable of improved absolute and relative speed. 
The tool must be able to process data volumes that exceed the aggregate 
RAM of all processors by at least an order of magnitude. An automated 
method for distributing evidence data around processors and collecting 
results must be provided. The tool should be able to use processors with 
different operating systems and processor architectures. The tool may 
make use of distant ‘‘grid computing’’ resources providing that evidential 
integrity and confidentiality is maintained. 
On data storage and I/O bandwidth, he believes “the tool” 
“… [It] must support a fault tolerant, high performance and scalable data 
storage medium so that analysts can implement a data storage solution to 
meet arbitrary capacity and throughput criteria. The data storage medium 
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should support a range of computer architectures and operating systems. 
The tool should store evidential data in a form that ensures it may be 
efficiently accessed. 
 On software tool assurance, data assurance and auditability, he says: 
“Source code for forensic analysis functions should be available for 
independent review by a qualified third party. Ideally, this requirement 
would be met by making source code publicly available, although in the 
case of closed-source tools a detailed source code review and acceptance 
test by an independent auditor could be substituted. The tool must be able 
to generate a detailed log of all evidence parsing, analysis and searching 
activities. The tool must maintain an audit trail record of the actions of 
each analyst. The tool must be able to record and display to the analyst, in 
a convenient form, details of all computations undertaken to produce any 
result together with details of any assumptions used in those computations 
and any other factor (such as configuration data or information provided 
by the operating system) capable of influencing the outcome of a 
particular computation. The tool must clearly identify which results are 
merely displayed and which are the result of computations or are 
influenced by configuration data or information provided by the operating 
system. It must be possible to trace each result and/or fragment of 
evidence back to the original raw data in an evidence file. The tool must 
ensure that the integrity of evidential data is provably maintained.” 
Ayers was the first to consider the broader issues of the application of a distributed 
processing approach to processing of data for forensics and notes that  
“Grid computing is so different to the normal way of conducting computer 
forensic analysis that it may be difficult to convince a Court that results 
obtained using that technique are reliable and therefore admissible.” 
Ayers concludes with  
“Digital forensics investigators have access to a wide variety of tools, both 
commercial and open source, which assist in the preservation and analysis 
of digital evidence. Unfortunately, most current digital forensics tools fall 
short in several ways. First, they are unable to cope with the ever-
increasing storage capacity of target devices. As these storage capacities 
creep into hundreds of gigabytes or terabytes, the traditional approach of 
utilizing a single workstation to perform a digital forensics investigation 
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against a single evidence source (e.g., a hard drive) will become completely 
intractable. Further, huge targets will require more sophisticated analysis 
techniques, such as automated categorization of images. We believe that 
the next generation of digital forensics tools will employ high-performance 
computing, more sophisticated evidence discovery and analysis techniques, 
and better collaborative functions to allow digital forensics investigators to 
perform investigations much more efficiently than they do today.“ 
Garfinkel (Garfinkel 2012) discusses the choice of platform and programming languages 
when writing software for digital forensics. He discusses the choice of C, C++ and Java as 
development language and the implications of speed advantage of multi-threaded 
programming. However, he does acknowledge that much software in digital forensics is 
written by knowledgeable non-programmers for whom the complexities of these more 
advanced process models prohibit the development of high performance software needed to 
return results in a reasonable time when processing large volumes of data. 
On the specific matter of parallelism he reports that his results are mixed with little or no-
success on GPU implementations but staggeringly successful results on making bulk-
extractor multi-threaded. 
Roussev et al. (2013) consider the idea of a time-constraint, or real-time limit, in the 
investigative process. Acknowledging that time is often an imperative in investigations they 
approach the problem by considering how much processing can be done in a set time. They 
observe that within a typical system used for forensic analysis, individual storage media can 
now supply data fast enough to occupy about 120-200 cores in typical i7 machines. They 
propose an architecture shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24 - Latency-optimised target acquisition architecture (Roussev et al. 2013). 
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This is based on a new paradigm in imaging, LOTA, where firstly the file meta-data is read, 
including the clusters occupied by the data, and as the media is imaged, cluster-by-cluster, 
completed files can be bags and sent off for processing. 
“The rationale of the system is simple d before we start cloning a target, 
we parse its filesystem metadata to build an inverse map of data blocks to 
files. After that, we start reading the disk blocks sequentially from 
beginning to end, and use the map to reconstruct on the fly the files whose 
contents have been acquired. Once a file is complete, it is made available 
through the regular filesystem interface to file processing tools. Disk 
cloning proceeds in parallel.” 
LOTA is examined in detail and compared with other imaging techniques in section 4.6.1. 
As media sizes started to increase significantly in the first part of the last decade, it started to 
become clear that a unit of storage capable of storing multiple whole devices or data items 
smaller than a whole media image was needed. Two new forensically sound storage formats 
were introduced in 2006. 
4.3 Distributed processing 
Having chosen distributed processing as being the approach that will most likely yield 
greatest results, it is now time to review the history of distributed processing and consider 
some of the existing system as to their suitability for our purpose. There are many distributed 
system but there are only four that can be said to be in common use and display 
fundamentally different characteristics in their operation. In this review we will see that the 
most recent addition, Hadoop, introduces a new concept in distributed processing, that of 
data locality. We find that moving data to be processes is actually a counterproductive 
activity and should probably be avoided. Distributed processing has been proposed within 
digital forensics and subsequently we review, in some detail, Vassil Roussev’s DELV 
system. We also review one of the most popular and trusted systems, AccessData’s FTK, 
which is promoted as a distributed processing system but find that this is limited by the need 
to transfer data from a central store of forensic images out to processing nodes. The very 
activity that Hadoop is designed to avoid. 
Programming in a distributed environment often means significant changes to existing 
programs and so we present the fundamental characteristics of programs that need to be 
considered when moving to such and environment. 
Finally we present the Open Architecture Information Systems Standard which was 
encountered after the design for FCluster was completed. It contains important 
characteristics and thankfully, FCluster does seem to conform to its specification. 
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4.3.1 The Historic background of Distributed Processing 
Electronic computing has its origins in the Second World War. At the time, processors were 
built from components like valves on circuit boards. In the late 1950 Jack Kilby proposed the 
idea of an integrated circuit and in 2000 won the Nobel prize in Physics for his work (Texas 
Instruments 2014). At this time the idea of more computing power meant more circuitry and 
so it is, perhaps, no surprise that the first moves to high performance computing were taken 
by attaching two processors together on the same board with ‘simultaneous’ access to 
shared memory (Wikipedia 2014a; Wikipedia 2014b). Very quickly, the number of attached 
processors increased. The key issue at this time was how to connect processors to each 
other, memory and I/O. There are a number of approaches. Symmetric Multiprocessing 
machines (SMP) arranged multiple processors, each executing its own program, but having 
access a shared memory. In a Multiple Instruction, Multiple Data (MIMD) processors are 
arranged to respond to a stream of commands that formed a program, each instruction can 
be sent to any available processor. Generally, in this model, each processor has its own 
local memory but they can share a central memory. The MIMD architecture suffers from 
scalability problems because interconnection becomes complex after 32 processors.  
There are many variations on this multi-processor, shared memory, architectures but they 
share one common factor, and they are all expensive. 
It is generally accepted that programming to exploit a tightly coupled parallel architecture 
efficiently is disproportionally more complex than single thread programming. The 
interrelatedness of the tasks adds a complexity of synchronisation that is generally not 
present in single thread programming. Eventually this may result in a state of a ‘law of 
diminishing returns’ where excessive effort is required to yield a minor return. 
It is not surprising that there was a growing need for a more affordable and accessible form 
of HPC. This was satisfied in the mid-1980s. In his PhD thesis “The Study of Load Balancing 
Algorithms for Decentralised Distributed Processing”, Miron Livny (Livny 1983) considered 
the theoretical aspects of the efficient co-ordination of independent host computers linked in 
a cluster. This formed the foundation for the first serious management system for distributed 
processing – Condor.  
4.3.1.1 HTCondor 
In “Distributed Computing in Practice: The Condor Experience” (Thain et al. 2005) we find a 
comprehensive review of the origins, design criteria and influences within the theory and 
practical implementation of the system by some of the original Condor project team at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The project was renamed to HTCondor in 2012 to avoid 
confusion with another commercial product.  
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HTCondor is a high-throughput distributed batch system that utilises spare capacity of 
existing machines. Programs can be run on any suitable host within an HTCondor cluster 
without modification to the original program. If the program can be modified, implying that the 
source code is available, extra libraries can provide the enhanced abilities to ‘checkpoint’ the 
progress of the task and, as a consequence, provide the ability to suspend the execution of 
that task on one host and allocate it to another for further progress. 
HTCondor highlights a distinction between tightly and loosely coupled problems. HTCondor 
is ideal for handling tasks that are said to be “embarrassingly easy to parallelise”. Each task 
should be capable of running as a ‘closed system’ without interaction to the user or with 
another running task. HTCondor recently introduced a facility to facilitate user interaction but 
it is most efficient when running in its batch model. 
From their introduction Thain et al. observe, “Scientific interests began to recognize that 
coupled commodity machines were significantly less expensive than supercomputers of 
equivalent power” 
It was accepted that although this architecture would have a higher management overhead, 
it would still deliver an acceptably high power to cost ratio. 
The HTCondor architecture is in stark contrast to the closely coupled architecture of SMP 
and MIMD. On the one side was very loosely coupled, embarrassingly easy parallelisation 
and on the other tightly coupled shared memory processing. In 1993, a new paradigm was 
established to bridge the gap between tight and loose coupling. 
4.3.1.2 Message Passing Interface 
The Message Passing Interface (MPI) (Message passing Interface (MPI) 2014) defined the 
semantics and syntax of a core of library routines that would extend C and FORTRAN to 
enable the exchange of information in the form of messages between machines in a cluster. 
It has been extended to most popular languages. In this architecture hosts within a cluster, 
for the most part, operate individually and either pass or receive information in the form of 
messages. Message Passing has now come to characterise ‘Distributed Computing’. For 
example, ‘Monte Carlo simulations’, where random numbers are generated to test a 
hypothesis, can be run on separate hosts. Interim results can be passed between hosts as 
the correct result is approached. MPI introduces the principle of memory locality where 
processing takes place within memory directly addressable to the processor host. These 
clusters have often become known, collectively, as Beowulf clusters after one of the first that 
was developed at NASA in 1994. There is no strict definition of the characteristics of a 
Beowulf cluster but it is generally expected to consist of a local cluster of ‘normal’ commodity 
grade computers that normally run a UNIX like operating system and employing message 
passing as a control mechanism. Several software architectures have been developed to 
operate on Beowulf clusters. These systems did not replace the operating systems in the 
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host computers; instead, it forms a layer between the user and the host operating system, a 
“Middleware” layer. 
According to Enslow (Enslow 1978) there are 5 characteristics of Distributed Systems. 
Whatever the system is proposed it should satisfy these criteria. 
• Multiplicity of Resources 
Distributed system have more than one, but probably many, 
hosts; 
 
• Component Interconnection 
Components (hosts) are connected by a network system and 
software servers by logical pipes to transfer messages; 
 
• Unit of Control 
There are programs running to control the cluster behaviour by 
allocating tasks, scheduling processing and clearing up after 
processing; 
 
• System Transparency 
The user should not be aware of where or how the cluster 
achieves its ends. The control software should deal with this; 
 
• Component Autonomy 
The system design should assume the certainty of failure and 
deal with it without the knowledge of the user. Ideally, the failure 
of one component should not affect any other. 
 
Coulouris et al. (2012) adds “A distributed system is one in which components located at 
networked computers communicate and coordinate their actions only by passing messages”. 
This often manifests itself in the form of an additional software system that sits between the 
host operating system and the user’s programs. Not surprisingly, it is called Middleware. 
There are many examples of middleware in distributed processing; each design is intended 
to be optimised for a specific type of task. A brief examination of one commonly used system 
will highlight some of these characteristics. 
HTCondor has grown out of the desire to utilise fully whatever processing resources are 
available. The key here is efficiency, embodied in the concept of load balancing. HTCondor 
has its origins in the PhD thesis of Miron Livny (Livny 1983). HT – High Throughput. From 
the HTCondor v7 manual 
“A growing community is not concerned about operations per second, but 
operations per month or per year. Their problems are of a much larger 
scale. They are more interested in how many jobs they can complete over a 
long period of time instead of how fast an individual job can complete. 
The key to HTC is to efficiently harness the use of all available resources.” 
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Livny believes that the salient characteristic of Distributed Systems is the multiplicity and 
autonomy of its resources. HTCondor runs concurrently on non-dedicated computers 
connected by a network. They do not have to be on the same sub-network i.e. a local 
cluster. Jobs are allocated to hosts based on a ‘Class Ad’ service that reports on the 
capabilities of the candidate machine and the current load state of the candidate. When a 
user submits a job to Condor, the system finds a suitable candidate host and sends both 
programs and data files to the machine.  
Each host in an HTCondor cluster needs to be identified and its capabilities collated to be 
used as a ClassAd to enable the selection of a suitable host. 
 
Machine = "turunmaa.cs.wisc.edu" 
FileSystemDomain = "cs.wisc.edu" 
Name = "turunmaa.cs.wisc.edu" 
CondorPlatform = "$CondorPlatform: x86_rhap_5 $" 
Cpus = 1 
CondorVersion = "$CondorVersion: 7.6.3 Aug 18 2011 BuildID: 361356 $" 
Requirements = ( START ) && ( IsValidCheckpointPlatform ) 
Memory = 1897 
OpSys = "LINUX" 
Arch = "INTEL" 
Mips = 2634 
Activity = "Idle" 
TargetType = "Job" 
CheckpointPlatform = "LINUX INTEL 2.6.x normal 0x40000000" 
Disk = 92309744 
VirtualMemory = 2069476 
 
Figure 25 – An example of an HTCondor Classified Ad file 
Jobs are defined in a text control file. 
 
executable = mathematica 
universe = vanilla 
input = test.data 
output = loop.out 
error = loop.error 
log = loop.log 
request_memory = 1 GB 
requirements = OpSys == "LINUX" && Arch =="INTEL" 
rank = Memory >= 64 
image_size = 28000 
initialdir = run_1 
queue 
 
Figure 26 - HTCondor Job Definition 
HTCondor itself selects an appropriate host based on the criteria described in the Job 
description being matched to a specification presented in a Classified Ad. The user plays no 
part in the allocation of a job to a host. 
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Condor assumes that the whole job, including data, will be transferred to the processing host 
once it has been allocated to a host. It then sends the results data file back to a location 
specified in the job file. If no specific source hosts are specified, it assumed the local host, 
from which the job was initiated is both the source of the data and the destination of the 
results. 
4.3.1.3 BOINC, Distributed Community processing 
BOINC (The University of California 2014) is a ‘community distributed processing system’ 
developed over the last decade. BOINC’s basic architecture is of a client-server model with 
the server, or cluster of servers, providing job management, allocation, distribution and finally 
collation of results and clients who do the actual processing. There are some features of 
BOINC that are of significant interest. 
• The BOINC client collects benchmarking data about its host platform and 
returns this to the server. BOINC sends tasks triplets to clients running on 
comparable hosts; 
• BOINC is designed to ‘survive’ unreliable or links which may disconnect. 
BOINC pre-loads clients with work packages before the preceding 
packages have finished. Results are stored and new tasks are started 
with or without a network connection. Data transfer resumes when a 
network connection to the server is available; 
• BOINC projects, SetiAtHome for example, typically distribute more than 
one, usually three copies of a work package and compare the results 
when they are returned using what is termed a validator. The validator 
either completes a bitwise comparison of results or may employ some 
fuzzy logic in its validation process. 
4.3.1.4 Distributed Processing with Hadoop 
At about the same time as Roussev and Richard were designing DELV there were various 
groups addressing the problem of processing increasingly large quantities of data found 
across many fields of research. Of these, Hadoop has had the most influence in the last 
decade. 
Internet search engines generate usage data in the form of massive log files that record such 
things as the text search strings and the selection of a link from the results list generated.  
It was proposed that a new approach would successfully solve this data processing problem 
by a ‘Divide and Conquer’ processing model called MapReduce (Dean & Ghemawat 2004). 
The model is founded upon dividing very large files into regular blocks across many data 
nodes and processing each individually (White 2012).  
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These blocks are distributed across the cluster as a massive distributed file system. This can 
be thought of in the same way as clusters or sectors in a popular file system like FAT or 
NTFS when deployed on a RAID array, but on a huge scale.  
NTFS clusters are typically 4K; HDFS’s blocks are, by default, 64 MB. The choice of default 
cluster or block size is indicative of the overall size of data files expected to be stored and is 
a question of efficient use of disk space. Most files on a Windows XP system drive are less 
than 10k and so 4k is an efficient block size. Files stored within an HDFS file-system are 
expected to be many gigabytes, if not terabytes, and so 64 MB is efficient. We note that the 
HDFS block size can be increased to a maximum of about 4 GB, that is, a java long integer 
or 4,294,967,296 bytes. In the same way as data is distributed across different disks in a 
RAID array, the HDFS blocks are distributed across disks located in different hosts within a 
cluster or even across data centres. It is important to note that the whole file is divided into 
exactly 64 MB blocks regardless of any alignment to ‘data record’. Words, sentences, URLs 
etc. are routinely cut at the end of the block and subsequently continued at the beginning of 
the next block.  
When a program is submitted to Hadoop, it employs the MapReduce model within the 
‘tasktracker’ control program to initiate processes that run on each DataNode and process 
data held locally in each discrete block on the DataNode. The tasktracker tries to avoid the 
‘expensive’ act of moving the data to the processing host preferring processing to be done 
locally. The programs initiated by Tasktracker, for the most part, only process data held on 
local storage. 
Each of these instances (and there will be many instances running at the same time) read 
data in units decided by the programmer. They may be of a fixed length or delimited by 
expected markers like spaces, commas or carriage returns.  
Data is read from the first block from the start of that block assuming, quite rightly, this is the 
start of the data. When it comes to the final input of data from the block, which will almost 
certainly be incomplete, it retrieves the location of the next data block from the NameNode 
(the HDFS directory service) and requests data from the DataNode to be sent to complete 
the input block. By default, this is 16k. This is repeated, if and as necessary, until a suitable 
end of input is met. When set against a 64 MB block size, a 16kb transfer is minimal. 
For the middle blocks, MapReduce ignores any data before the first occurrence of either a 
multiple of the fixed record length or an anticipated delimiter, whichever the programmer 
chose, as that data was processed with the data in the prior block. It then supplies data to 
the task instance by a simple streaming input method. The last input of data is completed 
using the same method as in the first block. 
In the final block, it again discards data until the end of the first, incomplete record, and then 
reads data until the end of the file and, quite rightly, stops. 
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Figure 27 show a schematic of the data transfer within HDFS when reading a short list of 
words spread across 4 blocks that are held on 3 hosts (A, C and Z). The programmer would 
have chosen the space character (represented by the _ symbol) as an end of input marker.  
 
Figure 27 - Data transfer between blocks within HDFS 
The Job Tacker issues an instruction to the Task Tracker on each of the three hosts. The 
Task tracker on DataNode C, which has two data blocks, initiates two tasks while the Task 
Trackers on hosts DataNodeA and DataNodeB initiate just one each- Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28 - Tasks allocated to Datanodes 
Having read and processed each of the input units generated by “mapping”, the resulting 
data is the returned to the initiating host to undergo post processes, “reducing”, typically by, 
concatenation and perhaps sorting. Hadoop has a workflow system to enable this cycle to be 
repeated for further processing of data if required. 
For the type of data collected in log files, this is very efficient and is nearly linear in its 
scalability. This is so successful it is now employed as a model in many different fields from 
monitoring stock prices or customer purchases to processing weather station data and, 
famously, the Large Hadron Collider. Anywhere where the data resembles log files. 
However, this almost completely prevents efficient random access across a file. In our 
previous example, if a task, running on DataNode A, wants data that is at an off-set ‘n’ in the 
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current input file, the task would have to send a request to the NameNode, which contains 
and controls the file-system meta-data, asking for the location of the block containing that 
data. Let us say it is on DataNode C. The task would then have to initiate a transfer of that 
data from DataNode C in order to process the data. 
The only way to achieve random access within Apache Hadoop is to use the FUSE file 
system access and run the task on a single host, in which case all data must be transferred 
to the processing host. It is likely this would be worse than local processing of data. This is 
likely to be primary the reason HBase, built upon Hadoop, has no built in join (Apache 2014) 
It should be clear that although these file systems can be used they are not of an optimum 
design for use in digital forensics. 
We believe two groups are using Hadoop for forensics. The Dutch National Forensics 
Institute in Holland and Lightbox, in America, have developed systems that use Hadoop to 
process information previously extracted from the original forensic image.   
4.3.1.5 The Significance of Moving Data 
The movement of data off a central file server is a significant factor in determining the overall 
performance of the system and is a key limitation on scaling of the system and demonstrates 
the ultimate failing in this architecture. 
If we say,  
• V is the volume of data to process 
• P is the rate at which a single core can process data (a broad average rate 
of ~2MB/s) 
• N is the number of cores in a single host 
• T is the rate at which data can be transferred between hosts (~ 70 MB/s ) 
• I is the rate at which data can be transferred from the storage media hard 
disk (~ 100 MB/s) 




On a single host, when   > 
 ∗ 	 then the single host is underutilised. 
On a single host when   < 
 ∗ 	 then data transfer is worth considering. 
But transferring data to another host is only worthwhile when (P * N)host > T 
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If T is 70, P is 2 and N is 8 then one file server can support T/(P*N) hosts, 70/(2*8) = ~5 
hosts. 
It must be said that the current processing by FTK is basic. If we anticipate future 
developments in machine intelligence or data reduction it is highly like that the processing 
rate will reduce from the current average of 2MB/s to a fraction of that.  
There is a complication concerning the size of files. Opening a file, transferring a block of 
data and closing a file each take a set amount of time. Therefore, data transfer can be said 
to be: 	
 + 		 ∗  + 	 
• Small files, perhaps under 20k, take a disproportionately long time to 
open and close when compared with the time it takes to transfer its data. Transferring 10,000 
files of 10,000 bytes takes very much longer than one file of 10,000,000 bytes. 
 
• Individual files can also be very large, as in the case of video files. As 
the number of blocks increases, the overhead of opening and closing the file becomes 
proportionately less in the overall time. 
In this case, simple queuing theory can be used to reduce overall processing time by 
selecting a large file and transferring it to a suitable host either for processing and then 
continuing to process further, presumably smaller, files locally or by passing them out to a 
suitable host. 
A well-balanced system should have just the right amount of data storage, with an interface 
that could support the available processors so that they ran at an optimum usage for a given 
job and it would be a reasonable price. 
We will return to this issue in our experiment with FTK, in section 4.3.4. 
4.3.1.6 Hadoop processing local data stored across the cluster 
In 4.3.1.3 we saw how MapReduce and Hadoop enables vast quantities of data to be 
processed. They key to this is to initiate processing at the data storage location. It would be 
desirable if this could be applied to a middleware intended to process forensic data. The 
need to transfer data before processing was the main failing in Roussev’s DELV system 
(Roussev & Richard III 2004) as was examined in 4.3.2 and FTK distributed processing in 
4.3.4. 
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4.3.1.7 HTCondor’s Classified Advertising  
and Job Submission Definition 
In Figure 25 – An example of an HTCondor Classified Ad file, on page 88, we saw how 
HTCondor allows each host on the network to define and publicise its capabilities. This 
allows fine tailoring of load balancing. Hadoop seems to lack this ability to allocate specific 
jobs to hardware with certain capabilities. Hadoop seems to be based on the assumption 
that it will run on standardised hardware where the capabilities of the hardware do not vary 
greatly. HTCondor, on the other hand, allows fine-grained allocation of tasks to hardware 
that fulfils criteria set by the user. From the hardware owners point of view the Classified 
Advertising facility within HTCondor gives fine-grained control over the availability of 
resources.  
On the user side of this arrangement, as we saw in Figure 26 - HTCondor Job Definition, on 
page 88, HTCondor uses an extensive script language to initiate jobs on the cluster. This 
links in with the Classified Advertising facility to provide the user with a high degree of control 
over their job submission. 
4.3.1.8 Distributed File Systems, File Striping, Access Speed  
and local processing 
Distributed file system were first created alongside the first developments in supercomputers 
in the 1960s.  
The major relevant developments started in the 1980s when Digital Equipment Corporation 
developed a file system called “Network File System” in 1984 (Sandberg et al. 1985). 
Another notable file systems at this period included the “Server Message Block” (SMB), or 
more recently called “Common Internet File System” (CIFS) used by Microsoft (2014a). 
Designs for Distributed file systems have a number of goals that are similar to those of 
Distributed systems in general. These are evolved from the ideas identified in section 4.3.1 
from the work of Enslow and Coulouris but focus on transparency. 
• Access transparency is that clients are unaware that files are distributed 
and can access them in the same way as local files are accessed; 
• Location transparency; a consistent name space exists encompassing 
local as well as remote files. The name of a file does not give its location; 
• Concurrency transparency; all clients have the same view of the state of 
the file system. This means that if one process is modifying a file, any other 
processes on the same system or remote systems that are accessing the 
files will see the modifications in a coherent manner; 
• Failure transparency; the client and client programs should operate 
correctly after a server failure; 
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• Platform Transparency; heterogeneity. File service should be provided 
across different hardware and operating system platforms; 
• Size Transparency: Scalability. The file system should work well in small 
environments (1 machine, a dozen machines) and scale gracefully to huge 
ones (hundreds through tens of thousands of systems); 
• Replication transparency; to support scalability, we may wish to replicate 
files across multiple servers. Clients should be unaware of this; 
• Migration transparency; files should be able to move around without the 
client's knowledge. 
There are a large number of file systems and each had its own design objects. Successfully 
fulfilling one design objective can sometimes mean the file-system is very inefficient in 
another application setting. Identifying a specific need is the key to the correct selection of an 
appropriate file system. Typical criterion might be the number of files likely to be stored 
within the file system, the maximum or typical file size, the file naming convention or speed 
of access.  
Choosing to use a distributed architecture implies a desire to utilise the processing power 
and storage facilities of the whole infrastructure. Branches of a directory hierarchy can be 
connected to mount points on a file system structure. This feature can be stackable so that 
huge structures can be built without the user, be it a program or human, having any 
knowledge of the actual location of the data being accessed. Andrew File System (Carnegie 
Mellon University 2015), GlusterFS (Gluster.org 2015), Lustre (Lustre 2015) and Parallel 
Virtual File System (PVFS) (PVFS 2015) all employ this architecture.  
This obviously improves scale but usually implies loss of performance. Each layer of the 
hierarchy introduces a corresponding delay in transmission times as data is called and 
transferred across the network to a host for processing. 
If speed is the priority, a form of data stripping, similar to that found in RAID arrays, can be 
used but on a much larger scale. In this case, data is dispersed across many hosts in the 
same way as it is across many disks in a local RAID array. This means data transfer from 
source hardware, probably hard disks, is concurrent and so much faster. A four disk RAID 5 
array can read data at about four times that of a single disk. The IBM General Parallel File 
System (Schmuck & Haskin 2002) uses this this approach. Stripes are read from the storage 
media and combined in local memory before being available to the application program. This 
does mean that the data stored on individual storage media is incomplete can is of no use 
without the rest of the dataset that makes up the stripe. 
All these file systems have developed over time and have additional features to enhance 
performance but recently, Ceph File system (Weil 2007) (Weil 2007), has combined both 
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techniques from the start of the design allowing large structures of files to be built, whose 
data is stripped out across many hosts. 
All of these architectures assume data transfer will occur when data is required for 
processing. In section 4.1.2, we explained that data transfer was really the core of the 
current problem. 
In recent years, the issue of processing very large files has led to the design of file-systems 
like Google File System and Hadoop Apache where the data that comprises very large files 
is broken in chunks or blocks and stored across many storage servers while maintaining 
“location Transparency”. This is not stripped, as in the case of RAID or Ceph. Whole chunks 
of files are stored in a readable form. 
4.3.1.9 Programming languages 
If a program is to utilise the MapReduce model, Hadoop requires programs to be written with 
the MapReduce architecture in mind and to this end, it is highly recommended that it be 
written in JAVA. JAVA was chosen, presumably, because of its portability rather than other 
features of the language. We acknowledge that there is a considerable volume of software 
that is available for the forensic investigator to utilise that is not written in JAVA. By 
attempting to design a system that imposes the least restriction and expectation of the 
abilities of the programmer, we can maintain the openness of the system. 
This has a close association with the HTCondor Classified Advertising facility. Programs 
written in specific languages may only be capable of running on specific configurations of 
hosts. This might require data to be moved, which goes against the Hadoop principle of 
processing data locally. 
4.3.2 2004 - DELV - Breaking the performance Wall 
 “Breaking the performance Wall” (Roussev & Richard III 2004) is considered the base work 
in this area of forensic processing and is certainly the most cited. Vassil Roussev and 
Golden Richard were amongst the first to produce a paper that identified the increase in 
digital evidence as a major problem for digital forensics in the coming years. At the time, they 
wrote about drives of 200GB costing $165 and issued a warning that “investigators should 
be prepared to handle targets with massive amounts of data”. They identify that, because of 
the connection of a high power CPU to high capacity storage through a relatively low 
capacity IO, forensic data is a processing intensive activity. They asked the fundamental 
question “In summary, the case for going distributed in forensic analysis is not fundamentally 
different than in any other application domain where high performance is needed. The 
obvious question is: should we try to use generic distributed frameworks (GDF) and adopt 
them for our purposes, or are we better off developing a more specialized solution?” Based 
on their assessment that “A targeted solution can be better optimized for its specific purpose 
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and, hence, achieve better performance with less overhead. Generic frameworks tend to be 
heavyweight since they try to be everything to everyone. Usually they provide simple 
programming abstractions,  such as distributed shared memory, that are convenient but may 
become serious performance bottlenecks.” they dismiss adopting a generic distributed 
framework and choose to design and build a custom solution, latterly known as DELV, based 
around a bespoke message passing protocol and a central file store facility.  
There were a number of distributed middleware systems in common use in 2004 when 
Roussev and Richard designed DELV. No doubt, they influenced the characteristics of their 
design. This design retained the idea of a central file store from which data was transferred 
out to be stored in the RAM of processing workers. They pointed out that if each of the hosts 
in a 64 node Beowulf cluster had 2GB of RAM this would provide about 100GB of RAM that 
could act as storage with very high IO performance.  
 
Figure 29 - DELV System Schematic (Roussev & Richard III 2004)  
In a further effort to optimise the system away from the heavyweight generic solutions they 
dismiss standard message protocols like GENA and SOAP, saying that “we do not foresee 
the communication leaving the private LAN of a forensic lab” and instead design and 
implement a lightweight protocol of their own. Certain characteristics of their solution can be 
deduced from the commands they describe. 
JOIN and LEAVE commands are issued by the worker hosts to notify their availability for 
accepting tasks. EXIT, SHUTDOWN and STARTUP are issued by the co-ordinator to control 
the worker. CACHE and FETCH are issued by the co-ordinator to instruct the worker to 
allocate RAM memory, retrieve a file, or files, from the central store, and keep them in the 
RAM of the worker. There are a series of progress commands like DONE, ERROR, 
REPORT, PROGRESS and CANCEL that can be used to monitor the activities of the 
workers. There are then a series of processing commands like HASH, GREP, THUMB, 
STEGO, CRACK and EXEC that actually trigger the work. These commands indicate that 
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the system is a ‘Command and Control’ design where the co-ordinator is the central control 
issuing commands.  
They implement their system on the ‘Gumbo-72’ cluster at the University of New Orleans. 
Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the system schematic and architecture, respectively 
 
Figure 30 - DELV System Architecture (Roussev & Richard III 2004) 
Their testing was based on a 6GB image that they stored on the RAID server so each of the 
workers was able to cache about 700MB of data. They, quite rightly, acknowledged that it is 
not possible to make a fair comparison with FTK at the time because  
“None of the measurements for our prototype are directly comparable to 
these numbers, because FTK is performing a lot of initial pre-processing of 
the (forensic) image and we only have a general idea of the 
implementation”  
but the results were quite dramatic and certainly proved, in principle, that there were benefits 
from this approach.  
One of the most striking observations in the previous figure is the sizes of RAM, central 
storage at only 540GB and their choice of an image of 6GB. Even in 2004, this may have 
been considered small but now, 10 years later, they seem diminutive. If we scaled this up to 
the technology available in 2013, we might expect 64GB RAM, a central storage of tens of 
terabytes and images of terabytes as well. However, one thing that would not change is the 
network speed. The Gumbo-72 cluster was built with one Gigabit Ethernet connectivity. Ten 
years later this probably would not change but if it did it would be only by a factor of 10 to 10 
Gigabit networking in comparison with 32 times the RAM, 50 times the central storage and 
hundreds of times of the size of the forensic images to be examined. 
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They quite rightly identify scalability as one of the key issues in clusters but could not have 
reasonably predicted increases of the scale that have happened. With the data increases of 
the last 10 years, transferring data across the 1-gigabit network would probably negate the 
gains of distributed processing in DELV. Foreigners  
They note that there are a number of other key issues in distributed processing in addition to 
simple processing power, these repeat the observations by Enslow. The most important 
being ‘Robustness’, they omit ‘load balancing’ and ‘resource management’ completely and 
have no mechanism by which the special attributes of workers can be matched to tasks e.g. 
password cracking to hosts with GPUs. This is of course understandable as GPUs where in 
their infancy at the time. 
4.3.3 2008 – Is a Grid suitable for digital forensics? 
In response to Roussev and Richard’s work, Pringle and Sutherland (Pringle & Sutherland 
2008) attempted to recreate the DELV system using a Globus 4 Grid system. Technology 
had moved on by then and the paper “Is a Computational Grid a Suitable Platform for High 
Performance Forensics?” states that 500GB drives were available from British retailers for 
£99. They tried to build a system that closely resembled the New Orleans equipment, which 
was surprisingly difficult although only 4 years had elapsed. With the benefit of 3 years 
progress, they state that they found that the Globus Grid was available as Instant Grid 
(Instant-Grid 2013) based on the Knoppix 5.1.1 Live Linix CD. It is often observed that 
system installation has become easier over the years as anyone with more than 10-15 years 
of Linux experience has observed. This is also true of Globus, the installation of which has 
become much easier over the years. 
The most important observation we made was that the distribution of data from a central file 
store out to the workers was the main bottleneck on the system. Once the data was stored 
on the workers, the speed increase was dramatic.  
In the Globus implementation of the DELV experiment they used about 4GB of data with 
about 5000 files; roughly comparable to Roussev and Richard’s experiment. They tried 
sequential copies from a central store using NFS, and parallel copies using gsi-ftp and then 
grep searches from the local hard disk of each worker.  
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H001 859 660 39  94 16 2.6 
H002 978 648 36 114 17 3.1 
H003 826 669 37 88 17 3.3 
H004 758 654 33 90 19 3.1 
H005 822 670 36  88 17 2.3 
H006 838 664 37 97 19 3.4 
Total 5081 3965 218 571 105 17.8 
Table 10 - Data Processing Times in the Prototype Grid 
From the results, in Table 10, we can see that copying the data from the central storage took 
about 40 seconds for each worker using NFS. This was ‘running in parallel’ and is 
cumulatively limited as there is only one-gigabit Ethernet connection from the storage server. 
When they used the Grid gsiftp this time multiplied typically by three. This is in line with 
Roussev and Richard’s observations about protocols based on HTTP. Once on the worker’s 
hard disk, a grep search took about 17 seconds, understandably, as it needs to read the 
data from the hard disk. However, once the first search is complete the data remains in RAM 
and is then searched at far greater speed of less than 4 seconds. 
Their estimates at the time, where that the data transfer achieved 18MB/s over the Ethernet, 
the first search from the hard disk achieved 38 MB/s and the search from RAM was 222 
MB/s. As the data transfer rate from even PC3-3200 RAM is about 3GB/s we believe the 
task became processor limited at that stage, 222MB/s being the limit of the processor to 
perform the grep search.   
This broadly agreed with Roussev and Richard’s figures, however by using the Globus Grid 
they were using a full ‘professional’ system with the resources of the Globus foundation for 
its development. This provided installation, redundancy, monitoring and many more facilities. 
4.3.4 AccessData FTK and large datasets 
AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit was first released in the late 1990s. Distributed processing 
was introduced in version 3.0 with four workers in August 2009. It is currently the only 
example of a commercially available application of distributed processing in digital forensics. 
The following information is taken from “Divide & Conquer: overcoming Computer Forensic 
Backlog through Distributed Processing and Division of Labor” (AccessData  Corporation 
2009) 
AccessData has retained the centralised storage of forensic image files, shown in Figure 31. 
The disadvantage of a centralised store for forensic images, as was the case in both DELV 
and GRID, is that the data needs to be moved across the network to be processed. It is 
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reasonable to assume that AccessData is constrained by the need for commercial 
acceptance of their system and that they achieve this by retaining an architecture based up 
on a forensic image approach. 
 
Figure 31 - The Evidence Server (AccessData  Corporation 2009) 
We set up an FTK system to assess the impact of the data transfer from a central storage 
facility, out to the data processing hubs. As we were interested in data quantities rather than 
speed it was only necessary to process a very small image to get ratios of data quantities. 
As a result, we processed an image of 358MB (375,445,069 bytes) with a mixed bag of files 
including photographs, word documents and excel spreadsheets. 
AccessData’s larger version FTK-Lab seems to exhibit the same architecture seen in their 
system illustration, Figure 32 
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Figure 32 - Case and Evidence Storage (AccessData  Corporation 2009) 
To assess the impact of this central server approach we conducted a small experiment by 
building a four-processor installation of the Access FTK Forensic system. 
Our setup consisted of seven hosts. 
• The main host, GUI/DP1, is the ‘user console’ and hosts the primary distributed 
engine; 
• The SQL host supports only the SQL database; 
• DP2, DP3 and DP4 hosts support only the additional three distributed processing 
engines; 
• The Case File host holds any additional files created during the analysis, for 
example thumbnail images and text indexes for searching; 
• The Evidence host holds only the source image.  
Table 11, on page 104, shows the quantity of data transferred between hosts when 
processing a small 350MB image that was considered typical of a memory stick. 
We found that during the processing of a 358MB image, 335 Mbytes (93%) is sent to the 
primary Data Processing Host that also run the Graphical User Interface (GUI/DP1). 
Surprisingly, it sends only 29 Mbytes (9%), 18 Mbytes (5%) and 38 Mbytes (11%) to DP2, 
DP3 and DP4 respectively. 
• Processing 335MB of data resulted in moving 480MB of data between the hosts 
on the network; 
• While 358MB of data was processed, only 3.286 Mbytes (0.9%) of data was 
written to the database. Inspection of the PostgreSQL database shows that only 
analysis metadata is stored. The evidential raw data is held in the image; 
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• While 335MB of data was processed, only 39.999 Mbytes (1.1%) of data was 
written to the case folder. The case folder appears to hold data such as the text 
index files. This resulted in a case folder of 50MB – 5%; 
• The analysis of 335MB of data resulted in a database of about 135MB – 40%. 
From Table 11 we see that only 3MB of data was sent to the database. We 
suspect that the difference is because of fixed length fields in the database being 
padded out with spaces.  
This experiment suggests that FTK does not utilise the DPs anywhere near as much as it 
could. Currently it is about, 80%, 7%, 4%, 9%. If the distribution of tasks to the DPs was 
more even say, perhaps, 35%, 20%, 20%, 20% even with extra management it would 
improve processing time by perhaps 3 fold. 
This displays the characteristics of the observation made by Dean and Ghemawat when they 
proposed that MapReduce be focused on Data Locality. The ‘cost’ of moving data from a 
central data server out to processing nodes often exceeds the advantage of distributed 
processing.
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All Kbytes Host B               
Host A 
GUI/ 
DP1 SQL DP2 DP3 DP4 Case File Evidence Image 
Sum of Bytes 
out of host A 
GUI/DP1   1,196  1,464  1,693  1,164  30,983  3,101  39,602  
SQL 1,284    650  522  634    2  3,092  
DP2 1,324  685        2,953  258  5,219  
DP3 1,342  742        2,009  222  4,315  
DP4 995  661        4,053  312  6,021  
Case File 800    291  244  142    2  1,479  
Evidence Image 335,155  1  29,230  18,072  38,379  1    420,838 
Sum of Bytes 
in to host B 340,899 3,286 31,635 20,532 40,319 39,999 3,896 480,567  
 
Data transferred    Example 
from a specific Hosts A, listed on the left,  
to a specific Host B, listed across the top  
A to B is denoted as 
volume in Kb.  
29,230 kb bytes were transferred from 
“Evidence Host” to “DP2” 
Total transferred into a specific Host B 
regardless of the source 
All to B is denoted as  
volume in Kb. 
39,999 kb were received by the Case File 
regardless of the source 
from a specific Host B, listed across the top, 
to a specific Host A, listed on the left  
B to A is denoted as  
volume in Kb.  
30,983 kb bytes were transferred from “Case 
File” to “GUI/DP1” 
Total transferred out of a specific Host A  
regardless of destination 
A to All is denoted as  
volume in Kb. 
39,602 kb were sent by the GIU/DP1 
regardless of destination 
All data transferred All to All is denoted as  
volume in Kb. 
480,567 kb passed across the network 
Table 11 - FTK Distributed Processing Data Transfer Values 
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4.3.5 Running Programs 
Handling program execution is a complex problem. There are a number of characteristics to 
consider that include whether: 
• A program may, or may not, require user interaction either before initiation or 
possibly during processing. Parameters may need to be selected before the 
processing is started; 
• A program may result in the creation of one or more new data files such as 
the creation of thumbnail images from high-resolution image files; 
• A program may result in the amendment of one or more existing data files 
such as the case when a database is amended because of processing. 
Ideally, programs that are run on FCluster would be initiated from a command line and either 
have parameters on the command line or have parameters retrieved from a file whose 
location and name are hardcoded into the program or are supplied by the command line. 
This is common practice within the Linux community. This situation is easily accommodated 
by the adoption of a job submission control file such as was reported to be implemented in 
HTCondor. HTCondor’s Job Definition file has parameters such as “input=”, “output=” and 
“error=” to define data inputs and outputs to be used during execution. FCluster would use 
the same technique. It is beyond the scope of this prototype design to define exactly how this 
would work but they could connect to files that are then delivered to the user, they could be 
stored within a database or many other options. 
The widespread adoption of Microsoft Windows has encouraged a style of user interface 
where the user is presented with a program container, often Multiple Document Interface 
(MDI), and they then initiate a task with a selection from a menu, a key press or click on an 
object on the screen. The user is sometimes then presented with a dialog box into which 
they enter, or select, options and the task is initiated with a click on an appropriately labelled 
button. The code for the user interface and the code for execution are contained within the 
same module and are, effectively, inseparable. 
4.3.6 The wider forensic community will continue to produce useful 
software 
Although there may be greater weight placed on evidence revealed when established 
software from known sources such as Guidance Software and AccessData, we should 
acknowledge that the wider research community has and will continue to develop productive 
software.  
Any similar development should allow this to continue in a way least taxing for the 
programmer but still allow them access to the leverage of power in new forensic systems. 
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4.3.7 Open Architecture Information Systems OAIS - ISO 14721:2012 
FCluster, the subject of this thesis, was designed and written in the summer of 2013. Six 
months later, it was presented as a paper to the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
Europe 2014, with submission in December 2013. During the review process, two reviewers 
pointed out an existing system of information archiving used to store data from space 
exploration over the last 2 decades. This information was not known at the time of designing 
FCluster but is highly relevant in evaluating FCluster in chapter 7. 
The Open Archival Information System (ISO 2012a) was originally designed to 
accommodate the huge amount of diverse data originating from observation of the terrestrial 
and space environments.  
OAIS proposes a learning model, shown in Figure 33 - Data to Information in OAIS, to 
represent the transformation of data into information. 
 
Figure 33 - Data to Information in OAIS 
An OAIS archive has three distinct entities Producers, Consumers and Management - Figure 
34 - OAIS Environment Model. 
 
Figure 34 - OAIS Environment Model (ISO 2012a) 
Data is generated or gather by a “Producer”. In our domain, this could be the suspect, victim 
or DEFR and is packaged into Submission Information Packages (SIPs). The Producer 
would initiate its “Ingestion” into the system where it is processed and stored as Archival 
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Information Packages (AIPs). A consumer, the DES, can issue Queries against the archive 
which may illicit a response resulting in a list of AIPs. The Consumer can then order one or 
more AIPs resulting in Dissemination Information Packages (DIPs) being formed and sent to 
the Consumer. All this is subjected to the control of The Management whose job it is to 
develop and implement policies that govern data access and quality. A system schematic is 
shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35 - OAIS Functional Entities  (ISO 2012a) 
OAIS describes a transactional system where data is deposited by the producer and the 
consumer issues orders, to which the system responds by issuing dissemination packages 
to satisfy that request, Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36 - OAIS Archive External Data  (ISO 2012a) 
At the stage of acuisition, when the original data is packaged into SIPs, additional Content 
information is gathered and attached to the core data to provide context and provenance.  
The creation of a co-responding AIP implies the creation of Preservation Description 
Information (PDI). The PDI comprises of data that defines reference information about its 
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source. For example, this could be a crime case number. In the case of a Digital Evidence 
Container, the data’s Context Information would be information about which media it came 
from. The AIP contains Provenance Information, which would be our chain of evidence 
information. Finally, it contains Fixity Information that corresponds to the integrity data 
represented by MD5, SHA-1 cryptographic hashes. 
 
Figure 37 - Information Package Concepts and Relationships  (ISO 2012a) 
In OAIS information packages consist of two sub-components, shown in Figure 37 - 
Information Package Concepts and Relationships, one contains meta-data describing the 
nature of the raw data and the other, the actual data. Associated with this is descriptive 
meta-data that relates to the information gained from the data because of the data to 
information cycle described in Figure 33 - Data to Information in OAIS 
 
Figure 38 - Preservation Description Information  (ISO 2012a) 
OAIS has its own data format - Metadata Encoding and Transmission Standard (METS). 
METS provides a means of associating all the metadata of an object, including the object’s 
relationship with other objects, within the object. This is shown in schematic form in Figure 
38. 
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A METS definition is in the form of an XML Schema that is extensible to whatever is needed. 
The METS Editorial Board recommends a number of formats but these are not the limit. The 
US Library of Congress (The Library of Congress 2014) is developing a series of METS 
which is offers as a base for standardisation and is the official web site. These can be 
amended or extended as required.  
It seems that there are two key differences when a comparison is made between OAIS and 
existing forensic systems. Firstly, in OAIS it is assumed that there is a format change 
between the SIP used in the submission stage and the AIP used in the storage stage. 
Currently, the accepted best practice in digital forensics is that, where possible, an image is 
taken and stored within the forensic system and although it may be analysed and the results 
stored in a database, reference is always made to the original image. Secondly, there does 
not seem to be a facility WITHIN OAIS for processing. Data always needs to be Ordered and 
Disseminated to a location where processing takes place, with the resulting information 
being sent back into OAIS. 
4.4 Interim Discussion 
It should now be clear that current processing models, primarily single PCs or PCs on a 
network, will struggle to cope with the increase in data volumes being experienced in digital 
forensics. This is a problem of imbalance between system components and is not unique to 
digital forensics. In the last decade, Hadoop has enabled analysts to tackle vast quantities of 
data; the techniques of data-mining are already revealing quite amazing patterns in huge 
datasets. This is a new domain of research – data analytics. 
A similar new solution is needed in digital forensics. There are several on offer but only one 
that uplifts all the others with wide benefits.  
Data reduction presumably requires mass data to be pre-processed in order to reduce the 
volume; this increases processing time. Data mining is usually statistically based, which is 
well known for being processor intensive; again increasing processing time. Larger single 
processors are disproportionately expensive. Currently improving case management usually 
implies using a triage approach that could be viewed as selectively ignoring or discarding 
evidence or entire cases.  
Distributed processing is a platform not an actual application solution. It can provide us with 
greater storage, shared workspaces, more raw power to enable data reduction and provide a 
platform for more complex mathematical text processing algorithms. 
The history of multiprocessors clusters and distributed processing goes back to the 1960s. 
There are many examples of cluster and distributed systems being successfully deployed to 
solve problems. These systems are at their best when they have a clear design target and 
the features are focussed to that end. Nimrod is design for parameter sweeping. Weka is 
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design for data mining. HTCondor maximises processor utilisation. Hadoop is one of the 
latest to join the collection. Hadoop could be used for forensics but it is really designed for 
analysing log files. Anything else built on top, hBase for example, dulls its cutting edge. 
If we were to set our sights higher than adopting a general purpose solution and consider 
what might be required of a system specifically designed for forensic processing there are 
lessons to be learned from Hadoop. Key to Hadoop success is its file system HDFS. If it was 
possible to design a file system with the specific needs of handling and processing data for 
digital forensics then it could be the base of an acceptable new architecture. Designing a file 
system from first principles can be done but is complicated. Recently FUSE file systems 
have provided the opportunity to develop, effectively, custom file systems based upon the 
sound foundations of well-established systems like ext3/4. 
Since the file system covers all data access, it is possible to create a far-reaching control 
structure, a middleware that has complete authority over data storage, access and integrity. 
FUSE file systems have been proposed within digital forensics previously. There are several 
FUSE file systems that have features of interest and so a fusion and extension of these 
could provide the foundation we need. 
We believe that because of the increasing size of media, the adoption of cloud systems and 
storage, the notion of the ‘image’ as we understand it today, will become increasingly 
untenable. Partial and selective imaging will become more common and ultimately the norm. 
Evidential data will need to be stored as separate files across the system. Consequently, we 
must expect tens, if not hundreds of millions of files in a system that comprises the 
information previously stored the contents of many forensic images. We believe file formats, 
like AFF (4.6.2.8), will predominate in the next few years.  
The practice of taking a forensic image as one big file does not align with the dispersed 
concurrent nature of distributed processing. To be successful we need to devise a new 
paradigm of imaging. We have a lead from recent work by Roussev on LOTA, reviewed in 
section 4.6.1.3, but this can be improved.  
Chain of evidence procedures are well established in the real, analogue, world. 
Documentary proof is accepted, anti-tamper packaging is used and evidence is held in a 
secure locker. This is an end-to-end solution. We have treated the computer system as we 
would a single room secure storage locker. Until now, the computer system has been seen 
as a single place we store and process data. This is certainly true for a PC sitting on a desk 
but we seem to have slipped into the same thinking when we connected these via a local 
area network isolated from the Internet it’s the same situation. Even if this was true, surely, 
this thinking cannot continue into a distributed processing architecture. 
In the next few sections, we cover the additional areas of FUSE file systems, Imaging and 
data processing prioritisation needed to build a true concurrent distributed system. 
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4.5 Existing FUSE File Systems 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Although the MapReduce paradigm is the key to Hadoop’s success in processing, the 
Hadoop Distributed File System is the key to its successful implementation.  
There are many distributed file systems available. As we saw in section 4.3.1.3, each is 
designed to fulfil a specific set of requirements identified by the designers. No single solution 
is successful in every circumstance; there are always compromises 
Designing a file system from scratch is a difficult task that has, relatively recently, been made 
rather easier. With its origins in the mid-1990s, the File System in UsEr space (FUSE) 
project started in 2004 (FUSE 2014). It was officially merged into the Linux kernel in version 
2.6.14 in 2005 (Linux Kernel Newbies 2007).  Figure 39, taken from the FUSE web site, 
shows the schematic layout of the FUSE file system.  
 
Figure 39 - FUSE File System Schematic 
FUSE file systems are built on top of existing, well established and tested, file systems. A 
file-system request from an application program, in the figure this is “ls –l  /tmp/fuse”, is 
normally sent to the Virtual Files system which in calls the set of subroutines for the specific 
file system. If “ls –l/tmp/fuse” is used on a Linux system, it may well call routines in the ext3 
library that is now built in to Linux. FUSE intercepts these calls and adds a link in the chain 
that is processed in user-space. In this way, additional code can be added to alter the 
function of the storage system. 
Under normal operation ( Figure 40 - FUSE File System dataflow ), application programs, on 
the far left, can make any of a set of 42 operational calls to the Virtual File System. These 
calls are passed on to the appropriate code capable of accessing the file system format used 
on the storage media. 
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Figure 40 - FUSE File System dataflow 
A File System in User Space allows an ‘ordinary’ user with non-system administrative user 
rights to load and run code which intercepts these calls as they pass between the Virtual File 
System and the native format code - see Figure 41 - FUSE File System with User code 
inserted.  
 
Figure 41 - FUSE File System with User code inserted 
Essentially this means that existing file systems can be heavily modified in their operation 
and that application programs have no ‘knowledge’ that they are accessing a FUSE file 
system. The application programs do not need to be modified in any way.  
In Linux FUSE, file-systems are mounted by commands similar to the following: 
$mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/mydata 
In which the partition /dev/sda1 is mounted at the /mnt/mydata mount point. The mount 
command detects the file system on the media by its format number in the partition table and 
employs the appropriate code. FUSE file systems work in very similar ways calling FUSE 
code instead. 
The success of the FUSE approach is demonstrated not only by the existence of more than 
50 such file systems but the huge, and imaginative, diversity of implementations. FUSE has 
already been used in digital forensics. There is a FUSE file system interface for the AFF 
forensic format and Richard et al. (2007) and Marziale (Marziale 2009) introduced the 
Forensic Discovery Auditing Module (FADM) as a FUSE file system. 
The following FUSE file systems are of particular interest in this project.  
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4.5.2 MySQLfs 
MySQLfs (Brancatelli 2014) is a FUSE file system that stores file system data and meta-data 
entirely within a MySQL database. The component parts of a native file system, like the 
NTFS or EXT3/4, are mimicked with tables within a database. Calls to the VFS, as described 
in 4.5.1, are completely intercepted by the MySQLfs code. MySQLfs provides the full 
capabilities of read/write/create/delete. It does not support record or file locking. 
The location of the MySQL server is not limited to the local host. A remote MySQL server 
would only be apparent in that the connection speed presumably would have an effect on the 
response of file system operations. 
The database in MySQLfs achieves its functionality with three tables. 
• Inodes table: which stores most of the data found in the $MFT file in NTFS 
• Tree table: which holds the relational data that describes the hierarchy of 
files and folders that make up the NTFS file system 
• Data_Blocks table: This mimics the clusters on the file system that are used 
to store the data. 
There are no tables to mimic the cluster allocation table as this data is held within the 
data_blocks table fields. 
MySQLfs is invoked with a command line such as: 
$fusemount    -u myname:password  \ 
 –ohost=10.0.0.1 \ 
 –odatabase=myfilesystem \ 
/my/mountpoint 
This would append the contents of the ‘myfilesystem’ database on the MySQL server 
running on 10.0.0.1 at the file-system point /my/mountpoint. The mount will conform to any 
higher-level access control options. 
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Figure 42 - mounting MySQLfs 
MySQLfs can store only one file system in a single database but it can have more than one 
database on a MySQL server. A host may simultaneously access more than one MySQL 
server. Figure 42 shows 2 clients mounting the contents of three databases. 
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4.5.3 curlFTPfs 
curlFTPfs (Robson 2013) uses the libcurl (MIT 2014) library (Common URL) to enable a 
connection to an number of servers types, principally ftp, to be mounted onto a host file-
system as an extension to the host file system. In fact, curlftpfs support many other data 
transfer protocols including SSH, SMB and HTTP/HTTPS. Connections can be established 
across SSL and TLS encrypted links by setting options in the command line parameters. 
curlFTPfs substitutes common ftp commands like get and put in place of file system read 
and write to achieve an apparently seamless mount of a remote ftp server connection 
without using a conventional ftp client. CurlFTPfs is limited to a single ftp server connection 
per mount.  
 
Figure 43 - Mounting curlFTPfs 
CurlFTPfs has a command line such as: 
$>curlftpfs       ftp://10.0.0.1/   \ 
        –o user=username:mypassword  \ 
   /my/mountpoint      
This mounts the entire contents of the remote ftp server, hosted on 10.0.0.1, using the 
access “username” and “mypassword” to the directory /my/mountpoint. The mount will 
conform to any higher-level access control options and the read/write constraints of the ftp 
server. 
A connection to only one ftp server is allowed per mount but a user can have many 
simultaneous mounts, each to a different servers. See Figure 43 - Mounting curlFTPfs 
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4.5.4 eCryptfs 
eCryptfs (Hicks et al. 2013) introduces encryption for data stored on the media surface. 
eCryptfs mounts a folder, which can be from a local or remote file-system, in the client’s user 
space. When data is written into a file contained within the mount, it encrypts on the fly and 
writes the encrypted data to the media surface. When reading, the encrypted data is read 
from the media, transferred to the users RAM, often across a network connection, and then 
decrypted. Similarly, data due to be written is encrypted in RAM and then transferred to the 
storage media. In this way, all data is encrypted during transmission. 
eCryptfs’ command line is typically: 
$>mount -t ecryptfs [lower directory] [ecryptfs mount point] 
Where [lower directory] is the actual media directory, which could itself be a mounted file-
system, and [ecryptfs mount point] is the mount point for the decrypted data. See Figure 44 - 
Mounting eCryptfs. 
 
Figure 44 - Mounting eCryptfs 
4.5.5 Loggedfs 
Loggedfs (Flament 2013) monitors access to files in the mounted folder. Loggedfs intercepts 
any access to any of the files and writes out an audit log to a text file. Loggedfs give fine-
grained control over logging using definitions held within and XML format text file, see Figure 
45 - Loggedfs control file. Files can be included and excludes by wildcard definitions but 
level of logging cannot be changed and is quite detailed.  
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<loggedFS logEnabled="true" printProcessName="true"> 
  <includes> 
    <include extension=".*" uid="*" action=".*" retname=".*"/> 
  </includes> 
  <excludes> 
    <exclude extension=".*\.bak$" uid="*" action=".*" 
retname="SUCCESS"/> 
    <exclude extension=".*" uid="1000" action=".*" retname="FAILURE"/> 
    <exclude extension=".*" uid="*" action="getattr" retname=".*"/> 
  </excludes> 
</loggedFS> 
Figure 45 - Loggedfs control file 
Loggedfs’ command line is typically: 
$>/usr/bin/loggedfs –fp –c /my/loggedfs/conf.file /etc 
Which would initiate logging of any access to the file in /etc and below according to the rules 
in /my/loggedfs/conf.file See Figure 46 - Mounting a Loggedfs file-system. 
 
Figure 46 - Mounting a Loggedfs file-system 
4.5.6 ROfs 
ROfs (Keller 2014) is a FUSE file-system that intercepts any call that would result in a write 
action and passes through a NULL function which does not generate an error. Mounting a 
file system as Read Only has always been available in Linux but this makes it transparent 
and open to inspection. 
ROFs’s command line is typically: 
$>mount -t rofs readwrite_filesystem mount_point 
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Figure 41 - FUSE File System with User code inserted” shows the use of NULL code. 
4.5.7 Affuse  
Affuse (Cohen et al. 2014) is a Fuse File-system that allows AFFx files to be mounted as a 
read-only raw files. This allows ‘AFF unaware’ programs to access the contents of an AFFx 
digital evidence container. It does not appear to have been updated for the latest AFF4 file 
structure. Affuse is an example of a Fuse File system that unpacks a container file to expose 
its contents. 
4.6 Imaging 
4.6.1 Existing techniques of imaging and data acquisition 
4.6.1.1 Introduction 
One of the conclusions of the previous research was that, to be effective, assurance needs 
to be implemented across the whole system. Current best practice requires that a 
forensically sound image is taken, transferred, stored and then processed. The success of a 
distributed system hangs largely on the effective implementation of concurrency. Although 
concurrency can be implemented at the processing stage, we are prevented from achieving 
this in a satisfactory manner in the acquisition stage by the linear nature of imaging. With 
larger and larger media, this linear process is taking longer and longer but linear imaging is 
not the only replication method available. We need to reconsider forensic imaging. 
At a fundamental level, data can be stored as a continuous linear stream or as discrete 
blocks that store the data in defined sections. Transfer of data from streams to block storage 
is called blocking and the reverse is called streaming. Almost all storage media on general 
purpose computer systems with Windows or Linux operates as a block device. Even tape 
devices store data in blocks. Data may be a stream of bytes but it is subdivided into regular 
blocks. Most media found in modern devices have a block size of typically 512 bytes, 
although this is not the only size. Subsequently, one terabyte infers two billion blocks. Upon 
this, further layers are built. 
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Figure 47 - Block Storage Abstraction 
Figure 47 - Block Storage Abstraction shows the layers of abstraction built up upon the 
storage media. At its lowest level, the storage media is made up of electronic and magnetic 
components. Storage media is usually divided into partitions that usually contain file-
systems. File-systems are made up of clusters that make up files, which contain data. 
4.6.1.2 Linear Imaging 
We will refer to the current best practice approach to forensic imaging of storage media as 
linear imaging. This technique originated in the UNIX utility dd but persists in most imaging 
programs currently available and trusted as being forensically sound. A bit/byte for bit/byte 
copy of an input device is reproduced to an output device. This takes no account of any 
structural data, including files-system formatting, on the media. Imaging usually starts at 
block 0 and proceeds one block at a time to the end. It operates directly at the storage 
device level. 
Linear imaging has one clear advantage; speed. It does not attempt to make any sense of 
what is being copied and so runs as fast as is possible. This is also very useful when the 
data structure of the information on the media is not known. For example, many digital video 
recorder systems (DVRs) write directly to the media and do not have a recognisable file 
system. By reading directly from blocks on the media, with no interpretation of the data, we 
can assume that nothing will be lost in translation between the source and destination. 
Because no interpretation is undertaken, this technique is less prone to error, when errors 
occur they can normally be recovered. In addition, this provides a degree of separation in 
tasks between acquisition, by the DEFR, and investigation, by the DES. The DEFR does no 
interpretation; they collect. The DES does no collection; they interpret.  
The major drawback is that it is unlikely that any data processing can be started before the 
linear imaging is complete. It becomes a major problem when media size is increasing. Multi-
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terabyte media can take many hours to complete the process. Some imaging software offers 
the ability to scan the data as it passes across the copy for sequences of bytes, in other 
words text strings but little more. 
4.6.1.3 LOTA – ‘Bingo’ 
Roussev, Quates and Martell (2013) propose a new imaging strategy “Latency-optimized 
target acquisition” (LOTA). We choose to name this Bingo imaging because the strategy is 
similar to what happens during the popular game of Bingo. From their paper:  
“The rationale of the system is simple before we start cloning a target, we 
parse its file-system metadata to build an inverse map of data blocks to 
files. After that, we start reading the disk blocks sequentially from 
beginning to end, and use the map to reconstruct on the fly the files whose 
contents have been acquired. Once a file is complete, that is when all of its 
component clusters have been imaged; it is made available through the 
regular file-system interface to file processing tools. Disk cloning proceeds 
in parallel” 
The most important part of this technique is that it uses the file system to improve the 
imaging process and so is able to initiate processing as soon as the imaging process gets to 
the final cluster that holds the data for the specific file. 
They acknowledge that a failing in this system is that if evidence exists in a file that, by 
chance, is located at the end of the disk; it will not be acquired until the very end of the 
process. 
4.6.1.4 ‘Mosaic’ Imaging 
Another approach (Farrell 2014) recently patented, is where each block is read from the 
source and then stored together with its block number on a collection device. This mass of 
labelled blocks can then be reassembled later in the calm of the lab. This technique allows a 
large device to be imaged across to multiple small devices that can be combined to form a 
larger destination that may, or may not, be larger than the source device. Figure 48 and 
Figure 49 show acquisition and reassembly respectively. 
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Figure 48 - Mosaic Acquisition 
The main advantage is technique is that the imaging process can run through the file system 
following the files so ‘valued’ data can be acquired first. If the process is interrupted, it can 
still yield some useful results as it can recreate, at least, a partial image from the chunks. 
 
Figure 49 - Mosaic Reassembly 
As this is a new patent, the exact details are not yet published in full and so it is unclear as to 
the exact format of the data on the capturing devices. If Mosaic created a file for each 
cluster, then it could mean that, as many new files are there are clusters could be created, 
meaning billions of small files. It is more likely that cluster number, data pairs are appended 
to a sequential file on each output media. The original LBA underlying the cluster could be 
saved as a triple, shown in Figure 50. 
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Figure 50 - Mosaic probably stores triples of data 
This technique allows solid-state memory, like SD cards, which often has lower write speeds 
to be used in parallel for output. Having multiple destination devices could help the 
throughput of data by more closely matching the faster read speed from the source with the 
slower write speeds to the multiple destinations. 
We have identified three fundamental data processing techniques for imaging. Regardless of 
acquisition technique, there are a number of formats in which the acquired data can be 
stored. 
4.6.2 Current Forensic Imaging and Storage Formats 
4.6.2.1 Introduction 
Within digital forensics, we give great weight to the notion that all work is done on a whole 
copy of the image that was taken at acquisition time. We gain assurance from this because it 
is unaltered from acquisition time and we can prove that by reapplying the cryptographic 
hash process that was done at acquisition time and checking the result. 
There has been extensive work on the design of file formats for forensic data and there have 
been many proposals for Evidence Storage Formats, though none, with the possible 
exception of AFF4, has been designed with the specific requirements of distributed storage 
and processing in mind. In section 4.3.1.3, we saw how the Hadoop File system stores data 
and how it, effectively, supports the application of the MapReduce processing model from 
which Hadoop gains so much power. However, the data chunking technique used in HDFS 
effectively prevents it from supporting random access across a file within the MapReduce 
Model. This is a significant problem with current formats used within Digital Forensics is that 
they are all designed with the assumption random access is efficient, or at least possible, 
within the file. Whole image files are now so large that this is not the case. 
OAIS (ISO 2012a), see section 4.3.7 on page 106, makes a distinction between the format 
used for Acquisition – the Submission Information Package (SIP), the format used for 
storage – the Archival Information Package (AIP) and the format used for Dissemination of 
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data – the Dissemination Information Package (DIP) and in doing so, acknowledges that one 
format may not suit all situations. 
This raises a question about the suitability of currently defined data formats used in digital 
forensics when they are used in a distributed storage and processing system. 
A number of forensic image formats currently exist (forensicswiki 2014c) (CDESF 2006). 
They fall into a series of evolutionary categories. 
• A simple bit stream image of a single storage device or individual partition; 
• As above with the addition of meta-data and/or compression and/or 
encryption 
 There are two variants in this category; searchable and non-
searchable. Where the whole file is encrypted and/or compressed, it 
is not searchable without decrypting and/or decompressing the 
whole file. Later variants encrypt and/or compress in blocks of, 
typically, 32 kb allowing sub-sections to be processed without the 
overhead of decrypting and/or decompressing the whole file; 
• A complex hierarchical structure that is able to contain multiple objects that 
can be entire devices, file-system images, individual files and extraneous 
data. These formats are often extensible. 
Imaging is the subject of an authoritative testing program established by NIST described in 
(NIST 2014).  
4.6.2.2 RAW image format - dd 
The earliest image storage format is that of a simple binary file representing the original; this 
was often creating using the Unix program dd (2014). 
During the default imaging acquisition process with dd, there is normally no other 
processing. The dd program simply reads blocks of data from the source and writes them to 
the destination. This has the advantage of removing interpretation from the acquisition 
process and so enhancing assurance by reducing the risk of an accusation of collusion and 
tampering with the data at this stage. All analysis and interpretation is deferred to the 
investigation stage when the data is processed by different staff. 
The action of dd command line can be modified by supplying parameters to enable the 
generation of running cryptographic checksum, typically MD5 or SHA-1 but this is not stored 
within the resulting image. Any extra meta-data, for example a cryptographic hash needs to 
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be kept separately. Dd writes out to one single file. This means the destination has to be 
bigger than the source.  
In the last few years, this ‘dumb’ process has been extended to include key-word searches 
as the data is passing through the imaging process. This provides a simple method to alert 
DEFRs to significant data at the crime scene. 
dcfldd (Harbour 2014) is an enhanced version of dd with enhanced functionality for digital 
forensics including the ability to split the destination into many regular sized blocks. 
4.6.2.3 GFzip 
A major problem with the dd format is that the resulting image files are the same size as the 
original media. These image files can be compressed using programs like zip or gzip but 
when this is done the ability to access data in a random fashion is lost without 
decompressing the whole file. In addition, using zip and gzip to compress a file, works on the 
whole file and so requires a second pass at the data, which increases processing time. 
GFZip (Meijer 2014) addresses this issue by allowing random access within the compressed 
file without the need to unpack the whole file. In addition, it adds multi-level SHA256 
cryptographic integrity guards. GFZip development has been suspended in favour of the 
features of the AFF format covered in section 4.6.2.8 
4.6.2.4 ProDiscover 
ProDiscover (ARC Group 2014) is an open format which adds a finite set of meta-data that 
includes, for example, the name of the technician, a description and the date and time the 
image was captured, to a bit stream type image of a single file system. It can be seen as an 
extension of the dd format. 
4.6.2.5 SMART Expert Witness Format and  
Guidance Software’s EnCase Image File 
The SMART Expert Witness format has many similarities with Guidance Software’s Expert 
Witness Format version 1 (forensicswiki 2014a) as they are both originally derived from the 
same authors. Guidance Software’s EnCase (forensicswiki 2014b), commonly known as 
E01, adds integrity assurance by adding a checksum every 32KiBytes but does not provide 
any form of error recovery. 
4.6.2.6 DEB (QinetiQ) 
After about 2005, all development work on digital evidence storage formats focused on the 
ability to store objects smaller than whole media images. 
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Phil Turner proposed a format called DEB (Turner 2006; Turner 2005) which included a 
hierarchical structure to the forensic file. DEBs can contain DEBs. Bradley Schatz extended 
this format to include extra meta-data about the integrity of the contents. 
4.6.2.7 EnCase Logical Evidence Files 
EnCase Logical Evidence File (LEF), which was introduced in EnCase version 5 in 2006, 
extended the existing EnCase Image File formats so that they can store individual files.  
Both the EnCase Image file format and the EnCase logical Evidence File have recently been 
updated with version 2, identified as EWF2-EX01 and EXF2-LX01, where the primary 
improvement is the addition of compression and string encryption. 
4.6.2.8 AFF (AFF, AFD and AFM) 
AFF was originally developed by Simson Garfinkel and Basis Technology (Garfinkel et al. 
2006). There now appears to be two threads to its development with AFF3 and AFF4 co-
existing. AFF4 being authored by Michael Cohen and Bradley Schatz (Cohen et al. 2009). In 
their paper presented at DFRWS 2009 the authors do refer to distributed evidence but this 
seems to be the ability to access large evidence containers stored remotely. When data is 
requested from the remote AFF file, only specific chunks are transferred. In this, it is very 
efficient but it is up to the administrator to organise the AFF containers in a structure that 
aligns to the distributed structure of the storage cluster. There is also load redistribution 
where the most accessible copy of identical AFF files is accessed based on ‘pre-determined 
distance metrics’. 
4.6.2.9 SIP, AIPs and DIPs 
In 4.3.7, we considered the OAIS – ISO 14721:2012 system specification. In OAIS, data is 
submitted as Submission Information Packages (SIPs) and it is converted into Archival 
Information Packages (AIPs) for storage with the original SIP being lost at the end of the 
conversion. When data is distributed from the archive, it is converted into another format 
called a Dissemination Information Package (DIP).  
In the previous formats, created specifically for digital forensics, the data file remains 
unchanged from the time it was created, presumably at the scene of crime by the DEFR, 
through to the time is used for processing. Arguably additional data files and database 
entries may be created during processing and these are used to drive the user interface for 
the investigator. 
Woods et al. (2011) explored the use of SIPs, AIPs and DIPs and applied it to the problems 
of long term archiving of digital evidence.  
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4.6.2.10 Discussion and Conclusions on current forensic image and storage 
formats 
We can clearly see an evolution in the development of forensic file formats to deal with the 
digital environment present at the time. Initially single images were preeminent in the 
investigations but as items like memory sticks and now, cloud storage files have become 
more common the requirements have changed. Although AFF4 does start to address 
distributed processing, it is in a form that is rather like a collection of image stores described 
in 4.3.4 where AccessData have a central storage facility that holds ‘whole’ images. Although 
there is a ‘use case’ for AFF4 set in a distributed storage environment there does not seem 
to be any current development in this specific area. 
4.6.3 File Sizes, Contents and Fragmentation 
In 3.7 we saw that data is now characterised by ‘3V’; Volume, Velocity and Variety and 
nowhere is this more evident than our analysis task. 10 years ago, we would expect a case 
to consist of a single hard disk. Now it would most likely be a collection of media from PCs, 
phones, memory sticks and optical media. Our potential evidence dataset is characterised by 
diversity. 
Successful distributed processing is closely tied to the relationship between the overheads 
over moving data and processing data. As MapReduce shows, with large datasets it is better 
not to move the data and to initiate processing locally where the data is stored. However, 
moving a multitude of small files is very inefficient. This raises the need to gain knowledge of 
the data ecology upon which we will be processing. As part of this, we have devised a small 
program that scans a file system and returns statistical data about file numbers, file sizes, file 
types and file fragmentation. An example print can be found in Appendix B. 
We ran the analysis program against a wide variety of data from various Windows based 
PCs. The resulting data was so diverse as to render any collective statistical analysis 
effectively useless but there are a number of statements that can be made. 
We found that, on the subject of the number of files: 
• Windows XP based PC typically had of the order of 100,000 files, Windows 
7 based PCs typically had 200,000 files, Windows 8 based PCs typically had 
300,000 files, a heavily used desktop PC running Windows 7 sometimes had 
in excess of 1,000,000 files; 
• Certain file types, like picture images, JPGs, PNGs often represented more 
than 25% of all files by type; 
• Often video files, like MP4, represented as much as 40% of file volume; 
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• A many as 50% of all files were less than 10k. The impact of this is that 
when small files are received into the cluster, it may be better to keep them 
on the importing node and process them locally rather than to pass them 
across to the cluster to process them; 
• On PCs running Windows 7and above, with a hard disk as storage, there 
was very little fragmentation. We believe there might be two reasons for this.  
Firstly, Microsoft introduced the running of the disk defragmenting program 
as a standard scheduled task in Windows 7 (Microsoft 2014b). This, of 
course, should eliminate all fragmentation that would have occurred before 
the last scheduled running of defragmenter. Microsoft later modified this so 
that Windows 7 and above attempts to detect Solid State Drives and when 
detected, does not enable automatic scheduled defragmentation. This 
modification was done because of the negative effects of excessive writing 
to SSDs. From a performance perspective, fragmentation has no negative 
effects on performance as SSDs have zero head latency. Subsequently, 
when SSDs are used as storage, there was some fragmentation. 
Secondly, many programs load the entire file contents into RAM for 
processing. When the user saves their work, the entire file is written as a 
new file to the media as a stream of data. Then the original file is either 
deleted or marked as a backup. This is certainly true for word-processing 
files, graphics files and the like. The exceptions are those where the file was 
extended over time, for example log files or database files; 
• In our sample scan, which counted 325,372 files in total and came from a 
SSD, only 8,933, less than 3%, were fragmented at all and most of these 
had five or less fragments to them. These were all log or database files. 
We suspect that the low rates of fragmentation, where is does exist on hard disk media 
where defragmentation has not been run, is because the media is now so large that when a 
new file is written, there is little trouble in finding a large enough space of contiguous clusters 
to hold the file. On this assumption, fragmentation would only occur when the partition 
approaches being full.  
4.7 Prioritisation 
Although formal triage approaches have been applied within digital forensics numerous 
times in the last few years, investigators have always exercised a self-taught approach. 
When faced with finding the ‘data needle’ in the ‘storage haystack’ investigators will, of 
course, look in the area most likely to hold evidence and act accordingly.  
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In 2009, Harry Parsonage, at the time a Detective Constable in the Nottinghamshire 
Constabulary, focused on solutions available to the processing backlog (Parsonage 2009) 
that he described thus:  
“At present, in 2009, it is commonplace for digital forensic units to have a 
backlog, several as long as twelve months.” 
His proposals for improving case management by adopting a management triage approach 
is based on an acceptance that sometimes little or nothing can be done to solve the problem 
by using better computer processing. In fact, he quotes “work expands so as to fill the time 
available for its completion” which suggests that he believes if, and when, such additional 
power is available, the ambition of the investigation will increase correspondingly. 
One of the techniques Parsonage proposes is using software that can be configured to focus 
on specific targets. His example: 
“The triage software is configured to search for –  
1. Indecent images using a large hash set of known images.  
2. Indecent images using fuzzy matching of 25,000 known images.  
3. Text string search for common terms found in indecent image cases.” 
focus on the identification of indecent images as being a key trigger to further examination. 
More recently, Shaw and Browne (2013) have reported on their work with Warwickshire 
Police. They summary the weaknesses of triage as being mainly that of the risk of missing 
evidence through lack of thoroughness. They propose a system where human inspection, 
aid by appropriate tools, is conducted on the original media, with safeguards such as a write 
blocker. 
In 2013, Hong et al. (2013) proposed a triage model for digital investigations specifically 
addressing the issues of large quantities of evidence. They acknowledge the consequence 
of being overburdened with data is that time-scales are extended to inappropriate durations. 
Hong proposes that an acquisition strategy can be developed based upon on-going 
discovery within what they consider a reasonable time-scale to stay on-site. 
Hong et al. created a questionnaire that they offered to 97 examiners, of which 58 
responded. The questionnaire focused on the practices of respondents when conducting an 
on-site examination. In particular, it focused on the self-learned data reduction techniques, or 
short cuts, that the investigators have developed over their time as DEFRs. Half had been 
DEFRs for more than 4 years of on-site acquisitions. 
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Their conclusion was that prior knowledge of the investigation subject area allowed them to 
focus and prioritise data collection and examination. In one section, the questionnaire asked 
whether the DEFRs believed whether certain activities could be completed on-site, within the 
“First Golden Hour”. The responses to seven key questions are shown in Table 12. The 
highest response for each activity is highlighted in grey. 





File Carving 1 3 9 22 23 
Restoration of Formatted 
Media 
2 6 11 26 12 
Decrypting Disks without co-
operation 
0 0 4 10 44 
Decrypting Files without co-
operation 
0 1 0 7 50 
Finding data hidden by 
Stenography 
0 1 0 12 45 
Finding data in files where 
the extension or signature 
has been changed 
3 7 10 18 20 
Recovering data from 
Corrupt files 
0 1 13 26 18 
Contents Searching for text 1 8 10 23 16 
Table 12 - What can be done on-site? (Hong et al. 2013) 
We suspect that had the questionnaire been completed ten years ago the most common 
selection would have been further to the left, i.e. more possible on-site processing with less 
data to identify, collect and preserve. 
To determine current working practices in more detail, they defined four categories of crime 
and asked the respondents to express their priority in selecting data files based on their 
experience of the sources of evidence in these crime types. The categories are shown in 
Table 13, they are: 
 Personal 
Initiated in a Domestic Setting 
Corporate 
Initiated in a Business setting 
Hi-Tech where an individual engages in a 
crime that uses digital technology 
as its methodology, for example 
hacking initiated from home. 
This is typically the ‘insider threat’ of staff 
having limited access to a corporate system 
and exceeding that to gain unauthorised 
access. 
General where an individual engages in 
‘traditional’ crimes like fraud or 
counterfeiting but actions them on 
a digital device. 
This may include sexual harassment 
against another member of staff or spying 
on confidential documents. 
Table 13 - Hong's Crime Scenarios  
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Given these groups of file types: 
• Documents, word processing, spreadsheets; 
• Engineering drawing; 
• Graphic; 
• Voice file; 
• Video file; 
• Internet history; 
• Email; 
• Messenger; 
• Registry files; 
• Event log; 
• Executable files; 
• Accounting data files; 
• Source code files; 
• Link files; 
• Printer spool file; 
• Thumbs.db. 
 
Hong asked what priority the DEFRs would give to each of the file types in each type of 
crime scenario. 
There is no record as to whether the respondents agreed with the relevance or significance 
of the classification but Hong reports that they chose top 10 sequences as shown in Figure 
51: 
 Personal Corporate 
Hi-Tech Crimes 1 Internet History 
2 Document 
3 Registry 
4 Event log 
5 Email 
6 Executables 
7 Link files 
8 Engineering 
9 Messenger 




4 Internet history 
5 Messenger 
6 Graphic 
7 Link files 
8 Registry 
9 Event log 
10 Printer spool file 




5 Video Files 
6 Link Files 
7 Voice Files 
8 Graphic Files 
9 Event Log 
10 Registry 
1 Document files 
2 Accounting files 
3 Email 
4 Messenger 
5 Internet History 
6 Link files 
7 Registry Files 
8 Graphic Files 
9 Event Log 
10 Engineering 
Figure 51 - Four Categories of Crime and sources of evidence   (Hong et al. 2013) 
Horsman (Horsman et al. 2014) introduced the idea of a Primary Relevance Figure (PRF) 
which uses Bayes’ theorem with prior knowledge of previous cases to assign values to the 
location of potential evidence. 
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“Each location on a system that contains evidence related to an 
investigation is given an evidence relevance rating (ERR) by the 
investigating practitioner. The ERR represents the investigator’s 
assessment of the relevance to the case of the evidence found in that 
location. The ERR is a value between 0.1 (low relevance) and 0.9 (very 
relevant) in increments of 0.1. For example, for a particular case, evidence 
found at location C:\Folder might be assigned an ERR of 0.8 to denote that 
the data found there was highly relevant, that is, the evidence would be 
strongly relied upon in determining the outcome of the investigation. 
Research has shown that more fine-grained scales do not provide optimal 
opinion information during a rating exercise” 
“The PRF is the inferred probability that a given location is likely to contain 
evidence that is relevant to a DT case. As new cases are added to the 
knowledge base the PRF (i.e., P(E|L)) will change to reflect the new case 
knowledge” 
Figure 52 shows the changing value of PRF as further cases are assessed. 
 
Figure 52 - PRF changing as further knowledge is gained   (Horsman et al. 2014) 
In an earlier paper, Horsman et al. (2011) addressed the concept of profiling and draws on 
Rogers (Rogers et al. 2006) earlier observation that despite the “need and want” there is a 
lack of data generated from digital investigations about criminal behaviour and personalities. 
Hong and Horsman’s work is a move to the idea that, at least some, investigation work could 
be automated by an appropriate and relatively simple score system. This might be focused 
on data-reduction and prioritisation based upon prior knowledge of the characteristics of the 
crime being investigated. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
We explained the current options within distributed processing and presented previous work 
in the field that is relevant to our domain and then focused on a specific area of concern; the 
practice of working with forensic images. 
In 4.6.3, we assessed existing image formats and concluded that none was particularly 
effective in a new environment that did not exist when they were designed. We identified 
provision of Chain of Evidence as the single worst failing in the existing proposals for 
distributed solutions and that this has most likely come about by familiarity with the status 
quo that has existed for 20 years. 
In the next chapter, we will form these ideas into design criteria, which we will implement as 
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5 Designing an  
Extensible Digital Forensic Investigations Solution 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter section, we review chapters 3 and 4 and develop the framework of a solution. 
Section 5.2, is intended to read as a representation of a thought process drawing on the 
issues, criteria and requirements identified in the previous chapters. Having more focus on a 
solution, section 5.3 presents a list of identified problems and in 5.4 we describe the 
proposed solution. 
5.2 Design Discussion 
In chapter 3, we established the historic background and current practice in digital forensics. 
A lot of this has been adopted and adapted from analogue forensics. One key concept 
carried over is that of assurance and we see this most notably in the form of a Chain of 
Evidence used to prove the provenance of evidence collected and subsequently presented 
in court.  
Over the last 15 years, processes have been developed that provide assurance through an 
effective chain of evidence when processing data for forensics. This is a painstaking 
procedure of record keeping that does not differ greatly from any other rigorous audit trail. 
Forensic investigators are already struggling with the volume of data they are required to 
analyse and it looks as if it will continue. It has been suggested that this backlog of work is 
having a degrading effect on the legal system. Cutting corners in the legal process is not 
acceptable. The problem can be summed up as needing to improve processing efficiency 
while maintaining the quality assurance standards of processing. 
In chapter 4, we described several possible solutions. Scaling up, with GPUs and exotic 
multicore architectures, either often requires complex new programming paradigms or is 
disproportionately expensive in gaining processing power. Improving processing techniques 
requires a ‘win’ in many situations, one for each problem and it may be that not every 
problem has a new elegant solution. This approach could result in a long hard battle and 
may not yield much gain overall for all the effort. Case triage is reported to have achieved 
marked success in reducing the case backlog in the last few years. It is, however, open to 
the criticism that selectively ignoring evidence, or even entire cases, to focus on others 
based on the, all be it, experienced mind of a professional investigator, holds the risk that 
critical data will be passed by. Data reduction, in which data is processed to remove 
irrelevances and highlight connections or repetitions, combined with visualisation is a good 
candidate but these will surely increase the need for more processing power. Choosing to 
work to increase processing power in an economic and palatable form is the solution that 
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has most advantage. It would allow bigger algorithms to run in reasonable times. Shorter 
processing times could be achieved by simply using more hosts. 
There have been a few attempts to achieve this but none has had significant success. The 
common factor in these designs is that they retain the idea of a central file store that holds all 
the forensic images of the media under investigation. The forensic image, in the basic form 
of a raw byte-stream or more likely as an EnCase Expert Witness Format file with error 
checking built-in, has become such a foundation that the profession seems unwilling to give 
it up. It has attained this status because as it is a facsimile copy of the original and can be 
checked for integrity by applying a cryptographic hash, it represents completeness and so 
we gain the assurance of an acquisition job completed and verifiable. 
The problem when processing whole images is that when several of these images are held 
on a central file store, as is the case with AccessData FTK distributed processing, and 
accessed simultaneously for processing, the connection between the storage and the 
network switch becomes a bottleneck. We have seen that about 16MB/s can be processed 
on a PC based on an i7 processor. One storage server can supply enough data for about 
five host PCs before the Gigabit Ethernet connection limits data supply. Beyond this, there 
are scaling problems. It doesn’t matter how big the file store, the data can’t be moved to the 
processors fast enough to occupy any more than about five i7 PCs. 
This type of problem, encountered when processing large amounts of data is not unique to 
digital forensics. A decade ago, when attempting to analyse the contents of large log files it 
became clear that moving large amounts of data across a network to get it processed was 
increasing the primary limit on system performance. What was needed was an architecture 
where the data was already distributed and stored across the network, which would enable 
data to be processed locally on each storage host node without any, or perhaps minimal, 
data transfer across the network. 
The Hadoop system was designed to solve just this sort of problem. It succeeds because of 
a combination of a purpose designed processing model, MapReduce, and a purpose 
designed file system Hadoop File System (HDFS). In an HDFS file system, huge files are 
broken into chunks; these are typically 64MB with the multitude of chunks stored across the 
distributed storage facility. Efficient processing of data requires that processing one chunk of 
data does not require access to data in another chunk, as this would need network access, 
which is to be avoided if possible. The MapReduce processing model splits processing into 
tasks and processes just the data stored locally. HDFS is designed to handle a small 
quantity of very large files that do not require random access to process. Unfortunately, this 
does not describe the nature of the task during forensic processing of a large image file that 
does require random access within the image file. 
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Using the idea of splitting data across hosts, it might be better to acquire digital evidence as 
individual files and store them across the network hosts but this would mean dropping the 
idea of a taking a complete forensic image of the media and instead using selective digital 
evidence containers. This saving on processing time, on its own, may not be justification 
enough but in addition to this, the practice of taking a forensic image of the whole of the 
media is coming under attack for three other reasons. Firstly, because a forensic image 
collects everything on the media, data not relevant to the case is captured as well. There are 
increasing arguments that the collection of data using whole images is illegal as it is 
unreasonably wide in its action. Secondly, with the uptake of remote storage systems like 
Dropbox and Google Drive, there is sometimes no longer direct access to the media and so 
it is impossible to complete a forensic image. Gradually, the practice of capturing data in the 
form of forensic images is decreasing and in Digital Evidence Containers is increasing. 
Thirdly, the increase in media size is making the process of imaging untenably long. 
There are however, problems with adopting this approach as a processing model within 
digital forensics. Collecting data selectively and storing them in digital evidence containers 
would surely result in slower imaging. This is because the hard disk actuator arm would need 
to repeatedly seek data across the media rather than run through the sectors in a linear 
manner. In addition, there would be a considerable task in keeping track of all the individual 
data files when they are stored on the distributed system. 
On the later problem, it seems likely that a database, over and above the file system would 
provide a solution. There are several ways this could be implemented.  
Firstly, it is possible to store entire image files as a Binary Long Object (BLOB). It seems that 
the largest BLOB allowed in most SQL databases is 2
32 
= 4GB. This is nowhere near enough 
to storage an entire typical forensic image file. It would however, allow most current files to 
be stored individually. Under current expectations, only email and video files regularly 
exceed these sizes. How large individual files may be in the next few years we do not know. 
It is possible to mimic the clustering of data found in file systems like NTFS and EXT3/4. In 
this case, individual blocks could be up to 4GB and whole files would be limited only by 
storage capacity. However, SQL databases take data space allocation upon their own 
management control. It would be difficult to achieve data locality awareness in processing in 
the same way as has been so successful with processing in Hadoop. 
A more promising approach would be to use the SQL database to mimic just the directory 
files of a conventional file-system and then hold data within each database record to point to 
the file containing the data that would be stored in conventional file-system space. In fact, it 
would be possible to actively place the data file in a specific location, suited to that data and 
record the link in the SQL database. The SQL database could also host extra meta-data 
about integrity, evidence source, collation data and time and the like.  
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The provision of an information store in the form of an SQL database would work but it would 
mean that every program would need to be aware of the database. This would mean 
amending existing software and incorporating this functionality in the design of any future 
software. If would be far better if this was completely transparent to the application software. 
In fact, it would be better if this functionality could be written into the operating system, as 
application programs would be unable to avoid the control. Writing a new operating system 
specifically for digital forensics is a practical option. Luckily, there is an intermediate solution. 
This could be written as a File System in User space. We reviewed several FUSE file-
systems and this does seem very similar to a combination of the features found in existing 
FUSE file-systems. We should then think of a custom file-system that controls all access to 
evidential data. 
The downside of this is that we can still expect this to incur a management overhead. The 
additional time spent managing the data as it moves around the network needs to be 
regained in the advantages from embarrassingly parallel processing when it is in place. 
Where possible, processing should be undertaken on data held locally. 
On the issue of slower imaging using selective DEC techniques, the solution might be to 
introduce some form of prioritisation. Roussev’s LOTA imaging strives to make whole data 
files available as soon as the linear imaging process passes the last cluster in which data for 
that particular file has been held. Longer overall imaging time may be acceptable if highly 
valued data is available much sooner than by previous techniques. A file based, evidence 
container, collection method that targets files that have been given a high value for their 
potential evidence value should offset the latency we can expect from the costs of the 
management of data across a distributed system. 
Figure 53 is a representation of the current practice. With larger media needing investigation, 
the first two stages, where no profitable work is actioned, are taking longer. It is only in the 
final stage that the investigator actually gets to conduct meaningful investigation, producing 
evidence to be used in the case. 
 
Figure 53 - Productive Investigation Time with Conventional Processing 
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Figure 54 shows a representation of what we hope to achieve. By extracting data from the 
source and delivering it to a distributed processing architecture, we hope to draw forward the 
productive time of the investigator. Prioritisation will mean that the data considered by the 
investigator to be of greater likelihood of containing evidence will be drawn forward in the 
queue and so can be considered much earlier. 
 
Figure 54 - Improved Investigation Time with Distributed Processing 
5.3 Identified Problems (Design Objectives) 
The previous work has resulted in a design requirement that identifies 18 problems. These 
are listed in detail in Table A1 in the Appendixes. They are categorised and associated with 
a summary description of the problem. 
They are briefly: 
1. The blocking nature of Linear Imaging; 
2. Processing and data transfer balancing; 
3. Focusing processing on potentially high yield source data; 
4. Complex, time consuming tasks, can block processing flow; 
5. The need for meta data from the original source to be available throughout the 
process; 
6. Access to raw data needs strict control; 
7. Legacy software should not be excluded; 
8. From the point of view of the programmer, the system should be as close to existing 
paradigms as possible; 
9. The difficulty in handling large amounts of data from diverse sources; 
10. Data transmission needs to be secured; 
11. Data disposal needs to be monitored and secure; 
12. Audit must be transparent; 
13. Data transfer and replication must be transparent; 
14. Data must be read-only; 
15. Data integrity must be frequent and transparent; 
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16. Validation of processing results by replication of process; 
17. All source data needs a unique identification; 
18. Automation should be maximised. 
5.4 The Solution Outline and overview 
Therefore, in summary, our design has come to an SQL database based FUSE file-system. 
The database will hold meta-data but not the data itself. This will be linked via reference to a 
file stored in the host operating system, which is ext4 on Linux. 
The meta-data, stored in the database will be sufficient to assure the quality of data handling 
on the distributed processing platform. Access to data will not be possible without reference 
to the FUSE file system. 
Data will be acquired as selective digital evidence containers that must have sufficient 
provenance information and integrity meta-data included in its contents. 
Acquisition will not be in a conventional linear action but by using the file-system metadata, 
the directory, to prioritise collection based upon a scorecard system with values set by the 
investigator. 
Because evidence is acquired in discrete digital evidence containers, they can be dispatched 
to a processing facility immediately after they are created. They will be taken into the cluster 
by the middleware that organises load balancing and distribution. Integrity checks are run as 
a routine act. All this is controlled by the middleware. 
Processing can be initiated as soon as each one is received and verified. 
The previous sections lead to a solution that can be described as: 
• Middleware 
 Having an operational model that is implemented as a middleware 
that runs on an existing operating system. This leverages all the 
build assurance of a tried and tested infrastructure. In which all data 
movement, unpacking and verification will be implemented by a 
series of operating system scripts; 
• File System 
 Is based around a custom file system in which file meta-data data is 
stored within a well-established SQL database. All the existing 
facilities of this SQL database will be inherited by the forensic 
system; 
 one in which access to data for processing will be only via a custom 
file system implemented using FUSE technology; 
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 one in which evidential data will be stored as whole data files, not as 
partial chunks or blocks; 
• Processing 
 one in which data processing will be actioned locally where possible 
but can be actioned remotely via a network connection; 
• Organisation 
 one in which the system can be divided into zones of assurance; 
• Security 
 one in which data will be moved and stored in an encrypted form  
 one that implements fine-grained access control. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have constructed a design discussion that has led to an outline design 
solution. In the next chapter, we will describe this solution, in detail. 
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6 A Middleware Solution for Forensic processing on a 
Distributed System 
This chapter introduces a design for a solution to the problems identified in chapters 3 and 4. 
Section 6.2, presents an overview of the whole FCluster system describing the architecture 
together with a brief description of the components. 
Section 6.3, describes FCluster in terms of information assurance and the passage of data 
through those zones. 
During the design process, it became clear that although it would certainly be desirable to 
adopt a digital evidence container that has an active design and development community 
behind it, the use of the most likely candidate AFF4 caused too many complexities in our 
prototype. Instead, we substitute a greatly simpler design, described in section 6.5, that 
embodies the principles of the DEC requirement with few of the sophistications. 
FCluster comprises of a new imaging process we have chosen to call Jigsaw Imaging, a 
data processing priority algorithm and the FClusterfs File system. These are introduced in 
sections 6.4, 6.6 and 6.7 respectively.  
This chapter finishes with some conclusions, in section 6.8. 
6.1 Introduction 
FCluster is a peer-to-peer middleware for a network of heterogeneous host computers. 
FCluster has controls for data ingestion, movement and availability in a computer cluster in 
such a way that the data’s integrity and authenticity is assured throughout its existence. We 
take an holistic approach to the forensic process by extending this assurance from 
acquisition right through to processing. FCluster includes a design for a DEC with a simple 
structure. FCluster is a vehicle upon which application programs can be run; it is not an 
application program. It is language agnostic and so does not require application programs to 
be written in a specific way or language. 
Table A1 in the appendixes shows each facet of the solution against its corresponding 
problem. 
The movement of data through FCluster is achieved by several control programs that 
interlock in such a way that subsequent control programs cannot process data that does not 
fulfil the requirements of the successful completion of the previous control program.  
They form a series of four interlocking assurance zones; shown in Figure 55.  
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Figure 55 - FCluster Assurance Zones 
FCluster is based on a new FUSE file system, FClusterfs that mimics the functionality of a 
regular file system but writ large. FClusterfs is described, in detail, in section 6.3. 
The current assurance zone for a particular item of evidence can be determined by the 
presence or absence of data in the MySQL database behind FClusterfs. 
6.2 Architecture 
In this section, we present a broad overview of the components that make up FCluster. 
6.2.1 Hardware topology 
FCluster is intended to run on very conventional hardware often called Mass Market 
Commodity off the Shelf Processors (M
2
COT). This is the same approach as Hadoop and 
many other clusters. FCluster can run across local and wide area networks. While all the 
data transfer is encrypted via a VPN, we accept there are legal issues associated with the 
geographic storage local of the data that would be analysed within FCluster. This issue is 
outside of the scope of this project; see section 1.3.3 .  
6.2.2 Software Architecture – Middleware 
FCluster is implemented as a middleware that sits on top of an existing operating system; 
see Figure 2 - System layers. The prototype is implemented on Ubuntu 12.04 but we see no 
reason that this cannot be extended to Linux in general, OSx and Windows. 
6.2.3 Host Roles and Servers 
FCluster comprises of a number of servers. A single host may have several servers and thus 
fulfil several roles. Each host computer in the cluster might fulfil all of the roles listed below, 
but it is likely that most hosts will be allocated just three or four roles. 
6.2.3.1 Acquisition Authority Server 
This manages the cryptographic keys used to authorise imaging. These keys are stored in 
the MySQL database at the heart of FClusterfs. These keys are issued to the imaging 
devices. 
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6.2.3.2 Imaging Device 
These portable devices read accept the cryptographic keys created by the Acquisition 
Authority servers and use them to encrypt data from the original media and create the 
directory metadata Digital Information Containers (DECs), file data DECs and Image files. 
Imaging devices are considered part of the assured system of FCluster. They need to be 
uniquely identified and the cryptographic keys created by the Acquisition Authority Server 
are uniquely allocated to a specific imaging device. The Acquisition process, which we will 
still call imaging although the primary output is not an image but a collection of digital 
evidence containers, encrypts all the data collected. 
6.2.3.3 FClusterfs file-system metadata storage server 
The heart of FCluster is a multi-featured File System in User Space (FUSE) filesystem. 
FClusterfs is a hybrid amalgamation of the existing FUSE file systems described in 4.5 with 
some original extensions. None of these existing FUSE file-systems, in themselves, provides 
all the features needed to satisfy our requirements. FClusterfs can be thought of as a 
superset of, in particular, MYSQLfs with considerable amendments to their code to enable 
extra functionality.  
6.2.3.4 DEC Ingestor/Importer 
This firstly identifies new evidence DECs that were created by an Imaging device, and have 
been placed in an input staging area. They are then validated to assure that they are 
expected. This triggers the start of ingestion. 
6.2.3.5 Load Balancer 
The load balancer takes DECs from the DEC ingestor and then chooses which 
storage/processing host should hold the primary copy of the data based on the processing 
server’s capacity and workload. 
6.2.3.6 Replicator Service 
The replicator’s primary task is to see that there are enough copies of the DECs to ensure 
redundancy. Its primary sub task is to identify and place the primary copy of the DEC on its 
allocated storage server. Subsequently, its subordinate tasks are to ensure the secondary 
and tertiary copies are in place. The Replicator service always ‘pulls’ data. In this way, each 
server is responsible for obtaining and managing its own data, thus distributing the task. 
This service also verifies that the data on the storage server is still valid by routinely 
performing cryptographic hash calculations and comparing these to those stored in 
FClusterfs’ MySQL database.  
A Middleware Solution for Forensic Processing on a Distributed System 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  143 | P a g e  
6.2.3.7 Data Storage server 
This server actually holds the data. All data is stored in the native file system used by the 
operating system. For example, on a storage server running Linux this would most likely be 
ext3/4. Data is stored within the native file system is encrypted and needs to be decrypted 
before it can be interpreted. 
6.2.3.8 Processing Host 
This role controls the actual processing of data. To avoid any unnecessary data transfer, this 
would usually be combined with the data storage role. 
6.2.4 Scale and scalability 
FCluster is intended to provide distributed processing to regional forensics labs. At the start 
of the project, in 2011, we arbitrarily chose the budget of £30,000 as being realistic and that 
this would buy about 100 host PCs. Each might have 16GB RAM and 3 TB of hard disk 
storage and be linked together with a gigabit Ethernet network on a single 48-port switch. 
FCluster is intended to be implemented on small clusters. It is not certain where scaling 
problems would occur but these are outside the scope of the project; see section 1.3.3 .  
6.2.5 Peer to Peer and multi file-system 
MYSQLfs (Brancatelli 2014) is presented by its authors as a single database solution in 
which one database is hosted on a MySQL server to hold the metadata and data of a single 
file-system which is mounted on the host file system.  
In FClusterfs, we extend this to enable any single MySQL server to hold any number of 
databases that can each hold any number of file system volumes. 
Within the limits prescribed by the access control system of MySQL, a user can access any 
MySQL server and then any database within that and any file-system within that. In reality, it 
is unlikely that every host on a cluster would provide a MySQL database service for 
FClusterfs. 
6.3 FCluster 
In this section, we will describe FCluster in much more detail. 
6.3.1 Introduction 
FCluster can be understood as a collection of components that interrelate and depend on 
each other for the assured transit of data through the system. FClusterfs is the file system 
that handles all the data interactions during this transit. 
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6.3.2 An Overview of Data transfer through FCluster 
Having established the component parts of FCluster from a high-level view, it is now possible 
to demonstrate its operation by following data as it is gathered and passed into the system. 
Figure 56 show this as a series of data movements controlled by the control daemon 
programs. 
 
Figure 56 - Data Movement through the Zones 
The whole process is initiated by an administrator creating an Acquisition Authority - 
“Authority to Image”. This is in the form of a file that is created on the cluster and contains a 
key text string to be used for encryption. This is then passed to the imaging device.  
The imaging device uses the data contained in the authorisation file to encrypt the data as it 
is acquired and stored as DECs. 
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The imaging process has four deliverables: 
1 a single DEC containing directory metadata; 
2 a collection of DECs, one each for each file that falls into a ‘high value’ 
criteria set by the image acquirer; 
3 a conventional ‘forensic image’, for reference and later extraction of further 
data; 
4 and DECs for unallocated disk space. 
 
The imaging process is explained in detail in section 6.4.  
The selection of files to be packaged as DECs is based on a user determined priority, which 
is explained in section 6.5, and subsequently only file types expected to have a higher 
likelihood of containing evidence depending on the case type are collected at this stage. 
The ingestion of data into FCluster is initiated as a part of load balancing when the directory 
metadata DEC, containing the data defining the file system directory, is imported into the 
MySQL database at the heart of FClusterfs. At this stage, a directory skeleton will exist 
within FClusterfs but no data is available for analysis. 
The file data, in the form of a multitude of DECs, is imported as it becomes available. If the 
Acquisition device and the cluster are connected, data DECs are ingested almost as soon as 
they are created. When the Acquisition is remote from the analysis cluster the DECs are 
stored and forwarded later. The arrival of the data DECs on the cluster starts a process of 
‘filling out’ the evidence file system with data associated with each directory entry.  
The allocation of DECs to storage servers is based upon calibration benchmarking that is 
undertaken locally on the storage/processing servers and reported to the MySQL database. 
This allocation information is saved within the MySQL database behind FClusterfs. 
The cluster-runtime-movefiles daemon is constantly scanning the FClusterfs MySQL 
database to find files allocated to storage local to the running daemon. When it learns of one, 
it copies it onto its local storage. 
The cluster-runtime-unpackfiles daemon is constantly scanning to find DECs as they arrive 
at the storage/processing servers. When a DEC arrives on its storage host, it is unpacked 
and its contents are verified against the data already held in the FClusterfs MySQL 
database. Only if it is proven valid is it then accepted and made available via the distributed 
file system, FClusterfs. Upon approval at its storage location, another daemon, 
cluster-runtime-processfiles, initiates a defined list of tasks and automatic processing is 
conducted, for example generating text indexing or thumb-nailing images. 
To provide integrity, redundancy and secondary load balancing, a replication daemon, 
cluster-runtime-replicate, firstly ensures constant and routine validation of data by applying a 
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SHA 1 checksum calculation to each file and comparing the result with the figure created at 
acquisition time and stored in the MySQL database. It then ensures that there are multiple 
copies of the data, normally three, held on separate hosts within the cluster.  
The DECs created at image time will, most likely, have captured only part of the evidence. 
Subsequently a ‘Bag it on demand’ system can trigger an on-the-fly acquisition of data that 
was initially deemed of secondary interest within the image once it has been completed and 
is available to the cluster. This data is validated and placed in the same assured manner as 
the rest of the system.  
How FCluster is configured as a network system is up to the administrator but it can form a 
local or wide area network. The prototype successfully uses a VPN to connect the nodes and 
we have extended it to use nodes on Amazon Web Services. Whenever data is transferred 
between nodes is it always in an encrypted form and so can be considered safe in a 
technical sense but this may not be acceptable on principle within a legal environment. The 
primary objective, and the core of any speed improvement, is that processing takes place 
locally on the datanode holding the data. In a similar way to the use of SHA1s to identify 
‘Bad’ files, the system can be used without the actual files being accessed. Results are 
transferred across the network but not normally the data. 
6.3.3 Various Perspectives on FCluster 
6.3.3.1 By Assurance Zone 
The Assurance zones Figure 57 - FCluster Assurance Zones, first seen on page 141, shows 
a very high-level view of the separation into zones. 
 
Figure 57 - FCluster Assurance Zones 
Figure 58 - Assurance Zones as Rings, expresses this as a series of concentric rings. The 
progress of data through the assurance rings depends on the successful transition through 
the previous ring. Ultimately resulting in the processing of data that is assured to be correct 
in terms of is provenance and integrity within the system. 
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Figure 58 - Assurance Zones as Rings 
The properties or attributes necessary to establish assurance of data are all stored within the 
MySQL database as an integral part of the FClusterfs file system. In the processing zone, 
there is no other method of accessing data other than through FClusterfs. 
6.3.3.2 As a schematic with FClusterfs at its core 
Figure 59 - The four Zones of Assurance, shows the movement of data in detail. FClusterfs 
is the constant control throughout the later three assurance zones. 
A Middleware Solution for Forensic Processing on a Distributed System 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  148 | P a g e  
 
Figure 59 - The four Zones of Assurance 
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6.3.3.3 Mapping the Assurance zones to the FCluster system schematic 
Figure 60 shows the assurance zones mapped against the system schematic. 
 
Figure 60 – Mapping FCluster Assurance Zones 
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6.3.3.4 FCluster system schematic 
Figure 61 - FCluster System Schematic shows the components and their interrelations. 
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6.3.4 Assurance in more detail 
6.3.4.1 Acquisition Assurance in Detail 
 
Figure 62 - Acquisition Assurance Loop 
The first assurance zone in FCluster is controlled by a “Loop of Authority and 
Acknowledgement” in which authority is granted to an imaging device to take an image; 
Figure 62 - Acquisition Assurance Loop. Consequently, FCluster only accepts data that was 
gathered with an authority issued by FCluster. 
 
Figure 63 - Imaging Authority over Time 
Figure 63, shows the passage of data, in red, and the movement of hardware, in yellow, set 
against the passing of time. First, the existence of the imaging device “A”, is registered with 
the FCluster DeviceID table in the FClusterfs database “B”. Then the Acquisition Authority 
program “C”, shown in more detail in Figure 64, is used to create a random key to be used in 
encryption. This key, specifically allocated to device “A”, is stored in the VolumeListing table 
in the MySQLfs database “D”. When device “A” is used for acquisition, is used the key 
generated at “C” and stored in “D”. FCluster will only accept input if it comes from device “A” 
A 
B 
C D D 
A 
E 
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and uses the specific key. If it is acceptable, the resulting data is added into the inodes table 
“E” 
 
Figure 64- Acquisition Authority Dialog Box 
The key information is sent to the imaging device where it is used to encrypt the data within 
the DECs. The meta-data DEC, who contents are shown in Figure 67, is ingested in to the 
Cluster where it is matched with the database record of its creation, an example is shown in 
Figure 65. The directory structure, stored as data within the meta-data DEC, is ingested as 
added to the FClusterfs database. 
The Administrator chooses options within the dialog box to control the contents of the 
authority file. 
• Device Identification: Authority is granted to, and only to, one of the devices 
known to the system. The details of which are held in the DeviceInfo table; 
• Expiry Date: As part of the assurance control, the Authority can expire. This 
authority will expire on a date set by the Administrator; 
• Number of Keys to Generate: The Authority is given to create one or more 
keys depending on the assessment of the Administrator. 
The ‘Authority to Image’ file contains a reference number and a randomly generated key that 
will be used at acquisition time to encrypt the data stored in the DECs. The reference 
number and key are recorded as a new record in the VolumeListing table in the FClusterfs 
database. Multiple keys can be created and issued to multiple imaging devices to form a 
‘stock of authorities’ to be used over a period of time, the keys have an ‘expiry date’ 
associated with them as an added control. The reference number under which the 
cryptographic key was recorded is located in the VolumeListing table. 
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Figure 65 - VolumeListing Table Sample Contents at 20
th
 May 2014 
Figure 65, shows the typical contents of the VolumeListing table. Record 12 contains the 
253
rd
 authority granted by the system. The authority is granted to ‘Device008’, and was 
created on the 21
st
 April 2014 at 20:41 and will expire on the 31
st
 May 2014, in 10 days’ time. 
The scan may have taken place but the data has not yet been returned as evident from the 
absence of data in the ScanDateTime, VolumeID and FSRootnode fields. Record one is an 
example of an authority that will have expired on the 20
th
 May 2014. Record 4 is an example 
of a scan that is now complete as there is evidence that it has been drawn into FCluster by 
the presence of data in the ScanDateTime, VolumeID and FSRootnode fields. 
We have devised a novel imaging process that provides assurance while also fully exploiting 
the concurrent nature of distributed processing. We will present Jigsaw Imaging, in detail, in 
section 6.4.2 . For now, it will suffice to say that the imaging process has four outputs.  
1 a single DEC containing directory metadata; 
2 a collection of DECs, one each for each file that falls into a ‘high value’ 
criteria set by the image acquirer; 
3 a conventional ‘raw forensic image’, for reference and later extraction of 
further data. 
4 multiple DECs containing the data from the Unallocated file-space. 
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6.3.4.2 Ingestion assurance 
The ingestion section of the zones schematic is shown in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66 - Import/Ingestion Zone 
The DEC containing file-system directory metadata is the first to be imported back into 
FCluster. The typical contents of the file-system metadata file can be seen in Figure 67 and 
the controlling dialog box can be seen in Figure 68.  
<keytext>-NbtMSejN$c&LO^URH9</> 
<scandatetime>2014-08-07  0:35:28 +00:00</> 
<filesystemSerialNo>14A51B74C91B741C</> 
[      4 -rwxrwxrwx        2560 May 11  2011]  ./$AttrDef 
[      8 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$BadClus 
[      6 -rwxrwxrwx       32736 May 11  2011]  ./$Bitmap 
[      7 -rwxrwxrwx        8192 May 11  2011]  ./$Boot 
[     11 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./Extend 
[      2 -rwxrwxrwx     5361664 May 11  2011]  ./$LogFile 
[      0 -rwxrwxrwx     2127872 May 11  2011]  ./$MFT 
[      1 -rwxrwxrwx        4096 May 11  2011]  ./$MFTMirr 
[      9 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$Secure 
[     10 -rwxrwxrwx      131072 May 11  2011]  ./$UpCase 
[      3 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$Volume 
[   2044 drwxrwxrwx        4096 May 11  2011]  ./Acer 
[   2027 -rwxrwxrwx       76800 Nov 30  2008]  ./A Grid GPS part 2.doc 
[   2028 -rwxrwxrwx       11805 Nov 30  2008]  ./A Grid GPS.pdf 
.. 
.. 
[   1942 -rwxrwxrwx        6225 Aug  6  2008]  ./VideoViewer/guard.jpg 
.. 
.. 
[   2025 drwxrwxrwx           0 May 14  2009]  ./Winhex 
[   2026 -rwxrwxrwx     1246735 Jul  3  2008]  ./Winhex/winhex.zip 
[   2042 -rwxrwxrwx     1373751 Jun 23  2009]  ./wrar39b3.exe 
46 directories, 1967 files 
Figure 67 - The Contents of the Image File-System Metadata DEC 
The design for the simple DEC is given in more detail in section 6.5. 
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Figure 68 - File-System Volume Metadata import 
The keytext, in the image File-System Metadata DEC, is searched against the contents of 
the VolumeListing table; the keytext was generated during the authority stage and should be 
present in the database table. If it is present, and the record has not expired or has not been 
previously fulfilled, the import can proceed. If the keytext cannot be found in the 
VolumeListing table or has expired, it is not possible to import the file-system directory 
metadata. 
The remaining contents of the meta-data DEC is read and the directory meta-data is 
decrypted and records for each file are created in the inodes, tree and metadata tables. 
These include fields that describe the full path and filename, file size, MAC dates and times. 
These fields are marked in the “updated at ingestion stage 1” column in Table 26 - inode 
table field updates by processing stage.  
At the end of this process, a complete ‘framework’ of the directory structure and filenames 
will have been created in the FClusterfs database. It is actually possible to mount this 
FClusterfs structure and traverse the directory but as the import of file DECs that contain file 
data has not yet been carried out there is no actual data to analyse in the files. 
A series of “checklists” is now used to control the import of the details and contents of the 
data-DECs. Table 26 - inode table field updates by processing stage, on page 208, shows 
the fields set against the stages of ingestion. 
Figure 69 shows the initial dialog for data-DEC ingestion. 
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Figure 69 - Stage 1 of Evidence Ingestion 
To initiate ingestion, the administrator selects the folder DECs to be used as a staging area 
for ingestion. This might be mounted removable media or a network connected shared drive 
into which the acquisition process has deposited the digital evidence containers. The DEC 
staging area is scanned, any DECs that form part of a Volume that is expected to be 
imported are found, and the header is read to extract details of the VolumeID, path, filename 
and size. The inodes table is searched to see if this DEC is expected, that is, there is an 
entry previously made by a file-system directory metadata DEC import. At this stage, various 
fields in the inodes table that were created in the Acquisition stage, like the original file’s 
cryptographic hash and staging directory URL, should be empty. If there is a record in the 
inodes table that satisfies these criteria, then the fields in the table are populated with the 
meta-data extracted from each of the data-DECs. For each data-DEC, if there is a record in 
the inodes table and it shows it has already been imported, it will not be considered again. 
6.3.4.3 Distribution Assurance 
The Distribution section of the Zones schematic is shown in Figure 70 
 
Figure 70 - Distribution Assurance Zone 
This stage has four components.  
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• Load Balancing; 
• Moving DECs to their primary destination; 
• replication to two other locations; 
• unpacking. 
 Load balancing 6.3.4.3.1
Load Balancing is a function of the ingestion control dialog shown in Figure 69 
Having ingested the volume directory metadata the system is now primed to expect the data-
DECs that makeup the acquired file system. The first task of load balancing is the selection 
of the primary storage for the data. It allocates a storage server to hold the data held within 
the data-DEC and records this in the FClusterfs inodes table. Allocation is based on the 
available capacity of the host, its processing power and its estimated time to finish its current 
task list. This data is generated by the cluster-runtime-nodestate daemon and its data is 
stored in the nodestate table, see Table 24 - nodestate table structure, in section 6.3.4.4.2 
and 6.7.3.3.9 for more details on its operation. 
 The cluster-runtime-movedata daemon 6.3.4.3.2
The cluster-runtime-movedata daemon also uses “checklist” type assurance by constantly 
scanning the inodes table of FClusterfs for any DEC that has been allocated a primary 
storage server, not been marked as being ‘in place’ and where the evidence DEC is staged 
in a directory local to the cluster-runtime-movedata process. This is column three of Table 26 
- inode table field updates by processing stage. If these conditions are met, the DEC is 
transferred to the storage datanode as was allocated by the loadbalancer; see Figure 71. If 
and only if, the transfer is successful does cluster-runtime-movedata update the inode table 
with ‘primarystorageinplace’ set to true. cluster-runtime-movedata and cluster-runtime-
replicate are the only mechanisms whereby actual data can be moved around the system. It 
can only operate when all the preconditions from Ingestion Assurance are met. It does not 
simply scan an evidence folder and move whatever DECs are present; it moves only 
expected DECs, as recorded in the FCluster inodes table, from a specific folder. 
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Figure 71 – Movedata 
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 Cluster-runtime-movefiles Flowchart 6.3.4.3.3
The cluster-runtime-movefile daemon controls the placement of DECs in their primary 
storage position. Data is drawn into the primary server, not pushed by an external agent, 
based upon data present in the inodes table; see section 6.7.3.3.3 on page 201. The 
process can be seen in Figure 72 - Cluster-runtime-movefiles Daemon Flowchart. 
 
Figure 72 - Cluster-runtime-movefiles Daemon Flowchart 
 The Cluster-runtime-replication daemon 6.3.4.3.4
The cluster-runtime-replicate daemon controls the placement of DECs in their secondary and 
tertiary storage positions. Data is drawn into the storage server from a copy on another 
storage server, most likely the primary server. It is not pushed by an external agent but 
pulled by the daemon running within the storage host. This is based upon data present in the 
inodes table; see section 6.7.3.3.3 on page 201. 
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 Cluster-runtime-replicate Flowchart 6.3.4.3.5
The process can be seen in Figure 73. 
 
Figure 73 - Cluster-runtime-replicate Daemon Flowchart 
 The cluster-runtime-unpack daemon 6.3.4.3.6
Unpacker daemon constantly scans the inodes table to see if there are any DECs that are on 
its local server but have not been unpacked. It takes the entry from the database and looks 
to see if the files are on its ftp host, as should be the case from the entries in inodes, not the 
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other way round. A file that simply arrives on the server without an entry in inodes would be 
ignored. When a suitable DEC is identified, it is split into header and data sections. If this is 
the primary storage server, the header, containing the meta data read and the meta-data is 
inserted into the ‘meta_data’ table and the header file erased. The data section is uudecoded 
and the data decrypted with a key stored in the VolumeListing table. This was the key first 
created during Imaging Authority and issued by FCluster to be and used to encrypt the data 
in the DEC at acquisition time. If the key does not work, the file cannot be decrypted and so 
unpacking would fail. Only if the file decrypts and the resulting file have a SHA1 checksum 
that matches both the name of the file itself and the SHA1 as recorded in the inodes table is 
the data-DEC finally accepted. 
 Cluster-runtime-unpackfiles Flowchart 6.3.4.3.7
The cluster-runtime-unpack daemon controls the unpacking of DECs and their placement as 
AIPs in their allotted storage positions. Data is drawn into the storage space by the daemon, 
not pushed by an external agent, based upon data present in the inodes table; see section 
6.7.3.3.3 on page 201. The process can be seen in Figure 74 - Cluster-runtime-unpackfiles 
daemon Flowchart. 
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Figure 74 - Cluster-runtime-unpackfiles daemon Flowchart 
 
6.3.4.4 Processing Assurance 
 
Figure 75 - Processing Assurance Zone 
The processing assurance zone, in Figure 75, is the last of the four zones. 
The cluster-runtime-processfiles daemon scans the workflow table to see if any jobs are 
scheduled for a file that is held locally and that it is the designated primary storage for that 
data. The program is run and the task exit code is stored in the meta-data table. 
In section 4.3.5, we categorised programs and assessed the implications of trying to run 
them in a distributed environment. 
It is not possible to cater for programs written in a GUI environment where the code is 
inherent in the display control and maintain the distributed processing paradigm but FCluster 
does support this non-distributed processing paradigm, though it is much less effective. 
In most cases, the investigator would not see FClusterfs mounted in their user space. 
Distributed processing is intended to take place on the storage server with local data but this 
does not prevent FClusterfs being mounted on the user’s workstation.  
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Figure 76 - Legacy GUI Software Access 
In this arrangement, shown in Figure 76, any legacy software such as FTK and EnCase can 
work but will gain no advantage from distributed processing. “File1” could be a legacy image 
file. All data would have to traverse the network between the storage server and the 
workstation where the processing will be performed. This is no worse than the centralised 
network storage model presented in Figure 31 - The Evidence Server and Figure 32 - Case 
and Evidence Storage both of which are taken from AccessData’s documentation with FTK. 
We are assured that the evidence data is correct because all file access must take place by 
utilising the FClusterfs file-system.  
This means that its progress from authority to image, imaging, ingestion, load balancing, 
primary movement, secondary and tertiary movement, unpacking and constant validation 
against a cryptographic hash mean that it must be the correct data. 
FCluster does not validate the appropriateness or functionality of any application programs 
that are run but because all programs are normally run from the worktask table it is possible 
to limit what is acceptable to be placed in the table to a certified subset of commands. 
We could, if we wished, control which users can process specific data with specific 
programs. 
FClusterfs also gives us fine grained access control to the files within a file system. by 
implementing a ‘UserAccessControl’ table FClusterfs could allow and deny access to any file 
recorded within the database thus allowing some degree of acknowledgement of the rights of 
privacy of the suspect. 
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 Cluster-runtime-processfiles Flowchart 6.3.4.4.1
The cluster-runtime-processfiles daemon controls the processing of data according to the 
entries in the workflowtasks table of FClusterfs. This is initiated and controlled by data stored 
in the inodes table; see section 6.7.3.3.3 on page 201 and the workflowtasks table; see 
section 6.7.3.3.7 on page 204. The process can be seen in Figure 77 - Cluster-runtime-
processfiles Flowchart. 
 
Figure 77 - Cluster-runtime-processfiles Flowchart 
 Cluster-runtime-statemonitor Flowchart 6.3.4.4.2
The cluster-runtime-statemonitor daemon controls the processing of local calibration and 
workload data monitoring and posts the benchmark figures to nodestate table of FClusterfs, 
see section 6.7.3.3.9 on page 205. The process can be seen in Figure 78 - Cluster-runtime-
statemonitor Flowchart. 
An instance of the cluster-runtime-nodestate daemon program, written in Bash, runs on each 
Cluster member. During a run, it gathers information about key features of the host. cluster-
runtime-statemonitor calls a variety of utility programs to gather operational statistics about 
the host computer. These include processing load on each core, available and committed 
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RAM, available and spare data storage, the network link speed. This data is sent to the 
NodeState table that contains records of each of the nodes within the cluster. The Load 
Balancing process refers to the data in the NodeState table to determine which storage 
server will be the primary holder of the data. 
 
Figure 78 - Cluster-runtime-statemonitor Flowchart 
At a set time interval, perhaps every 24 hours, and certainly when any key feature of the 
system is changed, each node is ‘calibrated’ by running a specific set of test programs with a 
standardised ‘typical’ data set. The time taken to complete each of these calibration tasks is 
stored locally and is sent to the MySQL server and recorded in the NodeState table, 
6.7.3.3.9, Table 24 - nodestate table structure.  
The Estimated Time to Complete (ETC) is calculated by factoring the processing time per 
megabyte for a specific file extension against the time last recorded as the time taken to 
complete a megabyte of processing of that file type. This would yield an indicative ETC, 
which until the task is undertaken, would be a good a guide as any. 
The selection of a storage/processing server to hold the primary data copy is based upon the 
ETC relative to the ETCs from other hosts. In this way, hosts that are more powerful are 
subject to a greater utilisation. 
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6.4 Jigsaw Imaging 
6.4.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, 6.3, we described FCluster and made a design decision that to attain 
higher assurance, departing from current practice, the imaging of source media should be an 
integrated part of the forensic system. In this section we describe “jigsaw Imaging”; a novel 
approach to forensic imaging which is more suited to very large media and concurrent 
processing of data. This approach is based on the observation that when executing a raw 
linear type of imaging on a machine with an i7 processor, the processor is vastly 
underutilised and could do much more. We reviewed existing approaches to imaging in 
section 4.5 
6.4.2 The Jigsaw Technique 
6.4.2.1 Overview 
The primary objective in Jigsaw Imaging is to obtain usable data while processing a 
conventional imaging process. In LOTA – “Bingo Imaging” in 4.6.1.3, Roussev, Quates and 
Martell proceeded traditional linear imaging by first reading the file system meta-data from 
the directory and using this data to monitor the completion of files as the data was imaged 
sector by sector in a linear fashion. In this way, LOTA is able to identify which files have 
been completed by the linear copy process and make them available for analytical 
processing. We move further in that we use the file system data to control the sequence in 
which the sectors are processed. 
In our technique, which we have named “Jigsaw Imaging”, we develop on existing 
techniques by tracking the data through paths defined by the location of file data as recorded 
in the file-system directory rather than simply reading sequentially through the media sector 
by sector. Overall, the production of an image will take longer but Jigsaw makes investigable 
evidence available almost immediately. 
6.4.2.2 Strategy 
Our strategy will be familiar to anyone who has ever attempted to build a jigsaw puzzle. 
While a small jigsaw of perhaps 20 pieces can be conquered by starting at the top left and 
locating each piece sequentially by matching from the picture, this approach becomes 
untenable when applied to puzzles of thousands of pieces. The alternative is obvious. First, 
we search for all the pieces with a straight edge, in particular we look for the corners. When 
we have found and positioned the corners, we build a rectangular frame into which we will 
place all subsequent pieces. Next, we look at the pile of remaining pieces and try to group 
them into piles of similar colours or patterns. We attempt to complete these areas ‘in 
isolation’ and having done so, we complete the remaining areas as best we can fill in the 
gaps between the areas already completed. 
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Although not all areas of the hard disk allow us to apply this structured approach, where we 
can, we use the information structures on the media to direct our imaging process we do but 
in other areas, we adopt linear imaging. Our strategy works in areas of the disk that contain 
known file-system formatted data where we are able to track through the data and read data 
in a sequence that yields analysable data as quickly as possible. It does not work in areas 
like the partition table, HPA, DCO or unused or at least unidentified space on the media. In 
these, we revert to a linear sequence. 
The prototype program only addresses devices with the NTFS file-systems and so we will be 
specific in this. We will not explain the intricacies of the NTFS file-system. We refer the 
reader to File System Forensic Analysis (MySQL 2014) and ntfs.com (MySQL 2014) for 
more details of NTFS but will highlight some key features. 
System File File Name MFT 
Record 
Purpose of the File 
Master file table $Mft 0 Contains one base file record for each file 
and folder on an NTFS volume. If the 
allocation information for a file or folder is 
too large to fit within a single record, other 
file records are allocated as well. 
Master file table 2 $MftMirr 1 A duplicate image of the first four records of 
the MFT. 
Log file $LogFile 2 Contains a list of transaction steps used for 
NTFS recoverability. Log file size depends 
on the volume size and can be as large as 4 
MB. It is used by Windows NT/2000 to 
restore consistency to NTFS after a system 
failure. 
Volume $Volume 3 Contains information about the volume, 
such as the volume label and the volume 
version. 
Attribute definitions $AttrDef 4 A table of attribute names, numbers, and 
descriptions. 
Root file name index $ 5 The root folder. 
Cluster bitmap $Bitmap 6 A representation of the volume showing 
which clusters are in use. 
Boot sector $Boot 7 Includes the BPB used to mount the volume 
and additional bootstrap loader code used if 
the volume is bootable. 
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System File File Name MFT 
Record 
Purpose of the File 
Bad cluster file $BadClus 8 Contains bad clusters for the volume. 
Security file $Secure 9 Contains unique security descriptors for all 
files within a volume. 
Upcase table $Upcase 10 Converts lowercase characters to matching 
Unicode uppercase characters. 
NTFS extension file $Extend 11 Used for various optional extensions such 
as quotas, reparse point data, and object 
identifiers. 
    12-15 Reserved for future use. 
Quota management file $Quota 24 Contains user assigned quota limits on the 
volume space. 
Object Id file $ObjId 25 Contains file object IDs. 
Reparse point file $Reparse 26 This file contains information about files and 
folders on the volume include reparse point 
data. 
Figure 79 - NTFS Metadata Files (NTFS.com) 
In an NTFS file system all data is contained in files, even the directory of the file system 
itself. There are about 25 special files that contain file system meta-data. These files are 
always the first written when the file system is created and occupy the first 32 ‘slots’ in the 
directory table. These files all begin with the “$” symbol and are all hidden to ‘normal’ 
computer users. Unlike other files, the system files entries are always in a defined position 
and never move. See Figure 79 - NTFS Metadata Files (NTFS.com) 
The most important file-system meta-data is contained within a system file called $MFT 
which is always $MFT record 0. Another note-worthy file is $Bitmap, which is always MFT 
record 6, which contains a bitwise representation of which cluster are in use and which are 
currently unallocated to files. Each of the records in $MFT contains a data item which points 
to the cluster at which the co-responding data starts and any defragmentation which occurs. 
6.4.2.3 Jigsaw Imaging Deliverables  
Jigsaw imaging has two types of deliverables – (Figure 80 - Jigsaw Device Connection).  
• An imaged copy or copies of the original; 
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• A collection of Digital Evidence Containers that contain the potential 
evidential data. There are two types of DEC contents. 
o A single master DEC containing specifically directory meta-data describing 
the contents of the second type of DEC, shown in Figure 88 - FCluster 
Master DEC; 
o A Multitude of DECs containing the actual data, shown in Figure 89 - 
FCluster Data DEC. 
 
Figure 80 - Jigsaw Device Connection 
There could be a multitude of files forming one data DEC or a multitude of data DECs each 
containing one file or a combination of multiple files in multiple data DECs, or a combination 
of the pervious arrangements. 
In our description, we use the generic term DEC. This can be any one of a variety of formats 
suitable for storing one of more files. AFF is an obvious choice. 
6.4.2.4 Outline 
Jigsaw imaging uses linear imaging but directs this by interpreting the file-system and using 
this information to direct the focus to the high value areas of the media; namely those with 
actual data. Jigsaw imaging first accesses the disk meta-data, then the data within each 
partition and then, in turn, the directory data for each partition. Referring back to the 
description of our strategy in 6.4.2.2, this is like building the borders of the file-system into 
which we can fill the gaps with data from the files. Then we access the files themselves. 
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Once we have read the files, we can then read the unallocated space. See Figure 81 - 
Jigsaw Imaging Process 
As we have read the directory, we can apply a selection criterion to select certain files to be 
accessed as a priority because we consider them likely to hold evidence, see 6.4.2.5. Jigsaw 
imaging reads these files and adds them to the evidence DEC(s). It then reads all the other 
files, considered to be of lesser potential value by or selection criterion, and finally reads the 
unallocated space to complete the imaging of the partition. 
 
Figure 81 - Jigsaw Imaging Process 
The most important single feature of Jigsaw imaging is that as each block/cluster is read 
from the source, it is written in its corresponding location to the image target drive(s) while 
simultaneously creating DECs of the file. Each block/cluster is read just once from the 
source and written just once to the target drive. This is described in Figure 82 - Jigsaw Read 
Write Sequence.  
The nature of this process means that the image output cannot be to a file on a file system 
as is the case with EWF and FTK, but is written as an image, written directly to a storage 
device. As each cluster is read from the original, it must be written directly to the 
corresponding cluster on the image target. 
A Middleware Solution for Forensic Processing on a Distributed System 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  171 | P a g e  
Select a Partition 
Select a file 
Create a new DEC 
 
Read cluster from Source media 
Write to corresponding location on target media 
Append to DEC(s) 
Further Writes as required 
 
Read cluster from Source media 
Write to corresponding location on target media 
Append to DEC(s) 
Further Writes as required 
 
Read cluster from Source media 
Write to corresponding location on target media 
Append to DEC(s) 
Further Writes as required 
 
Close DEC 
Figure 82 - Jigsaw Read Write Sequence 
6.4.2.5 Selecting data; Primary and Secondary Evidence 
The prototype includes a simple filtering facility where a regular expression can be given to 
define a subset of files to be ‘bagged’ as DECs. In Figure 83 - Acquisition initiation Dialog, 
we are choosing as files ending in “.txt”, “.doc”, “.c”, “.jpg” and “.scr” as an example. The 
prioritisation technique, described in section 6.5, on page 181, greatly enhances this. 
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6.4.2.6 Initiation 
 
Figure 83 - Acquisition initiation Dialog 
The operation of Jigsaw Imaging is best explained with the features of the initiation dialog 
box, Figure 83 - Acquisition initiation Dialog. The options are explained in Figure 84 - Jigsaw 
Imaging Options 
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Evidence Device Name the name of the source media. This is the name of a 
storage device, in this case /dev/sdg (not a partition on 
that drive which would be /dev/sdg1) 
DEC Storage root The root directory, in a file system, where the DECs will be 
deposited as they are created. 
Destination drive for the image The destination name of the media. As with the  Evidence 
Device Name, this is the name of a storage device, in this 
case /dev/sdg (not a partition on that drive which would be 
/dev/sdg1) 
Text preamble file name This should contain the name of a text file whose content 
describes meta-data for this imaging process. This 
enables a text note to accompany the image meta-data. 
Cryptographic Keytext file See section 6.4.2.7 
Cryptographic Key Selection See section 6.4.2.7 
Unallocated Space  
Copy Unallocated Space? 
Will the copy continue into the unallocated space of 
the file system? 
Unallocated Space  
Bag Unallocated Space? 
If the previous option is selected, will the space be 
bagged into DECs? 
Unallocated Space  
Max Unallocated Space Bag Size 
If the previous option is selected, what size will the 
bags be? 
Known File Fingerprinting This is the connection information of an SQL server that 
can be used as a reference to test file fingerprints to 
enable ‘known safe’ or ‘known unsafe’ to be ignored or 
highlighted as appropriate. This can be enabled or 
disabled as required. 
Evidence Bag Selection This can contain a regular expression used to define which 
subset of files to be bagged as the imaging process 
proceeds. 
Figure 84 - Jigsaw Imaging Options 
6.4.2.7 Jigsaw as part of the FCluster system 
The motivation that led to Jigsaw imaging was twofold. Firstly, we feel that FCluster needed 
a corresponding imaging technique that aspired to a higher-level assurance found in 
FCluster and secondly that we needed an imaging technique that lent itself to yielding the 
advantages so long promised by parallel distributed processing but not delivered. 
Unlike any existing system, in FCluster imaging starts within FCluster itself. In the first of the 
four assurance zones that we first introduced in Figure 55Error! Reference source not 
found., an authority to image is generated by the action of an administrator when they 
trigger the creation of a set of cryptographic hashes destined to be sent to, and used by, a 
specific imaging device, shown in Figure 64- Acquisition Authority Dialog Box. This process 
is detailed in section 6.3.4. 
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6.4.2.8 Exit Points 
Jigsaw imaging is intended to provide the investigator access to potential evidence as soon 
as possible whilst still completing a traditional image in an acceptable time. This is facilitated 
by having ‘exit points’ within the full sequence. 
 
Figure 85 - Jigsaw Exit Points 
Figure 85 - Jigsaw Exit Points shows that after the high potential evidence has been 
captured in stage 4, the ‘removable storage media A’ can be removed and passed to the 
analysis software. Meanwhile, Jigsaw imaging will continue until stage 5 is complete, at 
which point the ‘removable media B’ can be removed and sent for analysis. If required, 
Stage 6 can write the unallocated space as DECs to ‘removable media C’. It may be some 
time after the three pervious captures have completed that the image hard disk is available. 
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Figure 86 - Jigsaw Process Flow 
6.4.2.9 The Sequence in detail 
There are eight stages in Jigsaw Imaging. Shown in detail in Figure 86 - Jigsaw Process 
Flow. 
• Stage 1 reads data from the device control channel to identify the storage 
media as a device; 
• Stage 2 uses linear imaging to read the partition table; actually, this is just 
one sector; 
• Stages 3 to 6 use file-directed linear imaging to read the contents of a 
recognised file system; 
• Stages 7 and 8 use linear imaging to read the remainder of the storage 
device. 
 Stage 1 - The Storage Device 6.4.2.9.1
First, the device ID and structural data, about LBAs, is read from the source device. This is 
not actually part of the media contents and so is not written to the target device but will be 
written, as part of the header section, to a “directory metadata DEC” file. 
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 Stage 2 - MBR, the partition table 6.4.2.9.2
The Master Boot Record, which contains the partition table, is read and interpreted as a 
guide for the rest of the imaging process. All currently agreed standards for MBR are set at a 
single block of 512 bytes. As the partition information is read, it is written to the 
corresponding block on the image target drive and is also interpreted and stored in RAM. 
The appended to the directory metadata DEC file as part of the header section. 
 Stage 3 – Directory within a partition 6.4.2.9.3
When starting to acquire a file-system partition, Jigsaw imaging starts by reading the 
directory, which in the case of an NTFS partition is the $MFT file, which always starts in 
cluster 0, and creates an array of data representing the file structure of the partition. 
Directory entries in NTFS are usually 1024 bytes (Carrier 2005) and so even large disks 
rarely have $MFT files greater than 500MB. As with the partition table data, as each 
block/cluster of data is read, it is written to the corresponding cluster on the target drive and 
is appended to the directory metadata DEC file as part of the header section. The $Volume 
MFT Record is read to obtain the volume label and version information which is written to the 
Directory DEC. The $MFT file contains, not only, entries for ‘visible’ files which can be seen 
by the user but also a set of up to 32 ‘system’ files which hold information about the file-
system’s meta-data that includes, for example, security schemas, unused cluster availability. 
These files are copied in section 6.4.2.9.6 
 Stage 4 –Selected/Prioritised Files with a partition 6.4.2.9.4
In Jigsaw imaging, the array of file/directory data created in the previous stage is used to 
select files that conform to a selection criteria decided by the acquirer. In the prototype, 
these can be selected by a regular expression acting on the file name or a selection based 
on the MAC dates of the file. 
There is an improved File Selection and processing Prioritisation in section 6.5 
Jigsaw imaging proceeds by processing each of the selected files. A cluster-by-cluster copy 
of the file is taken to the target drive at the same time a digital evidence container is built on 
the DEC storage media. Each cluster that makes up these files is read only once from the 
source and written at least twice, once to the image target and once to the DEC. 
It is most likely that the End Of File will be encountered before the end of the final cluster. 
Jigsaw Imaging includes the data in slack space in its copy. 
As a file is read, Jigsaw imaging calculates a cryptographic checksum for the file. This is 
possible because, unlike previous imaging techniques, Jigsaw reads by following through 
files not clusters. In the prototype, there is an option to lookup these checksums against a 
database of Known File Fingerprints. As the files are read, the SHA1/MD5 is calculated. 
A Middleware Solution for Forensic Processing on a Distributed System 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  177 | P a g e  
Known ‘Good’ files can be discarded at this stage and not included in the primary DEC 
collection. Also known bad hashes can trigger an alert to the Acquirer for appropriate action 
to be taken. 
 Jigsaw imaging - exit point Stage 4 6.4.2.9.5
At the end of this stage, all of the evidence selected as primary will have been collected in 
DECs. In Figure 80 and Figure 85 we showed that several storage devices could be used for 
DECs. If a device had been allocated to storing the DECs produced by stage 4, it could now 
be removed and the transport and ingestion to the analysis facility could begin leaving the 
remainder of the imaging process to continue. More so, if the DECs were stored on 
shareable media, they could be ingested and processed as soon as they are created. 
 Stage 5 - Residual files 6.4.2.9.6
After the primary evidence files are copied then the remaining files are imaged. This stage 
includes copying the remaining NTFS system files that occupy inodes less than 32. As with 
the previous files, these are read cluster by cluster and written cluster by cluster to the target 
media. As the clusters pass through, the cryptographic hash is calculated. If selected, the 
result can be tested against a database of SHA1 checksums of files known to be ‘bad’ and 
the acquirer can be alerted. 
 Jigsaw imaging - exit point Stage 5 6.4.2.9.7
At the end of this stage, provided the option was selected, all of the evidence selected as 
‘bad’ from its KFF will have been collected in DECs. In a similar way to ‘DEC exit point Stage 
4’, this data can be processed as the rest of the imaging continues. 
 Stage 6 - Unallocated Space 6.4.2.9.8
The NTFS system file, $volume, contains a bit mapping of cluster usage. In this final stage, it 
is used to copy, sequentially cluster by cluster, all the remaining data from the original to the 
target.  
Jigsaw imaging has an option to write unallocated space data to DEC(s). This is a significant 
departure from current practice. Current carving software, known to the author, only supports 
carving of whole image files. Jigsaw imaging can provide a series of DECs that contain the 
data from unallocated areas of the files system. The advantage of this is that it can be used 
across a distributed system to allow parallel processing of carving without special 
programming techniques. 
During our experiments for prioritisation, we found a number of significant factors that affect 
Unallocated Space. 
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• Most files, 97%, are not fragmented at all, 1 or 2 are very fragmented (500+ 
fragments); 
• We note that Windows XP does not automatically run defrag; 
• Windows 7 and above schedules automatic defrag runs for hard disks; 
• Windows 7 and above does not automatically defragment Solid State Drives; 
• Solid State Drive often clear sectors that held data and have been deleted in 
the file-system. 
File slack space is read within the Files Section See 6.4.2.9.4 
 Jigsaw imaging - exit point Stage 6 6.4.2.9.9
At this stage, all the unallocated space data will have been written to DECs. In a similar way 
to ‘DEC exit point Stage 4 and Stage 5’, this data can be processed as the rest of the 
imaging continues. 
Stages 3 – 6 are repeated for each partition found in stage 2 provided it is of a known format 
so that the Jigsaw imaging program can interpret its structure. If an unknown partition type is 
discovered then linear imaging is more appropriate. 
 Copy Gaps in Partition Table 6.4.2.9.10
Linear imaging is used to copy any gaps left between the partitions. This will be evident from 
the partition table data. 
 HPA and DCO 6.4.2.9.11
Finally, the HPA/DCO areas are copied cluster by cluster to the target using linear imaging. 
An audit trail can be seen in Figure 87 - Jigsaw Imaging Progress. 
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Figure 87 - Jigsaw Imaging Progress 
6.4.2.10 Parallel carving using DECs 
Simply put, carving involves reading a stream of data and attempting to detect data that can 
be recovered in some intelligible form. There are several factors that govern the success of 
carving (Richard III & Roussev 2005) among them are: 
• Fragmentation – carving can only recover whole files when they are stored 
in contiguous clusters and have not been overwritten in part. It can recover 
part files consisting of a series of contiguous cluster whose run is interrupted 
when clusters are overwritten; 
• Analysis complexity – in general, the more complex the regular express or 
search technique, the slower the process. For different searches, often 
multiple passes are needed; 
• The read speed of the storage media contributes to whether this is a disk I/O 
bound, where the disk cannot keep up with the need to feed the processor, 
or processor bound operation, where the processor leaves the media I/O 
idling. 
Jigsaw imaging can collect data from unallocated space in DECs. The DECs can then be 
submitted to FCluster for analysis with existing tools such as Scalpel (Richard III & Roussev 
2005). It is very unlikely that all the unallocated space within a file system will occupy one 
large contiguous run of clusters; although this could be the case after a thorough 
defragmentation of the disk. It is most likely that it will be interspersed by the data from a 
‘real’ file. It is far more likely, the unallocated space will comprise of a scattering of runs of 
clusters of a variety of sizes.  
Jigsaw imaging does allow DECs to be built with any number of clusters but in practice, they 
need to be limited in size to enable them to be processed effectively across a distributed 
processing system.  
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In Jigsaw imaging, the unallocated space DECs can be limited in the maximum size to which 
they are allowed to grow. A natural break is when a ‘run’ of unallocated clusters ends when it 
is interrupted by a cluster which is marked as ‘in use’; this data is readily available from the 
NTFS file $Volume. Another possible break point is when the user specifies a maximum file 
size. The default length set for Jigsaw is an arbitrary 500MB but can be changed. 500MB is 
based on our research that shows that, typically, 40% of all files on a system running a 
Windows OS are less than 10MB. 
Carving has two objectives; to recover entire files, for example photographic images, or 
smaller artefacts that are like email addresses or credit card numbers. 
In a 500MB file with 4k clusters, there are 125,000 possible start positions for a file because 
they must be cluster aligned. If a high resolution JPG is 10MB it will occupy 2,500 clusters. 
This means that a randomly placed 10MB will be truncated only if it starts in any one of the 
last 2500 clusters. A chance of 2,500/125,000 or 1:50. A 1GB DEC would reduce this 
chance to 2,500/250,000 = 1:100, and so on. An email address might be as many as 50 
characters but could start anywhere within a cluster. In this case it could be partially lost if it 
started in the last 50 characters of a DEC. A chance of 50 in 500,000,000. The latter is so 
small as to be of negligible risk, if the former is considered too great then the acquirer should 
choose a larger DEC size when using Jigsaw imaging.  
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6.5 A simplified SIP, DEC design 
We discussed the current availability of Digital Evidence Container designs in section 4.6.1, 
on page 118. With the assumption of the unsuitability of image formats like those create by 
dd to cope with ever larger media simply because of size, we need to make some design 
decisions about a DEC upon which a distributed architecture can be based. 
It is clear that because of its provision for reference to external data and its potential AFF4 is 
the most likely candidate upon which an implementation of FCluster should be based but we 
consider AFFx too complicated to implement in a prototype. The metadata that forms the 
header part of the simplified DEC is very similar to the output of fiwalk command found in the 
Sleuthkit (Carrier 2015) but the Sleuthkit only works on forensic images of media not 
individual files themselves. 
Instead, for development purposes only, we substitute a very basic design that enables us to 
demonstrate the action of assurance in FCluster, yet it embodies all the principles needed in 
a DEC. 
In FCluster, data is packaged in two types of DECs; a Master DEC and a Data DEC. 
The Master DEC contains information about the file-system. It contains the first 20 
characters of the key used to encrypt the data in the Data DECs, a reference to the scan 




<scandatetime>2014-08-07  0:35:28 +00:00</> 
<filesystemSerialNo>14A51B74C91B741C</> 
[      4 -rwxrwxrwx        2560 May 11  2011]  ./$AttrDef 
[      8 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$BadClus 
[      6 -rwxrwxrwx       32736 May 11  2011]  ./$Bitmap 
[      7 -rwxrwxrwx        8192 May 11  2011]  ./$Boot 
[     11 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$Extend 
[      2 -rwxrwxrwx     5361664 May 11  2011]  ./$LogFile 
[      0 -rwxrwxrwx     2127872 May 11  2011]  ./$MFT 
[      1 -rwxrwxrwx        4096 May 11  2011]  ./$MFTMirr 
[      9 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$Secure 
[     10 -rwxrwxrwx      131072 May 11  2011]  ./$UpCase 
[      3 -rwxrwxrwx           0 May 11  2011]  ./$Volume 
[   2044 drwxrwxrwx        4096 May 11  2011]  ./Acer 
[   2027 -rwxrwxrwx       76800 Nov 30  2008]  ./A Grid GPS part 2.doc 
[   2028 -rwxrwxrwx       11805 Nov 30  2008]  ./A Grid GPS.pdf 
[   2029 -rwxrwxrwx      361472 Nov 29  2008]  ./A Proposal for a GPS Grid.ppt 
.. 
.. 
[   1942 -rwxrwxrwx        6225 Aug  6  2008]  ./VideoViewer/BMP/device/guard.jpg 
.. 
.. 
[   2041 -rwxrwxrwx    17331590 Mar 28  2011]  ./VideoViewer_Setup_M0178.exe 
[   2025 drwxrwxrwx           0 May 14  2009]  ./Winhex 
[   2026 -rwxrwxrwx     1246735 Jul  3  2008]  ./Winhex/winhex.zip 
[   2042 -rwxrwxrwx     1373751 Jun 23  2009]  ./wrar39b3.exe 
 
46 directories, 1967 files 
 
Figure 88 - FCluster Master DEC 
The Data DEC contains all the information needed to fully represent the data collected. 
There are three sections within the DEC. The First section contains header data about the 
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DEFR who actioned the scan, the case, the date and time the scan took place and 
information about the media and file system. The second section contains detailed meta-
data about the data file. In the example in Figure 89 - FCluster Data DEC for a single file 
“/VideoViewer/BMP/device/guard.jpg “, we can see the meta-data for a file stored on an 
NTFS file-system. This includes details of the original cluster numbers and corresponding 
cryptographic hashes of the data from each of these clusters. In addition, a cryptographic 
hash of the entire file is stored. The third, and final section, contains a Uuencoded version of 




<case>A Villainous Crime</> 
<date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23</> 
<description>This is a small 1GB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect</> 
<ScanStartedAt>Thursday, August 07 2014. 00:35:30 BST</> 







Dumping attribute $STANDARD_INFORMATION (0x10) from mft record 1942 (0x796) 
 Resident:    Yes 
 Attribute flags:  0x0000 
 Attribute instance:  0 (0x0) 
 Data size48 (0x30)</> 
 Resident flags:   0x00 
 <FileAttributes> ARCHIVE (0x00000020)</> 
Dumping attribute $FILE_NAME (0x30) from mft record 1942 (0x796) 
 Resident:    Yes 
 Attribute flags:  0x0000 
 Attribute instance:  3 (0x3) 
 Data size84 (0x54)</> 
 Resident flags:   0x01 
 Parent directory:  1873 (0x751) 
 File Creation Time:  Fri Apr 18 13:58:54 2014 UTC 
 File Altered Time:  Fri Apr 18 13:58:54 2014 UTC 
 MFT Changed Time:  Fri Apr 18 13:58:54 2014 UTC 
 Last Accessed Time:  Fri Apr 18 13:58:54 2014 UTC 
 Allocated Size:   8192 (0x2000) 
 Data Size0 (0x0)</> 
 Filename Length:  9 (0x9) 
 <FileAttributes> ARCHIVE (0x00000020)</> 
 Namespace:   POSIX 
 Filename:   'guard.jpg' 
Dumping attribute $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR (0x50) from mft record 1942 (0x796) 
 Resident:    Yes 
 Attribute flags:  0x0000 
 Attribute instance:  1 (0x1) 
 Data size80 (0x50)</> 
 Resident flags:   0x00 
 Revision:   1 
 Control:   0x8004 
 Owner SID:   S-1-5-32-544 
 Group SID:   S-1-5-32-544 
 System ACL:   missing 
 Discretionary ACL:   
   <Revision>2</> 
  
 <ACE><type>allow</><flags>0x3</><access>0x1f01ff</> 
   <SID>S-1-1-0</> 
Dumping attribute $DATA (0x80) from mft record 1942 (0x796) 
 Resident:    No 
 Attribute flags:  0x0000 
 Attribute instance:  2 (0x2) 
 Compression unit:  0 (0x0) 
 Actual Data size 6225 (0x1851)</> 
 Allocated size:   8192 (0x2000) 
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Figure 89 - FCluster Data DEC 
One key feature of the FCluster DEC is that given all the DECs it is possible to rebuild an 
exact reproduction of the original media accurate to the cluster location of data on the 
original. 
DECs are named with a regular convention: 
[File System Serial Number-[SHA-1 of the file contents].meta 
14A51B74C91B741C-FE3B0313FF0CA689B894DEFFF3978C410579253F.meta 
The FCluster DEC is not intended to progress into a fully working format. It is an expedient 
allowing more effort to be focused on the main issues with movement of data through the 
cluster.  
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6.6 Prioritising Data Acquisition 
6.6.1 Introduction 
Forensic analysis has become much more complicated in recent years. The term 
Velocity/Variety/Volume (3V), section 3.7, has been used to express this increase in data 
throughout the computer domain. 
As investigators, we have no control over the media we are required to examine. It would be 
very useful if our investigations could be limited to evidence stored on small memory sticks 
or SSDs as these, by virtue of their capacity and speed, currently pose few challenges. One 
of our biggest problem areas is the analysis of the data found on large hard disks. Our 
techniques have not changed in more than a decade. We still take an entire image then copy 
it onto a workstation/server and initiate analysis. After this, we can start our manual analysis. 
This is linear. 
In line with the principles addressed in section 4.5, we strive to introduce optimisation in the 
acquisition process. In this section, we introduce data processing prioritisation in which we 
use a Bayesian approach to a valuation of the potential. Using this ‘self-assessment’, every 
file is given a value that represents the investigator’s feeling of the likelihood of evidence 
being found in the file. From this, we prioritise the sequence in which the data is acquired 
and so available for processing. By ‘pushing’ data, files with a high likelihood of yielding 
evidence towards the front of the processing queue we hope to make the process immediate 
and reduce ‘noise’. 
6.6.2 Current practice 
6.6.2.1 Introduction 
From our own experience, we have come to expect that a PC running Windows XP and with 
only one file-system partition, drive c:, when subjected to typical use after a couple of years, 
will have about 80,000 files. We have seen this increase to about 150,000 with Windows 7 
and further increase to about 250,000 with Windows 8. Clearly, the number of files, their 
types and their sizes depends on the user but there is no doubt that volumes are increasing. 
15 years ago, in 2000, when investigators were considering analysing the data on a 40GB 
drive running Windows XP they could expect acquisition times of about an hour and 
processing times of the order of 6 hours. This was not unreasonable given the time scale of 
investigations and the prevailing view, at the time, that digital information was of 
questionable provenance in an investigation. 
If now takes about 24 hours just to read all the data from a 4TB hard disk, and perhaps many 
days, or even weeks, to process it, it is sensible to reassess the sequence in which we 
process the data. 
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Historically approaches to analysis have been largely sequential, perhaps influenced by the 
approaches to overall investigation management and evidence acquisition. 
Forensic file formats were discussed in section 4.6.3. In this section, we revisit the same 
techniques but assess them from the point of view of speed of acquisition and access to the 
data for processing. We reviewed existing techniques for imaging in section 4.6.1. From that, 
we saw that there were two fundamental approaches to imaging 
• Linear: where data is read from the source and replicated to the destination 
in a strictly linear sequence, normally by media block sequence; 
• Non-linear: where some strategy is adopted with the intension of maximising 
the time efficiency of the task. 
6.6.2.2 The linear approach - by Media Cluster 
This has been the prevailing method for the last 20 years. Derived from the use of the ‘dd’ 
utility in *ix operating systems, it ignores any structures on the media and reads the data at 
block level. See section 4.6.2.2 
This has one key advantage; because it is linear, it runs as fast as the source media will 
deliver data and the destination media can write. 
Linear imaging has two possible outputs. It could be (a) as a file within a file system or (b) as 
an identical replica on another media device where the data is written directly to the media 
block structure.  
a) dd if=/dev/sda of=/home/forensics/myimagefile 
b) dd if=/dev/sda of=/dev/sdb 
The former has an advantage because the process could deliver the result straight to a 
storage device available to the processing system e.g. a file server accessible via a network. 
The latter would normally need to be recopied onto the file storage on the processing 
system. 
Linear imaging has a major drawback in that the result cannot be accessed for processing 
until the entire imaging process is complete. 
6.6.2.3 Non-linear Approaches 
Adopting a Digital Evidence Container or Submission Information Package format during 
acquisition, allows us to take an alternative approach by parsing the data and prioritising 
data made available for processing. This could include a selection and/or sorting criterion 
where we can reduce the overall capture. There is, however, a danger in selecting data, as 
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opposed to collecting it all. It may be that key evidence is somewhere we never anticipated. 
This technique relies on the quality of informed focus. 
In sections 4.6.2.6, 4.6.2.7 and 4.6.2.8, we described several evidence container formats 
that can hold individual files rather than whole images. In building the former, there are a 
number of ways data could be sorted and selected for inclusion. 
 By using the name of a Folder or File name 6.6.2.3.1
Files could be sorted and selected based upon folder and filename. For example, on 
windows XP the user files are held under “/Documents and Settings” and so these would be 
processed before “/Program Files” and “/Windows". On Windows 7 system this would put 
“/Users” before “/Windows”. In Linux, we would choose “/home” before “/etc”. Within a top-
level folder like “/User” there could be many users and within them many sub-folders, some 
of which are setup by the system or applications programs, some are used by the user to 
store their data, for example “My Documents”. The problem with this is that the arrangement 
of files and folders varies so much. 
 By inode number 6.6.2.3.2
In most file systems, filenames, and their associated meta-data details, are stored in a file-
system’s database (in NTFS, Ext and HFS) as a series of records, one per directory entry. 
These records are filled sequentially as files are added to the file-system. This means that, at 
least initially, as the operating system is the first thing written to the file-system, the operating 
system files will occupy the earlier records. Most likely, as the user installs initial application 
programs, next files are the application programs and associated files. These therefore 
occupy the next series of records and the user files are last to be created and added. When 
a file is deleted, the record it once occupied is marked as available and can be reused when 
a new file is created.  
As the first files stored on a disk are those that comprise the operating system and 
application programs, there is a tendency for user files, which are the most likely source of 
evidence, to be placed towards the end of the file-system inode list. If we processed in inode 
sequence order, we are delaying the processing of the evidence rich data until last. This 
does offer a strong argument for a reverse inode sequence processing. 
 By File Size 6.6.2.3.3
The increase in media size and the connectivity of our digital devices over the last few years 
has resulted in changes in the way we use storage media. Prior to the mid-1990s, local 
storage, and local storage was the only type available, was where we stored our own work. 
During the mid-1990s, as Internet access became more common and so we increasingly 
used our larger local storage to keep our copy of data sourced from the Internet. Arguably, 
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we now have greater cheap storage than we will ever need for our personal data storage 
needs. We suggest that massive media, currently of 2 TB and above, remains largely empty 
with a few exceptions. Copies of studio produced ‘feature’ films, youtube type downloads 
and originals of ‘home movies’ are often found occupying large media. 
Our research, in the appendix, has indicated that a high percentage of files within Microsoft 
Windows are less than 10k in size.  
In the form of statements, we found: 
• There are a high percentage of files with very small sizes. E.g. 62% of 
325,372 files are < 10k; 
• There are a low number of very large files. 29 files greater than 1GB totalling 
168GB. 
It is disproportionately time consuming to process many small files as opposed to a few files 
that total the same data volume. This is because of the latency of opening and closing files is 
disproportionately high when compared to processing the contents. Conversely, it can be 
argued that processing a small number of very large files is a high-risk strategy where a 
large amount of processing power and time could be spent to yield not results. It may be 
better to process 1 x 1MB file rather than 100 x 10kB files. 
 By type 6.6.2.3.4
The obvious analogue in conventional forensics it one where the forensic team might look for 
finger prints on doors, windows, light switches and ‘the murder weapon’. We could focus on 







This approach is likely to be efficient but only if the selection were appropriate for the specific 
investigation in that in the case involving pornographic images would select JPGs before 
XLSs and a case of fraud would choose XLSs before JPGs. It would also need to be 
sensitive not just to the existence of a file but the implications of placing it in a processing 
queue ahead of other files. In addition, there may be huge numbers of one type of file. For 
example, it is not uncommon for an enthusiastic photographer to have tens of thousands of 
JPGs. This may require further refinement within the sequence that the JPGs are processed. 
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 By Date 6.6.2.3.5
All files have a ‘Last Modified Date’ that can be used to isolate them on a time line. In some 
cases, this is not of use, for example, Outlook PST file will have a ‘Last Modified Date’ but it 
yields no information about the dates and times associated with each of the emails recorded 
within the file.  
 By Processing time 6.6.2.3.6
We could choose to process ‘low hanging fruit’ to yield quick results. This may be, for 
example, to extract EXIF information first from all JPGs rather than to attempt any face 
recognition on the files. Conversely, we could avoid creating thumbnails of key frames in a 
massive video file until later. 
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6.6.3 Bayesian Allocation of values 
We allow values to be assigned to the following parameters 
 File Attribute Description 
1 By Folder or Filename Specific files or the contents of entire folders can be 
allocated scores to push them up or down the ratings. 
2 By inode We could favour files, that were generally (see section 
6.6.2.3.2 for limitations) created earlier or later in the 
history of the file-system. 
3 Size of the file: in MB This could be used to exclude small files and the 
latency overhead associated with them. 
4 Files by Extension (type) : 1 – 9, representing the likelihood of evidence being 
present. e.g. JPG images are likely to be good sources 
of evidence, hence score 9, whereas .pg5 “Guitar pro 5 
Tablature” Files are not and so would score 1.  
5 File Extension Category. File types can be grouped into categories such as 
Video, Text, spreadsheet rather than specific file 
extensions. Giving these groups a value can speed 
allocation of parameters. 
6 Last Modified Date Many crimes can be reduced to having been taken 
place within a certain period. This would most likely be 
an array of values for discrete periods, with 9 
representing periods of high interest and 1 
representing periods of low interest. 
Jan  – 2013 – 3 
Feb  – 2013 – 7 
Mar  – 2013 – 9 
Apr  - 2013 – 5 
May  – 2013 – 3 
Jun  – 2013 – 9 
July – 2013 – 1 
Continuously accessed files like logs could not be 
classified in this way and so could be allocated 9 as 
being always of interest, or 1 as never. 
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 File Attribute Description 
7 KFF If this were known as ‘ok’ in the NIST database, it 
would score -10 to push it down the score table. 
However, its presence in the CEOP database would 
attract a score of 10 to push it up. 
The problem with this characteristic is that the entire 
contents of the file have to be processed to create the 
hash. By that time, it may as well have been 
processed. 
8 By exceptional location in the 
file system 
A JPG in any location other than “My Documents” is 
‘normal’ and so could be set at 0, however the same 
file in “/Windows/System32” is abnormal and so could 
be score 7. 
9 Processing rate: for this type 
of data on our equipment 
Our experience tells us that processing it is possible to 
process 2 MB/s on average. 
Table 14 - Evidence Value Score Parameters 
Ultimately, we aim to create an index number for each file. 
Index =  
 ( K1 * Filename or Folder Value) 
+  ( K2 * inode) 
+ ( K3 * File Size) 
+  ( K4 * Ext type Value) 
+  ( K5 * Category Value ) 
+  ( K6 * Date index)  
+  ( K7 * Known File Fingerprinting index)  
+  ( K8 * Location normality) 
+  ( K9 * Size / Processing Rate)  
 
 
We believe the constants (K1..K9) would need to be adjusted depending on feedback from 
real cases, as Horsman, Laing and Vickers (2014) suggest.  
If Known File Fingerprint lookup is used to either eliminate known good files or highlight 
known bad files, it should effect the seventh term so that it either forcing inclusion or 
exclusion. Eg K7 = 1000 or K7 = 0. 
Prioritisation will be evaluated in section 8.4. 
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6.7 FClusterfs  
6.7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, we set out a number of design objectives for FCluster. These included the 
ability to store file data across a distributed cluster, store the associated file meta-data, have 
highly tailored access control and have the ability to track access and processing. As 
discussed, these are very similar to the basic functions of a file system.  
We have observed that Hadoop employs a custom designed file system, HDFS, as a base 
for its processing, see section 4.3.1.3. HDFS has been implemented as a middleware on top 
of the native file-system used by the operating system running on the hosts within the cluster 
and below the application layer. Basing assurance upon a custom designed file system 
means that a layer is formed between any application programs and the data upon which 
they operate, which could not be circumvented. We have chosen to call this file –system 
FClusterfs. 
Data storage in the FClusterfs file-system is dispersed across the hosts of the cluster. 
Whereas an NTFS file-system would have pointers to the local cluster number at which the 
data would start within its partition, FClusterfs’ meta-data includes a pointer to a remote 
storage server where the entire file is located. This is not to be confused with mounting a 
network drive that mounts a whole directory tree on a mount point within the local file-
system. In FClusterfs, the data of files, whose entries are adjacent within a directory listing, 
may not be within the same file-system partition as each other or even the same host 
machine. Figure 90 shows how files adjacent in a directory listing can be on separate 
servers using the native file system such as ext3/4. 
  
Figure 90 – Fclusterfs - Individual Files on individual servers 
FClusterfs extends the ‘normal’ metadata found in file-systems such as NTFS and EXT3/4, 
which describe the file characteristics of the file within the storage server’s file-system, to 
include information needed to justify the claim of assurance in Chain of Evidence. This 
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includes information about the original source media, the date and time it was acquired, the 
date and time it was ingested into the cluster, where it was stored, and who and when it was 
access for processing. It supports distribution by recording the data about the server upon 
which the actual file data is stored within the cluster so that subsequently messages can be 
sent to the server, via the database, to initiate processing. 
6.7.2 FClusterfs implemented as a FUSE File System 
6.7.2.1 FUSE File-Systems in Digital Forensics 
The use of FUSE to build custom file systems has already been proposed within the digital 
forensics domain (Richard et al. 2007). FClusterfs advances this notion and uses the 
technique to provide a solution that addresses the key issues of Assurance in a distributed 
processing environment. It merges the functionality of several existing FUSE file systems, 
then adds and extends them to form a new file system. 
FClusterfs is a FUSE file-system that holds the file-system metadata, normally held in the 
native media file system, in a MySQL database while its data is spread across remote 
storage servers. 
6.7.2.2 FClusterfs is based on MySQLfs 
FClusterfs is based on MySQLfs (Brancatelli 2014). MySQLfs employs an SQL database 
consisting of three tables to replace the native file system. The ‘inodes’ table provides 
storage for file metadata like names, dates/times, size, access rights etc usually seen as a 
‘directory’. The ‘tree’ table stores the hierarchical structure of folders and filenames found in 
the file-system. The third table ‘data_blocks’ stores the actual data as a series of binary large 
objects (BLOBs), replacing the clusters of the disk format. More details can be found in 4.5.2 
. 
In FClusterfs, we use the tree and inodes tables found in MySQLfs and have added a table 
called ‘meta-data’ to store the additional meta-data from the original location of the data. This 
is a variable length, large text field and so is better in a table of its own rather than extending 
the inodes table. 
6.7.2.3 Multivolume within a Single Database 
A single FClusterfs database is designed to store many file-systems. We have a table, 
VolumeInformation, which contains a record of each file-system whose individual records are 
stored within the inodes table. We have added a field ‘VolumeID’ to the inodes table, as a 
back reference, to identify the source file-system. This is not technically required within a 
relational database, as MySQL conforms closely to the ACID model (MySQL 2014), but has 
been added to raise assurance. 
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6.7.2.4 Remote storage 
We substitute the functionality of the ‘data_blocks’ table in MySQLfs with the ability to read 
data stored on remote storage servers.  
In the prototype, proof of concept design, we have chosen to connect to the remote servers 
using the ftp protocol because of the features of another existing FUSE file-system curlFTPfs 
(Robson 2013). curlFTPfs allows the user to mount a connection to an ftp server and make it 
appear to be part of the host’s file system. curlFTPfs attains much of its power and flexibility 
because it is based in the libcurl library and can support not only ftp but SSH, SFTP, HTTP, 
HTTPS but, despite obvious security issues with unencrypted data transfer, we have chosen 
ftp as a simple base for a prototype as it avoids the complexities of dealing with 
cryptographic keys. In a real world scenario, SSH would be a more robust choice. 
curlFTPfs allows only one storage server per mounted file system. In FClusterfs, we have 
enhanced this to be able to access individual files on any storage server on a file-by-file 
basis. The corresponding server details are stored in the individual file’s record in additional 
fields that have added to the ‘inodes’ table. When the user sees a directory listing in their 
user space it appears as a continuous list drawn from the ‘inodes’ table but in reality each 
file’s data will be on a storage server which is most likely remote. Each file is held in its 
entirety on the storage server. In the prototype, the entire file is transferred and held in cache 
in memory. In curlFTPfs, 128MB chunks are transferred just once and, if the file is over 
128MB, a mosaic is built in a cache in local memory. In FClusterfs, unlike many distributed 
file-systems, file data is stored as a complete file on the storage server. It is not segmented 
or striped. This enables another key feature of FCluster to be implemented with ease; local 
processing. 
6.7.2.5 Primary focus on Local Access for Processing 
It is important to realise that although FClusterfs does allow data to be transported across 
the network, it is primarily a means of standardising access to data held locally. When we 
use the term ‘passes across the network’ it should be normally taken as via 127.0.0.1, the 
localhost loopback connection (Figure 91 – File Access via 127.0.0.1). 
FClusterfs is intended to replace any need for network shares like NFS or SMB but to 
emphasise, although FCluster provides access to the file-system under investigation and will 
work over a local or wide area network connection but is inefficient. It is intended to process 
local data by the host of the ftp server holding each of the files. The location, URL, of the 
storage server hosting the data is part of the ‘inodes’ table extending the fields used by 
FClusterfs and so the ‘locality’ of the file can trigger the processing task to be initiated within 
the host. 
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Figure 91 – File Access via 127.0.0.1 
In Figure 91 – File Access via 127.0.0.1, we show two host computers each with an ftp 
server that stores the files that make up a simple directory held in FClusterfs. Although each 
host sees the complete directory listing, we can see the files are split across the two servers. 
FCluster would normally try to restrict processing of File2 and File 3 to hosts A and File1 to 
host B. This avoids any transfer of data across the network. Local data can be accessed via 
either the 127.0.0.1 localhost or the local IP number, as routing will prevent it needing to 
cross the network media. This does not prevent remote access to data. 
6.7.2.6 Encryption 
Data held on this multitude of ftp servers is encrypted and uses techniques from ecryptfs 
(Hicks et al. 2013) to decrypt data on-the-fly. After it leaves the media of the ftp server, it 
passes across the network and is decrypted in the user’s host RAM before being held in 
cached space in RAM in their Virtual File System. 
6.7.2.7 Read Only Access 
As previously mentioned, FClusterfs provides read-only access. There is no code to 
implement functions like write / delete / chown / chmod. This is a fundamental requirement of 
a forensic system and, fortuitously, greatly simplifies the code and enhances the speed of 
FClusterfs. This based upon ROfs (Keller 2014). 
6.7.2.8 Auditing 
FCluster has auditing which it draws from Loggedfs (Flament 2013). Loggedfs’ audit is felt to 
be too granular for our purposes and instead we choose to record only significant actions like 
DEC movement, unpacking and the opening of data-files for processing. FClusterfs records 
an entry every time the ‘Open’ function is called. Recording access to parts of a file is felt to 
be unnecessary and would only slow the system and make the logs unreadable. All audit 
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records are stored in a table ‘audit’ recording date/times, users. The audit entries for DEC 
movement, unpacking etc are actioned within the daemons that control these activities.  
6.7.2.9 Storage Server Access Information 
Although the data location URL information is available to the user e.g. ftp://myserver.com/, 
the username and password needed to log into the storage server and gain access the data 
is not. It is held in another table ‘serveraccessinfo’ and is retrieved on the fly during a read 
request by FClusterfs. Users can only access evidence via the FClusterfs file-system that 
provides data from the storage servers. Users never know the credentials needed to access 
data on the storage servers. This is held within the FClusterfs MySQL database can only be 
accessed by the daemons that control data movement etc. In a real world implementation 
remote data access would not use ftp and would not use plain text credentials. Instead, 
perhaps SSH would be used together with PKI authentication. 
6.7.2.10 Peer to Peer 
FClusterfs is also peer-to-peer and so any node can mount a directory that can reference 
files on any server (Figure 92 - FCluster mounts peer to peer). 
 
Figure 92 - FCluster mounts peer to peer 
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6.7.2.11 Mounting the FCluster file-system 
The behaviour of an FClusterfs file system is defined when it is mounted by a command line 
that contains the following entries: 
fclusterfs \ 
 --mysql_user=me \ 
 --mysql_password=mypassword   \ 
--mysql_host=25.63.133.244  \ 
 --mysql_database=fclusterfs  \ 
--volume=74a8f0f627cc0dc6  \ 
 --audituser='Investigator Name' \ 
 /home/user/Desktop/fsmount 
Multiple file systems can be mounted on the user’s host system and multiple SQL servers 
can provide storage for FClusterfs file-system databases. 
FUSE file systems work in the User’s data-space. File-systems mounted by one user, under 
their authorisation, are not visible to any other users. 
6.7.2.12 Storage of File Meta-data 
Jigsaw imaging creates DECs that contain data from the original source context. This is 
travels with the DEC and is unpacked when the data is ingested into FCluster. All meta-data 
for files is held in the MySQL database in the meta-data table. In the proto-type, the data is 
held as a ‘text’ field and the meta-data is delimited with XML formatting. In future 
developments, some meta-data might be extracted and stored in its own fixed format fields 
to enable indexing and selecting.  
6.7.2.13 Cryptographic hashes meta-data checking 
One such item is the cryptographic hash created at imaging time. This is so important that it 
is extracted and stored in its own fixed length field in the inodes table for indexing and 
retrieval. 
6.7.2.14 Accessing data with a legacy program 
FClusterfs enables files to be mounted on an existing file system as if they were ‘normal’ 
files. The application layer programs are completely unaware of the actions of FClusterfs 
below it. This is specifically what FUSE file systems do. Subsequently, subject to access 
controls with FClusterfs and the speed of the network connection between the application 
program and the data storage media, legacy program are completely unaware of the 
environment in which they operate with regards files storage. As FUSE file systems are 
stackable, these mounts can, in turn, be mounted and so become available to software 
hosted on other operating systems. For example, FTK, Encase or Bulk Extractor running on 
A Middleware Solution for Forensic Processing on a Distributed System 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  197 | P a g e  
Windows would be unaware that the data that presents as begin on a CIF, SMB network 
share is actually hosted on a system running FCluster and FClusterfs. 
6.7.3 The MYSQL database at the heart of FClusterfs 
6.7.3.1 Introduction 
FClusterfs is based on is the MySQL database inherited from MySQLfs. Data is held as a 
hierarchical structure (Figure 93 - FClusterfs Hierarchy).  
• FCluster may have one or more hosts; 
• An FCluster host may have none, one or more than one MySQL servers; 
• An FCluster system must have one of more MySQL servers to support 
FClusterfs; 
• A MySQL server may have one or more FClusterfs Databases; 
• An FClusterfs Database may have one or more file-systems within it; 
• An FCluster host may have none, none or more storage servers. 
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6.7.3.2 Structure of Database 
An FClusterfs database consists of nine tables shown in Table 15 
 Table Name Description 
#1 Devicelisting 
 
This table holds a list of all the imaging devices 
acknowledged by the system. It holds details about serial 
number, device testing/calibration history 
#2 VolumeListing A table holding details of cryptographic keys generated 
and allocated to a specific device. These keys have a 
generation date/time and an expiry date/time. 
When the DEC data is ingested this table is updated with 
the file-system volume identifier, scan date and base 
record ID of the directory system in the tree, inodes and 
meta tables 
#3 Inodes  A table holding data about every single data file held in 
the system. In addition to data held by the evidence file 
system, extra data is held about evidence cryptographic 
checksums, data locations on the FCluster etc. 
#4 Tree  This is where the hierarchical structure of the data files 
acquired when imaging is stored. This is populated as 
the DECs are imported. 
#5 MetaData This holds the meta data about the evidence file 
gathered at imaging acquisition time. This includes the 
cluster numbers the file occupied on the original media 
and individual cryptographic checksums for each cluster. 
#6 Serveraccessinfo Contains the access information (user login, password, 
server type ftp, ssh, https etc) of all the datanodes on the 
FCluster. 
#7 Audit Contains records of activities. These include data 
movement, unpacking, opening and deletion. 
#8 WorkFlow Tasks Contain a series of tasks that are routinely initiated when 
data of a certain type arrives on a storage server. 
#9 NodeState A record of the characteristics of the hosts that comprise 
the cluster including storage capacity, capability metrics 
that represent the processing power of the host and 
network connection metrics. 
Table 15 - List of Tables in MySQL 
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6.7.3.3 Structure of Tables 
 DeviceListing table 6.7.3.3.1
In contrast to existing systems, imaging devices and software are seen as part of the 
FCluster system. As such, we keep a record of their existence for validation and to grant 
authority to image, see 6.3.4 Information about these devices is held in the DeviceListing 
table, see Table 16 
Field Name Typical Data 
Type 
Description 
ID BigInt(20) Unique ID for Indexing 
Description Varchar(255) Description of Device 
Custodian Varchar(100) The person responsible for this equipment 
Last Tested Datetime Last test/calibration data 
Serial Number Varchar(50) Serial Number 
Narrative longtext Description 
Table 16 - DeviceListing table structure 
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 VolumeListing table 6.7.3.3.2
To enable multiple source file-system volumes to be stored within one database, information 





ID BigInt(20) Unique ID for Indexing 
DeviceID BigInt(20) Device reference for the Imagine Device 
IssuedDateTime DateTime 
Date Time this Authority to Image was 
created 
ExpiresDateTime DateTime Date Time this Authority will Expire 
ScanDateTime DateTime Date Time the Scan took place 
FSRootInode BigInt(20) 
The ID number within the Inodes table, for 
the root of this file system tree 
Keytext Varchar(1024) 
The random string used to encrypt the 
Digital Evidence Containers in this scan 
Table 17 - VolumeListing table structure 
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 Inodes table 6.7.3.3.3
The Inodes table replaces the directory data structure in a native file system, for example 
$MFT in NTFS. It is the main store for all the directory information taken from the original 
source media and is extended to include the extra meta-data required in a distributed 
environment. Most of the entries in inodes are expected to represent files but some will 
represent directory entries, in which case the storage server meta-data is not necessary. 
Table 18 lists the fields in the prototype implementation. 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
Inode BigInt(20) Unique ID for the entry 
VolumeID Char(45) ID in the VolumeListing table 
FSFilename Varchar(255) filename 
Uid VarChar(50) 
Owner information from the 
original file-system 
Gid VarChar(50) 
Group owner information from 
the original file-system 
Atime DateTime 
Last Access Date/Time from the 
original file-system (Read-only) 
Mtime DateTime 
Last Modified Date/Time from 
the original file-system (Read-
only) 
Ctime DateTime 
Creation Date/Time from the 
original file-system (Read-only) 
Size BigInt(20) Size of the file 
SHA1 VarChar(40) Cryptographic Hash 
Originallocation Varchar(1024) 
Full path name on the original 
file system 
Firststorageprotcol VarChar(10) Eg ftp, ssh, http 
Firststorageserver VarChar(40) IP No or name of storage server 
Firststorageinplace VarChar(1) 
True if the DEC has been 
copied to the primary storage 
server 
Firststorearrivaldatetime DateTime 
Date/Time of the arrival of the 
DEC on the primary storage 
server 
Firststorageunpacked DateTime 
True if the DEC have been 
unpacked (and so is available 
for processing) 
Firststoragelastvalidated DateTime 
Date/Time the replication 
daemon last tested the integrity 
of the data 
Firststorageprocessed DateTime 
True if the standard work tasks 
have been completed on the 
data 
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Field Name Type and Size Description 
Secondstorageprotcol VarChar(10) See description as First storage 
Secondstorageserver VarChar(40) .. 
Secondstorageinplace VarChar(1) .. 
Secondstoragearrivaldatetime DateTime .. 
Secondstorageunpacked DateTime .. 
Secondstoragelastvalidated DateTime .. 
Secondstorageprocessed DateTime .. 
   
Thirdstorageprotcol VarChar(10) .. 
Thirdstorageserver VarChar(40) .. 
Thirdstorageinplace VarChar(1) .. 
Thirdstoragearrivaldatetime DateTime .. 
Thirdstorageunpacked DateTime .. 
Thirdstoragelastvalidated DateTime .. 
Thirdstorageprocessed DateTime .. 
Table 18 - inodes table structure 
 Tree table 6.7.3.3.4
The tree table stores the hierarchical tree structure from the original media. See Table 19 - 
tree table structure 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
Inode BigInt(20) Unique ID for corresponding 
entry in the inodes table 
VolumeID Char(45) Unique Volume ID for entry in 
VolumeListingID table 
Parent BigInt(20) Parent inode in file-system 
hierachy 
name Varchar(255) File/Directory name 
Table 19 - tree table structure 
 MetaData table 6.7.3.3.5
The Metadata table is used to store the meta-data from the original media. This data is 
created when the evidence is acquired; see 6.4.2, The Jigsaw Technique and forms part of 
the data stored in the DECs. It is unpacked when the DEC arrives on the storage server. In 
addition, the results of data processing are recorded in the metadata table. See Table 20 - 
metadata table structure. 
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Field Name Type and Size Description 
Inode Bigint(20) Unique ID for corresponding entry in the 
inodes table 
Metadata Longtext Text field for data gathered at acquisition 
time 
VolumeID Varchar(45) Unique Volume ID for entry in 
VolumeListingID table 
Result1 Longtext Text result of worktask processing. Could 
just be “Success” 
Result2 Longtext Text result of worktask processing. Could 
just be “Success” 
Table 20 - metadata table structure 
 Audit table 6.7.3.3.6
Every significant action upon the data is recorded in the audit table. These include 
movements, opening the file. This includes action initiated by the user but also actions 
initiated by the FCluster control Daemons and automated workflow tasks. The structure can 
be seen in Table 21 - audit table structure. 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
ID BigInt(20) Unique ID for record 
DateTime Char(40) Data/Time for entry 
Investigator Char(45) User ID for agent of action. Could be 
investigator or daemon name 
Action Char(45) Description 
Inode Bigint(20) Unique ID for corresponding entry in the 
inodes table 
VolumeID Varchar(45) Unique Volume ID for entry in 
VolumeListingID table 
Table 21 - audit table structure 
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 WorkFlowTasks table 6.7.3.3.7
As data arrives to each of the data storage servers this provision for a set of ‘standard’ tasks 
to be completed on the data. This could be, for example, extracting the EXIF data from JPGs 
or extracting data from an Outlook PST file. Ad-hoc processing, initiated by the user is also 
added to this table which forms a job queue to be executed as and when the processor has 
time. This task information is held in the workflow table, Table 22 - workflow table structure. 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
FileExtension Varchar(10) Eg *.jpg, *.doc to describe the 
file types to which this applies 
Priority Int(11) To enable priority control 
ExecutableName Varchar(255) CLI command line 
Table 22 - workflow table structure 
 ServerAccessInfo table 6.7.3.3.8
The access credentials for each storage server is stored within FClusterfs. Multiple storage 
hosts e.g. ftp, ssh, http could exist on a host and so multiple entries can be made for a host. 
Table 23 - serveraccessinfo table structure 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
ID Int(11) Unique ID for indexing 
Protocol Varchar(45) Communications protocol eg 
ftp, ssh, http 
IP Varchar(45) IP No or hostname 
Port Int(5) Port on which this server is 
listening 
User Varchar(45) Format user:password 
Table 23 - serveraccessinfo table structure 
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 NodeState table 6.7.3.3.9
The data in the NodeState table is used to make decisions when allocating data out to the 
nodes for storage and processing. See 6.3.4.3.1 
Field Name Type and Size Description 
ID Bigint(20) Unique ID for indexing 
Hostname Varchar(20) Hostname 
LastUpdate DateTime Date/time of last data update 
IPNo Varchar(20) IP number of host 
CPUIdle0 Float % idle time of this core 
CPUIdle1 Float .. 
CPUIdle2 Float .. 
CPUIdle3 Float .. 
CPUIdle4 Float .. 
CPUIdle5 Float .. 
CPUIdle6 Float .. 
CPUIdle7 Float .. 
StorageRoot Varchar(200) Full path to the root of the local storage 
allocation 
StorageAvailable Bigint(20) Storage capacity allocated for use on the 
storage host 
StorageUsed Bigint(20) Storage used on the storage host. 
ProcessorIndex Bigint(20) Processor Speed Index 
MediaIndex Bigint(20) Storage Speed Index 
LinkSpeed Bigint(20) Effective Link Speed from this database 
host.  
Table 24 - nodestate table structure 
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6.7.3.4 Table relationships 
The relationship between the important tables is shown in Figure 94. This is mostly the link 
between inode, tree and metadata by the common information about the file’s inode. 
 
Figure 94 - FClusterfs Tables 
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6.7.3.5 The use of tables within assurance zones 
Table 25 shows which table is used within each assurance zone. 
Sub System Database table Program 
































Table 25 - The use of tables with specific Subsystems 
6.7.3.6 Fields updated in the inodes table as data progresses through the 
cluster 
As DECs/SIPs/AIPs progress through ingestion into FCluster a series of fields within the 
inodes table are updated, Table 26, on the following page, shows the progress through each 
stage of ingestion. Progress through the assurance zones is dependent on the data for the 
previous assurance zone being present in the inodes table. 
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Progress of data through the cluster >>>>>>>>> 
Field Name updated  
























Inode X       
VolumeID X       
Fsfilename X       
Uid X       
Gid X       
Atime  X      
Mtime X       
Ctime  X      
Size X       
SHA1  X      
Originallocation  X      
Firststorageprotcol   X    X 
Firststorageserver   X    X 
Firststorageinplace     X  X 
Firststorearrivaldatetime     X  X 
Firststorageunpacked     X  X 
Firststoragelastvalidated     X  X 
Firststorageprocessed      X  
Secondstorageprotcol    X   X 
Secondstorageserver    X   X 
Secondstorageinplace     X  X 
Secondstoragearrivaldatetime     X  X 
Secondstorageunpacked     X  X 
Secondstoragelastvalidated       X 
Secondstorageprocessed      X  
Thirdstorageprotcol    X   X 
Thirdstorageserver    X   X 
Thirdstorageinplace     X  X 
Thirdstoragearrivaldatetime     X  X 
Thirdstorageunpacked     X  X 
Thirdstoragelastvalidated       X 
Thirdstorageprocessed      X  
Table 26 - inode table field updates by processing stage 
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6.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we introduced and described FCluster and its component parts. 
This design has been developed from the problem listing in the previous chapter using a 
Design methodology described in the appendix.  
The form of the solution is a result of the belief that the best way to attain assurance is by 
means of a layer in the operating environment that cannot be subverted. We achieved this 
by designing a FUSE file system. FClusterfs deals with everything concerning the 
custodianship of data within FCluster. It is extensible, and so, even if this design is seen to 
be inadequate in certain measures, it can be amended to cater for future changes. 
Early on, it became likely that the addition of this middleware would affect the performance of 
the system and so we developed both Jigsaw imaging and processing prioritisation to 
improve data flow through the system. 
In summary the key features are: 
• Acquisition of data by DEC; 
• Prioritisation by criteria set by the investigator; 
• The use of a relational database to store metadata about the evidence 
gathered; 
• The provision of transparent access to the metadata database by using a 
FUSE file system; 
• The dispersal of data across a distributed storage system; 
• The resulting ability to conduct concurrent local processing on that data; 
• Complete control over access to the data; 
• The ability to separate access to the raw data from the access to the 
resulting analysis; 
• The retention of access to the original raw data without having to work on 
abstracted data. 
In the next chapter, we concern ourselves with evaluation.  
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7 Implementation and Prototype Test Rigs 
In this chapter, we describe the implementation of FCluster ready for the evaluation stage. 
We state the objectives of the evaluation and the problems of selecting an appropriate 
platform between the choices of real hardware and virtual platforms. 
7.1 Evaluation Objectives 
From our hypothesis, on page 11, we have two objectives. Firstly to demonstrate the 
adequacy of the chain of evidence within FCluster and secondly to demonstrate the 
timeliness of this solution. Ideally we would simply build the target test environment of about 
100 i7 processor based PCs. Unfortunately that is not possible within our research budget, 
so we must seek an alternative. 
The most obvious alternatives are in virtualisation and cloud deployment. Both VMware 
Desktop and Amazon Web Services Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) were used during the 
development of FCluster and were considered as candidates for the evaluation phase. 
Ubuntu 12.04 LTS desktop version was installed within VMWare Desktop version 10 running 
on an i7 desktop PC with Windows 7 64-bit, 24GB RAM, a 128GB SSD for the system and a 
1TB hard disk drive for data. VMWare is capable of hosting up to about six virtualised hosts 
with this host, each as an 8-core processor with 2GB RAM and 10GB disk space. The same 
environment was created in Amazon EC2, which is effectively a virtual environment but 
operating in a remote location. EC2 instances run as virtualised machines on XEON hosts. 
Amazon EC2 does an advantage in that it has a variety of ‘Instance Types’ which enables 
identical software setups to run on variable hardware platforms. It seems that the c3.2xlarge 
is equivalent to an i7 and costs $0.42 per hour. 
These work well when evaluating the user interface, functionality and interconnectedness of 
the software and hardware but it creates problems when used for timing test. One key 
objective in any testing scheme is to eliminate variable factors that would cause the results 
to change between what should be identical tests. Unfortunately, when we run software on 
operating systems such as Linux or Windows, there are a number of mechanisms that 
influence performance, and most of them are beyond the control of the operator. Task 
scheduling, disk caching, memory management and hard disk response times are just a few 
examples. Running these operating systems within a virtual environment, whether it is local 
or remote, makes this worse and even further beyond our control. Within a virtualisation 
environment, a control program, often called the hypervisor, takes charge of the resources 
allocated to each virtualised hosts. This automatic control prevents a stable evaluation 
environment being established.  
To obtain absolute performance figures, trials should be run as near the real hardware as 
possible. 
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Amazon Web Services do offer a dedicated machine, the c3.8xlarge that is effectively the 
XEON host itself, at about $1.68 per hour. Unfortunately, these are effectively out of reach 
given the research budget and the time scale of evaluation. 
7.2 VMware Desktop 10 for Chain of Evidence 
As all development work was carried out within a virtualised host running Ubuntu Desktop 
version 12.04 with 4GB RAM, we selected the VMWare desktop 10 environment as suitable 
for proving the chain of evidence.  
The development environment included 
• One host for DHCP with MasqDNS; 
• One host for development with gcc, ntfs-3g, MySQL, Gambas; 
• Six workstations each hosting a MySQL server and ftp server. 
The VMWare environment allows the creation of multiple virtual hard disks for imaging 
without the need for extra hardware although actual hardware can be attached via USB if 
required. 
7.3 A LiveCD 
Setting up a cluster can be a considerable administrative task; it is no surprise that most 
cluster solutions have an associated administrative package to enable the rapid deployment 
and updates of hosts. 
When we assessed the practicalities of running forensics on a Globus Grid system in 2008, 
we started the research build facing the task of building a full Globus Grid system from 
source. Confirming Roussev’s observation in 2004 that “grid computing today is anything but 
easy to use or deploy”, we found building a Globus Grid system by hand was extremely 
difficult. Fortunately, we found that a LiveCD implementation, Instant Grid (Instant-Grid 
2013), had been built. This included a DHCP server, full authentication and a number of 
scripts that allowed configuration of the primary host as it booted. This greatly reduced the 
task of creating the Grid. 
For FCluster, we used a LiveCD creation tool, originally called Remastersys (Stafanov & 
Brijeski 2013) now called System Imager (Black Lab 2015), to make a single LiveCD/DVD 
delivery from our virtualised hosts. It differed from the Instant-Grid LiveCD in one key 
respect. Instant-Grid boots from just one single LiveCD in a master machine and all 
subsequent hosts used the master host as supplier for the operating system image that is 
accessed via a PXE boot that mounts an image from the original host’s CD. Throughout the 
functioning of the Instant-Grid cluster, all hosts needed constant access back to the primary 
host’s CD drive. This put great strain on the primary host and limited the size of the test 
cluster size to three or four hosts. Instead, we have chosen to deploy individual LiveCDs for 
each host on the cluster. This allows clusters of almost any practical size to be created very 
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quickly. We have created temporary clusters of up to 60 host PCs with this technique. 
Additionally, remastersys provides a single click command to install the contents of the 
LiveCD onto the hard disk of the host PC if required. This allows us to create an exact copy 
of our LiveCD on the chosen hardware for performance testing. 
As part of the boot procedure, the LiveCD operating system searches for a DHCP server. If it 
does not find one, it starts its own to provide DHCP services to the cluster. This will be the 
case if this is the first hosts in the cluster. If it does find one, it skips over the initiation of the 
DHCP server, using the primary host’s DHCP instead. 
As each LiveCD boots, it looks for hard disk drive 0, and if there is a suitable file-system, 
NTFS or EXT3/4, and enough space, it will create a temporary folder in which it will store its 
data. All other activities are actioned in a RAM Disk environment. As the boot progresses, it 
looks for an ftp server running on the host that provided the DHCP service. As the root 
crontab starts to run on each host, it connects to a specific external ftp server that holds a 
copy of the latest scripts and programs for the cluster and downloads a copy needed to run 
the cluster. It also draws information from a text file that defines the functionality that a host 
should fulfil. If no specific definition is found the host becomes a general-purpose 
storage/processing host for the cluster. The cluster host ‘roles’ are explained in detail in 6.2.3 
on page 141. In this way, many identical LiveCDs can be created and do not need to be 
constantly updated with program amendments. 
This deliverable means that setting up a test system is easy whether the tester runs the 
LiveCDs within a virtual environment or on an existing network with operating systems 
already installed. 
7.4 Hardware for the timing test 
Using the LiveCD, and so establishing constancy between implementations, we were able to 
boot on ‘real’ hardware. Our chosen system was: 
• Lenovo Thinkpad i7 with 8GB RAM; 
• Ubuntu 12.04 OS runs on a SATAIII - Crucial-M SSD; 
• Input drive on USB; 
• Image Output drive on USB; 
• DEC output drive on USB. 
7.5 Two Evaluation Environments 
Subsequently we have two environments. Firstly, a virtualised environment that provides an 
adequate base for all assessments other than performance. For performance testing, we use 
the hard disk install facility from remastersys to enable us to create a replica system installed 
directly on hardware.  
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7.6 Sample Data 
Jigsaw imaging is intended to be used when acquiring static data from large media, certainly 
bigger than 1TB, where conventional linear imaging takes many hours and so delays the 
investigation progress. It is most effective when acquisition requires the production of a full 
forensic image as well as selective data in DECs and where the large media is only partially 
filled with data with a high potential. 
In selecting suitable test data one should try to select one that represents an accepted 
standard from within the domain. Woods et al. (2011) have created a corpus of media for 
research – Digital Corpora (Garfinkel 2014). Their focus is in creating realistic forensic 
corpora that is plausible and internally consistent. As they are attempting to prove data sets 
for educational and research purposes the samples they create and store are of limited size. 
There are currently about 150 images of hard disks with the largest being 80GB. 
It seems unlikely that there will be a suitably sanitised large dataset available within the 
Corpus for some time but it is important that we should work on media with a representative 
real use. Subsequently, we tried to find our own candidate. 
To do this we needed to obtain an overview of the contents of each media candidate to 
enable us to judge its profile and therefore its suitability for analysis. This was achieved by 
running a small meta-data collection program against each candidate disk. 
A meta-data collection script was written as a Bash script and runs from an Ubuntu Linux 
LiveCD. In this way, we were able to operate the program without affecting the host PC. The 
script mounts drive 0 and reads the directory tree using a number of well-known Linux 
utilities such as “ls”, “fdisk”, “hwinfo”, ”ntfslabel”, “filefrag”, “file”, “md5sum” to elicit 
information about the target file system. 
The following Table 27 was created in MySQL and was populated with data from the file-
system under examination. 
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Field name Type Description 
  DiskID char(32) Hard Drive ID 
  NTFSSerial char(32) UID for File System 
  inode bigint(20) Inode record for the file 
  FileExt varchar(50) File extension 
  FileSize bigint(20) File Size in bytes 
  Fragments mediumint(9) No of Fragments in the file 
  Filename varchar(1024) Full path filename 
  LastAccess char(15) Last Access Data/Time 
  MD5Sum char(32) MD5 sum of File data 
  TypeDescription varchar(300) File type description from ‘file’ command 
  ID bigint(20) Unique record ID 
Table 27 - File System Analysis Table Structure 
We ran the analysis program on about 60 PCs but found that there was so much variation 
within such a small data set that there was little advantage in trying to form an idea of 
‘average’ or ‘typical’ contents by any statistical means. 
With the issues of privacy and of the availability of suitably sized media, it was decided to 
use a drive from a real machine, graciously provided by a friend. The script was run against 
this 256GB hard disk that had 325,372 files that occupied 168GB and was felt to be typical of 
many large hard disks found in notebook PCs. The content of this file-system was felt to be 
representative of a hard disk that has been subject to average use for about 18 months. We 
noted that the 256GB drive is now at the low end of drives sizes found in retail offerings, 1TB 
hard disks are more typical. 
Even this is not large enough to demonstrate fully the advantages of Jigsaw imaging and 
prioritisation but it is three times larger than the largest in the Digital Corpora. Subsequently 
a larger disk of 500GB with 182,527 files that occupied 207GB was chosen as an alternative. 
 GB Files GB Used GB Free 
Disk A - Phil 256 325,372 168 88 
Disk B - Nick 500 182,527 207 293 
Table 28 - Sample Disk Statistics 
The two disks, listed in Table 28, do demonstrate the variation of disk contents with the 
former disk being twice the capacity but having 40% fewer files. 
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This 256GB drive is from a host running Windows 8 that is held within a single partition of 
256GB with 168GB of data leaving 88GB free. The single partition contains the operating 
system, typical installed programs such as Microsoft Office and a collection of domestic 
videos of skiing and sailing holidays, JPG photographs of the same and the documents 
associated with Office. The PC has Outlook to collect email. 
We found these disks to be typical of the set of 60 disks we examined. 
7.6.1 Statistics for Disk A 
Appendix B has a table that contains the statistics of the files found on the 256 GB disk. In 
summary: 
• There are 325,372 files in total; 
• 97% of files are unfragmented; 
• 2% of files have between 2 and 5 fragments; 
• 29 files are over 1GB; 
• 202,313 files (62%) are less than 10k. 
7.6.1.1 By Count of Files 
Figure 95, shows a listing of files, grouped and totalled by file extension and sorted into 
number of files. 
 
Extension              Count %OfAll   Acc%       Total Size %OfAll   Acc% 
PNG                   46,719    14%    14%      273,153,414     0%     0% 
DLL                   34,638    10%    25%   20,121,659,259    11%    12% 
MANIFEST              20,265     6%    31%       21,961,922     0%    12% 
JS                    15,287     4%    35%      468,925,703     0%    12% 
‘None’                15,212     4%    40%    9,197,608,552     5%    17% 
JPG                   12,401     3%    44%    5,314,176,481     3%    21% 
XML                    9,630     2%    47%      931,753,634     0%    21% 
MUI                    9,191     2%    50%      267,692,732     0%    21% 
 
1st Column – File extension 
2nd Column – Number of files with the extension 
3rd Column – % of all files on the disk by number 
4th Column – Accumulating % of files on the disk 
5th Column – Total size of these files 
6th Column - % of all files on the disk by size 
7th Column – Accumulating % of size of files 
8th Column – Sub category of file type 
 
Figure 95 - Top File Types by Number of Files 
This shows that the most numerous file extension was a PNG, followed by DLL and then 
MANIFEST. There were 46,719 (the 2
nd
 Column) PNGs (the 1
st
 column) representing 14% 
(the 3
rd
 column) of all files on the disk by number. These totalled 273,153,414 bytes (the 5
th
 
column), or 273MB, which did not even represent 1% (the 6
th
 column) of the contents of the 
disk by size but 21% of all file space is occupied by files with one of just eight extensions. 
It appears that 50% of all files on the disk have one of only seven file extensions or had 
none. 
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7.6.1.2 By Size of Data 
The Listing in Figure 96 shows a listing of files, grouped by file extension and sorted into 
total size on the disk. 
 
Extension             Count %OfAll   Acc%       Total Size %OfAll   Acc% 
 MP4                    205     0%     0%   65,167,024,000    38%    38% 
 DLL                 34,638    10%    10%   20,121,659,259    11%    50% 
 SYS                  1,302     0%    11%   16,624,260,915     9%    60% 
'none'               15,212     4%    15%    9,197,608,552     5%    66% 
 JPG                 12,401     3%    19%    5,314,176,481     3%    69% 
 EXE                  4,330     1%    20%    3,986,747,297     2%    71% 
 M2TS                     1     0%    20%    3,913,285,632     2%    73% 
 CAB                    418     0%    21%    3,348,727,504     1%    75% 
 
1st Column – File extension 
2nd Column – Number of files with the extension 
3th Column – % of all files on the disk by number 
4th Column – Accumulating % of files on the disk 
5th Column – Total size of these files 
6th Column - % of all files on the disk by size 
7th Column – Accumulating % of size of files 
8th Column – Sub category of file type 
 
Figure 96 - Top File Types by Total Size of Data 
The file type occupying most space is MP4 (1
st
 column) with 65GB data (5
th
 column). There 
were just 205 (2
nd
 column) of these files.  
It shows that 75% (7
th
 Column) of the file system was occupied by data from one of just 
seven file extensions or had no extension. 
7.7 Conclusions 
In preparation for the evaluation the setup and configuration of a test environment was found 
to be a series of compromises. In a world without limits, it would be best to build and test a 
full working version of the target system but this was not possible. Instead, we assessed the 
requirements of the specific evaluation and built several test environments that enabled the 
evaluation of specific features. Each of these environments provides stability in the aspects 
of the environment that could affect the specific evaluation results. 
The same was true of the test data used. Reflecting back to chapter 3 and 3V, Velocity, 
Variety and Volume, we are affected by the same dilemma. Our conclusion was that it was 
not possible to use a form of ‘average’ data, as the notion of average makes no sense in the 
wide distribution we are required to investigate. Instead we chose what we considered might 
be expected to be presented as evidence. 
In the next chapter, we will conduct the evaluation. 
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8 Results, Evaluation and Assessment 
8.1 Introduction 
In the chapter 6, we described FCluster by a detailing each of its component parts; Jigsaw 
Imaging, data prioritisation and FClusterfs. In chapter 7, we described the test rig and 
selection of data for our analysis testing. In this chapter, we evaluate FCluster and its 
components. 
We first reflect back to the hypothesis and consider the best way to implement an evaluation. 
We find that there is a need to approach different aspects of the system with different types 
of evaluation. In section 8.2.1, we will consider different approaches to evaluation and 
conclude that a mixed approach, appropriate to the section of the system under 
consideration, is best. On the issue of ‘timeliness’, a quantitive approach is deemed best and 
on the issue of ‘soundness’ a qualitative approach is selected as best suited.  
In 8.3, we provide an extension to the thoughts developed in 5.3, describing the problems, 
and 5.4, describing the solutions, to include pointers to the evaluations in this chapter. 
In the following sections, we evaluate, in turn, Jigsaw Imaging, Processing Prioritisation, 
FClusterfs and then FCluster as a whole. 
8.2 Evaluation Strategy 
Referring back to the original hypothesis, in section 1.3.4, there are two characteristics that 
need evaluation: 
• Timely Handling of processing; 
• Maintaining Information Assurance primarily by maintaining chain of 
evidence. 
As we have seen, FCluster comprises of several components. Each has its own 
characteristics and so may need to be evaluated in different ways. 
8.2.1 Evaluation techniques 
There are broadly, two types of evaluation available: 
A quantitive one in which we time or measure the components and a qualitative approach in 
which we assess the capabilities of the components and consider their fitness for purpose or 
conformance to a standard. Quantitative evaluation generally attracts greater merit than 
qualitative evaluation. 
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8.2.1.1 Quantitative 
In a quantitive evaluation, we attempt to obtain a numeric measure of the subject in question. 
This enables a comparison within the subject, for example to measure change, or to allow 
comparison between the subject and some external system. Roussev (2004) observed the 
difficulty in comparing his prototype of DELV with existing systems like FTK. Having created 
a target ‘typical’ image, Roussev processed it using FTK in just under 2 hours but observes: 
“None of the measurements for our prototype are directly comparable to 
these numbers, because FTK is performing a lot of initial pre-processing of 
the (forensic) image and we only have a general idea of the 
implementation “ 
The speed and processing performance of FCluster is clearly capable of evaluation in a 
quantitative manner. However, this is not the real focus of FCluster. Speed is important but, 
at least initially, only as a measure of the penalty of the increased management suffered by 
additional processing that does no more than increasing assurance. We have no doubt that if 
working in isolation, and all other things being equal, ten computers can do ten times the 
work of one computer. What is of concern is the effect the act of load balancing, distribution 
of data, initiation and completion of tasks has on the performance. 
There are elements of this research that can be subjected to quantitative analysis. For 
example, we could complete a linear image with, perhaps dd, dcfldd or d3dd and then a 
comparable run with Jigsaw imaging. It is to be expected that Jigsaw would be slower but 
just how much slower will it be? However, we must ask, is this comparison of any use 
because it runs into the same problem as previously identified by Roussev in that the outputs 
of dd, dcfldd and d3dd are not the same as Jigsaw imaging? If this was done, then a more 
realistic proposal might be to run dd to get an image, then run AFF to create the DECs and 
compare this overall with running one pass of Jigsaw imaging. However, this does not take 
account of the feature of Jigsaw imaging that delivers DECs for processing before the whole 
imaging process has finished. 
It seems likely that an attempt to compare FCluster and Jigsaw imaging with existing 
techniques will suffer because of the same reasons identified by Roussev. 
8.2.1.2 Qualitative 
Although assurance can be measured on a scale of, for example, 1 to 10, it is really a 
question of a qualitative assessment. We could equally use a scale of A to J. A qualitative 
evaluation is often based upon an opinion of an individual’s, or group’s, contentment with the 
attainment of a criterion, for example a standard of operation. Specifically, in the case of the 
standards we considered relevant to this work, it is usually the real world case that an 
external auditor will assess the situation presented to them against a criteria, such as an ISO 
standard or the APCO guidelines. 
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When implementing an ISO 27001 Information Assurance Security Management System it is 
considered best practice to start by conducting a ‘Gap Analysis’ to establish the state of the 
security management system before, during and after implementation. This allows a baseline 
to be established and clarifies areas that need attention to achieve the certification to the 
standard. 
In more detail shown in Figure 97 – Gap Analysis Evaluation Process, the standard is 
assessed, a business plan is written describing the intended end result, a formal ‘Statement 
of Applicability’ (SoA) is written which describes how the standard will be implemented to 
fulfil the business plan. A Gap Analysis is conducted in which the current state of the 
business is compared to the vision for the future. An implementation plan is then created to 
guide the implementation. Throughout the implementation, the Gap Analysis is revisited to 
assess progress and priorities in future work. Finally, the newly implemented management 
structure is assessed by external auditors and, if appropriate, certification is sought. 
 
Figure 97 – Gap Analysis Evaluation Process 
A qualitative assessment of the assurance provided by FCluster and FClusterfs against a 
collection of relevant assurance standards would be more productive as that is what the 
design was intended to address. Table A, in the Appendixes, continues the previous 
columns  that listed the problems and solutions to provide a corresponding pointer to the 
evaluation in this chapter. 
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8.2.2 Evaluation Applicability 
As we saw in chapter 6, FCluster consists of a number of components. Some are best evaluated in a quantifiable manner; some are best assessed by 
qualitative means. Table 29 shows the components parts and the applicability of qualitative and quantitive evaluation. The table then identifies against which 
criteria they are best assessed. 
System/ 
Feature 

















There is no doubt that the extra processing 
in Jigsaw imaging, above that of simple 
linear imaging, will make it slower. 
Quantitative         
Is Jigsaw capable of a complete image? Qualitative         
DEC The integrity of the resulting DECs must be 
maintained by a robust structure for the 
acquired data in within the DECs. 
Qualitative         
Prioritisation Time the setup of the prioritisation database 
and sort into order. By demonstrating the 
improvement in delivery of data for 
processing. 
Quantitative         
FClusterfs 
and FCluster 
Robustness and failure to maintain Chain of 
Evidence. By assessing the facilities of 
FClusterfs against appropriate standards 
and best practices. 
Qualitative         
Management overhead affecting processing 
speed 
Quantitative         
Table 29 - Evaluation Strategy – Overview 
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8.3 Jigsaw Imaging 
8.3.1 The Evaluation Criteria 
In our evaluation, we restrict ourselves to two points, speed and integrity. Jigsaw imaging is 
the creation point for the DECs that will be drawn into the FCluster system. The integrity of 
the evidence must be established and recorded at the point of acquisition. Ideally, this 
should be done with as little possible effect on the delivery time of analysable data. 
8.3.2 Existing Evaluation Standards 
Disk, or media, imaging is one of the areas covered by the National Institute of Science and 
Technology’s (NIST) testing regime for Computer forensics Tool Testing (CFTT). Currently 
just over 30 products have been tested against the current Acquisition Tool Specification - 
Draft 1 of version 4.0 (National Institute of Science & Technology 2005) and Digital Data 
Acquisition Tool Test Assertions and Test Plan - Draft 1 of Version 1.0 (National Institute of 
Science & Technology 2005). The full list has 34 required and optional features. Our 
evaluation of a prototype version and so cannot be expected to fulfil all these requirements. 
The NIST tool test assertions all focus on thoroughness, integrity, recovery from error and 
operator feedback information. 
There are two optional tests within the NIST criteria DA-OA-14 where a clone is accurately 
written to the same address on the clone, which is true. In addition, DA-OA-22, that the tool 
creates accurate block hashing, would apply, which is also true. 
None of the NIST tests covers the time taken to acquire an image. Subsequently, we choose 
to setup a practical test and time the result. 
Our assessment will be between ‘conventional imaging’ in the form of a complete media 
image using dcfldd and a complete image using Jigsaw but with the creation of a sensible 
number of DECs during the process. 
8.3.3 The Testing Method 
We will conduct two tests. On timeliness, it is a straightforward timing to achieve the same 
copy with Jigsaw and dcfldd. On integrity, we will then use a small bash script that calls the 
Linux utilities diff, du and df to check the imaging and unpack the bagged data to check the 
encryption and encoding in the DEC. 
Timing comparisons must accept the limitations of the test environment. Obviously, the 
process can be improved by adding Solid State Devices or faster interfaces but these do not 
test Jigsaw imaging, they test the environment. Timing is more a question of relative results 
comparing the proposal against the previously accepted solution and observing any increase 
or decrease in performance. 
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8.3.4 Prediction on timing 
Assuming the linear read speed remains constant, the expected speed degradation with 
Jigsaw imaging comes from two actions. Firstly, random access seek times when moving 
between the starts of data runs, e.g. at the start of reading a file and similar seek actions 
when reading a file that is fragmented. Secondly, the additional processing needed to select 
the potentially high value files, calculate the cryptographic hashes and bag the evidence into 
the DECs. 
With regards the random seeks, we observe that it is now common for hard disks in typical 
use in desktop PCs or notebooks to contain, perhaps, 250,000 files, which means 250,000 
seeks to the starts of these files. A 2TB NTFS file system consists of 500,000,000 4kb 
clusters. The data transfer rate from a hard disk is a complex matter and consists of several 
components. Manufacturers often quote the rate at which data can be retrieved as a 
constant stream from the device. This is typically 80-120 MB/s. The most important effect 
that degrades this access rate is that of the head seeking across the disk, which is typically 
9ms = .009 seconds. 
We suggest that even if the 250,000 random seeks to the beginning of the files are 1000 
times slower than the sequential reads the overall impact is to add less than 5% to the 
overall time.  
When linear imaging, if a 2TB disk has 4,000,000,000 x 512 byte sectors and takes 7 hours 
to image then each sector must take 0.00005 seconds to access and read. 
When Jigsaw imaging if most sectors take 0.00005 seconds but the first sector of each file 
takes .009 seconds, nearly 200 times longer, to access and read this means that Jigsaw 
imaging should take just 250,000 x .009 seconds longer to complete the same task. 
Therefore, we expect Jigsaw to be about 37 minutes longer on a 7-hour task, which is 9% 
more. 
Additionally, regarding seek times when reading a fragmented file, we make two 
observations. We find the new huge disks are often only sparsely filled, and so when files 
are written they do not need to weave between used clusters. In addition when they are filled 
it is often with write once, read after, files like video. In addition, Windows 8 now runs 
defragmentation as a scheduled event as a standard configuration item. 
Solid State drives have zero seek times and so Jigsaw should see no speed penalty at all. 
Subsequently, we do not feel this overhead is an issue. 
Secondly, on the matter of processing overhead, we believe that running this on an i7 
processor will provide ample power to complete these tasks without any significant time 
penalty.  
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Jigsaw imaging’s main claim is to deliver actionable data very quickly and this is beyond 
dispute. From initiating imaging, it is likely that the first evidence could start to be delivered 
as single DECs within less than a minute. Subsequent DECs containing high valued data 
then roll off as fast as it can be written to the collecting device. 
8.3.5 Actual results on Timing 
We used one of our sample disks, which is 500GB, with 182,527 files totalling 207GB with 
293GB free, as it is the largest and so more of a challenge. 
We ran “dcfldd if=/dev/sdl of=/dev/sdm” and it took 513 minutes on our machine. That is 16.2 
MB/s.  
We ran Jigsaw with a regular expression of 
“/.PF$|/.PDF$|/.DOC$|/.XLS$|/.TXT$|/.JPG$|/.C$|/.SCR$” 
The run was with the regular expression above and was used to create DECs for all the files 
*.PF, *.PDF, *.DOC, *.XLS, *.TXT, *.JPG, *.C, and *.SCR, these numbered 6720 and totalled 
13GB. They were finished after 40 minutes. 
The remaining 175,807 files were finished after a further 260 minutes. The remaining 
unallocated clusters took an additional 500 minutes to copy. Therefore, Jigsaw imaging took 





Rate MB/s Speed 
+ is slower 
Dcfldd 500 513 16.2 Datum 
Copying and bagging  
6720 files 
13 40 5.4 +67% 
Copying  
175,807 files  
194 172 12.4 +23% 
Copying 
Unallocated space 
293 460 10.6 +35% 
Total for Jigsaw 500 672 10.9 +33% 
Table 30 - Jigsaw Imaging test results 
The full results, in Table 30, show that the first stage, copying and bagging, took 67% more. 
This was greater than expected and is probably because storing the bags requires that a file 
has to be created, opened, written to and closed within an EXT4 file system. 
If the entire source drive contained data then we could expect the overhead in the first stage 
to be continued throughout the whole process extending the entire process to 856 minutes. 
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The 35% speed reduction while copying the clusters that constitute the unallocated space 
was a surprise as the task is so similar to the process in dcfldd. It may just be down to the 
efficiency of the code. 
One significant observation was that while imaging by either linear or Jigsaw, the processor 
was hardly working, staying at about 25% capacity. Because Jigsaw collects data in files, it 
is available for on the fly processing within the remaining 75% capacity of the processor. 
8.3.6 On Integrity 
The tests run with various Linux utilities proved that the imaging and bagging was reliable. 
On the issues of resilience to interruption and recovery from error, neither of these issues 
were addressed in the prototype code. The obvious technique is to create and maintain an 
array to parallel the NTFS $Bitmap file used to locate data on the original evidence media. In 
this sense, Jigsaw imaging has the same efficacy and problems as its peers as it could be 
viewed as a linear imaging applied in bursts controlled by the directory file $MFT.  
The same can be said about achieving thoroughness. The $Bitmap file provides a mapping 
of all the clusters within the partition, when this is complete, so all the cluster have been 
copied. 
8.3.7 Assessment of Gains and Losses 
During a linear imaging process, it is possible create a cryptographic hash of the source 
media stream and so enable the destination to be verified after it has been written. This does 
require the destination to be re-read in its entirety as a stream and so consequently, it is time 
consuming but the ability to verify the whole copy is highly valued as a means of assuring 
integrity. This is common practice to write this process into an acquisition procedure. 
During Jigsaw imaging’s non-linear process, we lose the cryptographic hash of the entire 
image as a single entity. This would be true of any non-linear imaging, for example, AFF, the 
EnCase Logical Evidence File format or DEC as we reviewed in section 4.6. Similarly, we do 
gain the ability to record the cryptographic hash of each individual file that is not available in 
linear imaging, as it does not read files. 
With the ever increasing use of cloud storage we should ask for how long will we have the 
ability to create whole media hashes anyway? We gain the advantage of cryptographically 
hashing each individual file. As Jigsaw imaging reads files we gain the advantage that we 
can check teach file against a hash database to enable the DEFR to be alerted to 
‘contraband’. Current linear systems can only read individual clusters, create a hash and 
compare it with a database of contraband clusters hashes. 
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8.3.8 Conclusions 
Jigsaw imaging has a place in an arsenal of acquisition techniques. It clearly scores well 
when used in large media that is only partially filled. Its primary advantage is that it allows 
access to the data selected by the investigator within a few seconds rather than have them 
wait until the imaging and verification is complete without the need to start again on imaging.  
8.4 Prioritisation 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Figure 98 - Accumulated Evidence Score is provided as an illustration of our objective. The 
x-scale is linear from 0 bytes to 168GB, representing volume of data read and processed. 
The y-axis is the accumulated score of the potential to provide evidence. 
 
Figure 98 - Accumulated Evidence Score 
If the files all had the same potential evidence score per unit of data then we would expect to 
see the yellow line. As data is read, evidence potential increases in proportion.  
This would, for course, imply that a 5MB DOC file would be seen by an examiner to 
potentially hold the same chance as containing evidence as 5 JPG files of 1MB. This is the 
case without any prioritisation. Clearly, this is not a realistic expectation of the real world and 
is not suggested. The actual potential value of each type of data and its weighting based on 
size will vary from case to case. 
Our prioritisation technique, described section 6.6, allows us to allocate score points to each 
of nine attributes. If we sort files based on these figures we will either draw files to the left, in 
red, representing more prompt processing or to the right, in blue, for less prompt processing. 
8.4.2 Analysis Summary 
Figure 99, Figure 100 and Figure 101 show our primary analysis.  
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8.4.2.1 By Evidence Score Card 
The first table shows the file types, in order of Bayesian score allocated to the file type within 
the experiment. This list, shown in part in Figure 99 – Files Types sorted by User Allocated 
Bayesian Score, is sorted into the numerical order by the value allocated by ‘the user’ in 
parameter #4 of Table 14 - Evidence Value Score Parameters and listed. With 17 points 
awarded to AVIs, JPGs, MP4s and 16 points to DOCs, XLSs, DOCXs, F4Vs and so on. 
Ext Count Total Size Category Value Description 
AVI 28  457,528,844 Video 17 Audio Video Interleave File 
JPG 12,401  5,314,176,481 Raster 17 JPEG Image 
MP4  205  65,167,024,000 Video 17 MPEG-4 Video File 
DOC  394  164,337,404 MOffice 16 Word/WordPad Document 
XLS  210  17,163,288 MOffice 16 Excel Spreadsheet 
DOCX 1,001  266,899,785 MOffice 16 Microsoft Word Open XML Document 
F4V 5  571,275 Video 16 Flash MP4 Video File 
XLSX 50  1,447,020 MOffice 16 Microsoft Excel Open XML Spreadshe 
PNG 46,719  273,153,414 Raster 15 Portable Network Graphic 
FSD 1,575  841,482,240 MOffice 15 MSOffice File Cache 
HTML 7,398  78,132,803 Web 14 Hypertext Markup Language File 
HTM 4,862  93,322,059 Web 14 Hypertext Markup Language File 
VB 2,943  6,249,082 Develop 14 Visual Basic Code 
XLSB 2  1,647,139 MOffice 14 Excel Binary Spreadsheet 
Figure 99 – Files Types sorted by User Allocated Bayesian Score 
8.4.2.2 Post Score Allocation reports 
The score factors from all the parameters in Table 14 - Evidence Value Score Parameters, 
on page 190, was run against all the files on the file-system including those shown in Figure 
99 – Files Types sorted by User Allocated Bayesian Score, it is no surprise that the results, 
in Figure 100, show the top scoring individual files are all JPGs. 
Score      Size LastAccess  K  S  C  E  D  L Ext    Dir              Filename 
 882  1,636,491 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_094739.jpg  
 882  1,950,514 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_094745.jpg  
 882  1,708,496 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_094749.jpg  
 882  1,620,133 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_094752.jpg  
 882  1,908,146 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_102022.jpg  
 882  1,708,212 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_102033.jpg  
 882  1,667,173 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_102049.jpg  
 882  1,243,931 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104059_1.jpg  
 882  1,234,623 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_10.jpg  
 882  1,217,424 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_11.jpg  
 882  1,207,309 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_12.jpg  
 882  1,170,692 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_13.jpg  
 882  1,148,884 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_14.jpg  
 882  1,294,962 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_2.jpg  
 882  1,261,563 2014-03-01  0  9  8  9  4  9 JPG    /Users/SkyDrive/ Photos 20131031_104100_3.jpg  
Figure 100 - Top Scoring Files 
In Figure 100, columns K, S, C, E, D, L contain the scores from the attributes described in 
Figure 20. These are explained in Table 31 
 Description Value Factor Total Score 
K #7 – Known File Fingerprint 0 1000 0 
Results, Evaluation and Assessment 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  227 | P a g e  
S  #3 – Size of the file 9 30 270 
C  #5 – File type category 8 25 200 
E #4 – File Extension 9 30 270 
D #6 – Last Modified Date 4 13 52 
L #9 – Processing Rate 9 10 90 
    882 
Table 31 - Allocation of Bayesian Values to Figure 95 
Grouping files by similar score and file type, shown in Figure 101 - The Top score File 
Types, from 882 to 753 points 
we see that there are 2,144 files with the highest score of 882 and they are all JPGs. The 
next 13 highest scoring groups are also JPGs. The variation in scores is because of date 
variations between the JPG files. We know, from Figure 95, that there are 12,401 JPGs on 
the media. However, there are only 12,371 listed before the next file groups that include 
AVIs, MP4s, DOCs and XLSs. This reflects the influence of other parameters, most likely 
date variations. 
 
Start Tue Mar 18 15:01:30 GMT 2014: Top 40 Score Values are: 
Score Ext   Number              Size 
  882 JPG     2,144    4,834,602,377 JPEG Image                    
  880 JPG       778      249,185,431 JPEG Image                    
  879 JPG         2        3,589,123 JPEG Image                    
  878 JPG        11       31,742,231 JPEG Image                    
  876 JPG        32        4,392,316 JPEG Image                    
  875 JPG         2        2,854,572 JPEG Image                    
  874 JPG     8,288      124,296,646 JPEG Image                    
  873 JPG        42       43,584,085 JPEG Image                    
  872 JPG         3          101,104 JPEG Image                    
  871 JPG       184        1,482,268 JPEG Image                    
  870 JPG       807       16,671,431 JPEG Image                    
  868 JPG         1          516,424 JPEG Image                    
  867 JPG        98          928,272 JPEG Image                    
  865 JPG         9          230,201 JPEG Image                    
  853 AVI        20      457,528,748 Audio Video Interleave File   
  853 MP4       194   62,617,170,431 MPEG-4 Video File             
  850 MP4         2    2,520,549,532 MPEG-4 Video File             
  849 AVI         8               96 Audio Video Interleave File   
  849 MP4         5        9,362,919 MPEG-4 Video File             
  846 MP4         4       19,941,118 MPEG-4 Video File             
  813 DOC       353      163,751,047 Word/WordPad Document         
  813 DOCX      986      264,808,630 Microsoft Word Open XML Docum 
  813 XLS       201       16,971,776 Excel Spreadsheet             
  813 XLSX       49        1,441,250 Microsoft Excel Open XML Spre 
  810 DOC        22          257,744 Word/WordPad Document         
  810 DOCX       11          545,274 Microsoft Word Open XML Docum 
  809 DOC        15          232,357 Word/WordPad Document         
  809 DOCX        4        1,545,881 Microsoft Word Open XML Docum 
  809 XLS         5          136,216 Excel Spreadsheet             
  809 XLSX        1            5,770 Microsoft Excel Open XML Spre 
  806 DOC         4           96,256 Word/WordPad Document         
  806 XLS         4           55,296 Excel Spreadsheet             
  793 F4V         5          571,275 Flash MP4 Video File          
  762 PNG         8       10,379,761 Portable Network Graphic      
  760 PNG       112       24,629,237 Portable Network Graphic      
  757 PNG         1          101,933 Portable Network Graphic      
  756 PNG        69       14,828,082 Portable Network Graphic      
  755 PNG         2        3,030,370 Portable Network Graphic      
  754 PNG    32,344      127,053,304 Portable Network Graphic      
  753 FSD     1,575      841,482,240 MSOffice File Cache  
          
Figure 101 - The Top score File Types, from 882 to 753 points 
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8.4.3  “Evidence Points” Score Against “Time and Data Read” 
The effectiveness of the prioritisation technique process is best illustrated by focusing on just 
one file type. 
8.4.3.1 Selecting a high value specific file type – Only JPG 
 
Figure 102 - Only JPGs by inode 
In Figure 102 - Only JPGs by inode, we see the evidential potential points score attainment 
rate if only JPG files are selected as the files are scanned in inode order. Of the 130,000,000 
‘Potential Evidence Points’ available on the whole file-system about 11,000,000 come from 
JPG files. Although there is a general trend to attain more points as the files are processed, 
it can be seen that in lower inode places evidence potential attainment is less rapid but 
towards the higher inode places it increases. This is expected as files that occupy lower 
inode places are usually occupied by files associated with Operating System installation and 
there are few JPGs to be found. Towards the end, in the higher inode places, the rate of 
potential evidence attainment is greatest. This is most likely because the user has added 
more JPGs to the file-system and these are added in the higher inode places. This sequence 
aligns to the “Worse” profile in Figure 98.  
Results, Evaluation and Assessment 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  229 | P a g e  
  
Figure 103 - Only JPGs by Filename 
When the scan is executed in filename order, Figure 103 - Only JPGs by Filename, we see 
noticable steps of increase. It is likely that these are a result of the organisation of JPGs into 
directories that represent the subject or event being photographed.  
 
Figure 104 - Only JPGs by Potential Evidence Score 
Figure 104 - Only JPGs by Potential Evidence Score, shows the potential evidence attain 
when sorted using the user allocated scoring system. 100% of the 11,000,000 associated 
with JPGs is achieved very rapidly. The first stage is not vertical because other file type, 
notably AVIs, were considered more valuable see Figure 99 – Files Types sorted by User 
Allocated Bayesian Score.  
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8.4.3.2 Selecting a low value specific file type – Only DLL 
The opposite affect can be seen if we select a file type that we know has been set to a low 
potential evidential value. We can see, in the 3 graphs of Figure 105 - Selecting Only DLLs, 
how the use of the Potential Evidence Score delays any processing of DLL files until nearly 
half way through the processing cycle.  
   
Figure 105 - Selecting Only DLLs 
The first two graphs display the same sort of profile as we saw when we selected only JPGs 
but the final graph shows the same sort of rapid climb but it is delayed until much later in the 
overall process.  
8.4.4 General Results 
 
Figure 106 - Prioritising Processing 
In 7.6, we stated that our test data set was a 256GB solid state drive from a well-used 
Notebook running windows 8. The total ‘Evidence Potential’ for the files contained in this file-
system was about 130,000,000.  
It can be seen, in Figure 106 - Prioritising Processing, that when processing the data by both 
Filename and Inode sequence we obtain a nearly linear increase in potential evidence value 
over time spent reading the data by volume. 
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 However when we processed data by sorting our ‘Potential Evidence’ score the blue line 
align to the ‘Better’ profile in Figure 98. 
• When processing by inode or filename sequence: 
 After 25% of the time we attain approximately 35,000,000 score 
(25%), of the potential evidence value; 
 After 50% of the time we attain approximately 60,000,000 score 
(50%) of the potential evidence value; 
 After 75% of the time we attain approximately 100,000,000 (75%) of 
the potential evidence value. 
 
• When we use the Potential Evidence value: 
 After 25% of the time we attain the 60,000,000 score, nearly 50%, of 
the potential evidence; 
 After 50% of the time we attain the 95,000,000 score (75%) of the 
potential evidence value; 
 After 75% of the time we have processed 115,000,000 (90%) of the 
potential evidence value. 
 
If the total evidence was, instead of 16GB perhaps 4TB, it might take 70 hours to process it 
all at 2MB/s on a 12 core i7 based PC. Processing by ‘Potential Evidence Score’ would 
reduce the time to reach 50% of the evidence by 25% overall and is, in effect a doubling of 
processing effectiveness. 
This effect is even more dramatic when we assess the effect on specific file types. 
8.4.5 Discussion 
This technique enables prioritisation of processing data by allocating a hypothetical ‘Potential 
Evidential Value’ to a number of characteristics of file meta-data. This is more than just 
selecting certain file types for processing first. It allows more sophisticated prioritisation to 
control processing. In our examples, with a 256 GB disk we know to contain 168 GB of data, 
we improved the attainment rate by about 25%; see Figure 106 - Prioritising Processing. If 
this was applied to a 4 TB drive full of data, which would probably complete processing in 
about 4 days at 12 MB/s, we could reduce the time in which the data was processed by as 
much as 90% for specific file types. This is shown in Figure 104 - Only JPGs by Potential 
Evidence Score, and by 25% overall, Figure 106 - Prioritising Processing. 
Even within groups consisting of large numbers of similar files, for example there are 12,401 
JPGs in our example in Figure 95, the higher priority files will be pushed to the front of this 
sub-queue. 
When the x-axis equates to processing the data on a 4TB drive these time reductions can be 
significant. If we consider our rule-of-thumb to process about 2MB/s on a single core in an i7-
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based host, 4 TB of data will take about 4 days. This prioritisation technique could reduce 
results availability by a day or two. 
There remain two obvious questions that remain unanswered in this test. 
There is a question about whether to processes one large file rather than lots of small files. 
This is a strategic decision for the investigator who sets the prioritising parameters. Which is 
more likely to yield results sooner; Processing 10,000 x 1MB JPGs or 1,000 x 10MB JPGs? 
Both would likely take the same time but the former would ‘cover more ground’, in which 
case we might choose the adversely weight JPG files when they exceed about 5 MB. 
The second question is in the area of job queuing and is associated with the previous 
question. Within a single PC there is little scope for distributing tasks so that one large task, 
for example still thumbnail generation of video frames from a large video file while 
concurrently processing many smaller JPG files. In a distributed processing environment, 
this becomes a real possibility. 
What this prioritising technique does lack is the ability to choose and implement a strategy 
based upon the properties of the files to be considered. This could be in the form of a 
decision tree that allocated values dynamically during acquisition thus moving items up and 
down the priority list based on the amended values. 
8.5 Digital Evidence Container Design 
We explained in section 6.5 that a real implementation would most likely use a well-
established DEC format, perhaps AFF. We found that using this in our prototype 
development became too complicated and so we developed a basic design for design trials. 
The design, shown in Figure 88 and Figure 89 was explained in section 6.5. Its key claim to 
integrity is that each DEC holds a cryptographic hash of each cluster, a cryptographic hash 
for the entire file and that the header should contain sufficient data to enable its exact 
placement as part of a reconstruction of the original after imaging. 
As a prototype, the design is incomplete and one obvious addition is that there is no record 
of the Master Boot Record details within the Master DEC data. 
Additionally, our DEC naming scheme is flawed. The naming convention, shown on page 
183, uses the file system serial number and the SHA-1 cryptographic hash of the contents. 
We found that host machines sometimes have their hard disks cloned from a master. This is 
often the case within large organisations. In addition, using the cryptographic hash of the 
contents means that these could be collisions within the naming of duplicate files. We note 
that AFF uses a unique, random ID string to name each container within its namespace. 
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8.6 FCluster and FClusterfs 
8.6.1 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
In 3.4, we identified Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability as three founding principles of 
information security. Here we assess FCluster and FClusterfs against these principles. 
8.6.1.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality Assurance is present throughout FCluster. Jigsaw imaging reads from the 
original source and creates Digital Evidence Containers as one of two outputs. Our simplified 
DEC inherited a key feature from most of the existing forensic image and DEC design, that 
of encryption. 
The key to be used in the encryption is generated within FCluster and then uses a PKI 
architecture to encrypt this using the public key of the designated imaging device together 
with the private key of FCluster. This is transferred to the imaging device where it is 
unpacked and will be used to encrypt all DECs. 
Data stored within the DEC is encrypted using a cryptographically strong algorithm, AES-
256. This data is then Uuencoded to reduce data transfer problems that can sometimes 
occur with non-ASCII data. 
The DECs are transferred to FCluster be ingested. The identity of the DECs is verified and 
they are allocated and transferred to their allotted storage location while still in an encrypted 
form. 
It is only when the DEC is received within the storage location that it is unpacked. Using the 
key, stored within the FClusterfs SQL database, the data is unpacked and stored within the 
file system using the FClusterfs FUSE file system. FClusterfs inherits the on-the-fly 
encryption technique used in eCryptfs, described in 4.5.4, with AES-256 and a locally 
generated encryption key to encrypt the data before it is stored on the media. 
As the data is needed for processing, it is read from the media and decrypted in user 
memory space. 
All data transfer is over, typically, SSH encrypted communications protocols. 
Access to data within the FCluster file-system is controlled by entries in the SQL database 
behind FClusterfs. This can offer fine-grained access control to data.  
8.6.1.2 Integrity 
As the original data is read from the source media, a cryptographic hash is calculated for 
each cluster read and for each file read. A file is of course, a collection of a sequence of one 
or more clusters, so both can be calculated at the same time with one read of the data. This 
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is recorded in the header section of the DEC created to hold the data. This meta-data is 
transported within the DEC, into FCluster. Finally, it is stored in the meta-data table of the 
SQL database used by FClusterfs. 
Periodically, it is used by the verification daemon to check the integrity of the data as stored 
on the storage media. 
There is a failing in this approach caused by the non-linear jigsaw imaging technique. 
Because cryptographic hashes are generated from a stream of data, it is no longer possible 
to create a cryptographic hash of the whole source media in Jigsaw imaging, as has been 
the practice for several years. ACPO 2.2.5, our section 8.6.2.2.  
Selective and reasonable seizure is currently the subject of much discussion. Because of the 
difficulty of dividing the data on storage media because it has been considered indivisible, it 
has become common practice to image the whole media; as a result, a cryptographic hash 
of the whole media can be created. The 4
th
 amendment of the Constitution of the United 
State (Legal Information institute 2014) contains reference to “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure [_. ] against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and this being used to hamper 
collection of evidence in the form of an image. When this is set against the trend to adopt 
cloud storage systems and the popularity of ‘closed’ devices that, unlike Microsoft Windows 
for example, do not enable the storage media to be isolated and examined without the host 
device. The increased use of cryptography in storage devices is another factor preventing 
imaging in the conventional sense. The file-system cannot be read without the operation of 
the host operating system and the host operating system does not enable the storage media 
to be imaged. 
Our belief is that the ACPO 2.2.4 proposal, to image rather than not, will increasing fail to be 
possible and so the practice of cryptographically hashing the entire media will be seen as the 
exception rather than the norm in large media. It may remain in the case of smaller media 
like memory sticks. 
8.6.1.3 Availability 
FCluster replicates DECs on, typically, three storage nodes. This is an arbitrary number 
based upon common practice in devices such as RAID and the Hadoop file system. Thus, 
we have redundancy to ensure availability. 
One objective in the design of FCluster was to allow access to DECs for processing while 
not allowing the investigator to have complete access to copy the target file at will. FCluster 
can offer this. If, by means of access control, investigators are unable to directly mount an 
FCluster file-system in their own user space they can only gain access to the data by adding 
tasks to the system workflow table. If additions to the list were restricted to entries that called 
programs that were on an approved list then by controlling additions to an approved list, 
programs that could copy a whole file could be prevented from being run. 
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8.6.1.4 Non-repudiation 
FCluster achieves effective non-repudiation by provision of a comprehensive logging system. 
This records all DEC ingestions, movements, unpacking and verification as well as any file-
system open actions on the data. 
8.6.2 Evaluate against ACPO v5, Dec 2007 
In 3.5.2 we identified the ACPO Guidelines as key to the acceptance of assurance in digital 
forensics in the UK. Here we assess FCluster and FClusterfs against the relevant parts. 
8.6.2.1 Principle 3 
“An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence 
should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be 
able to examine those processes and achieve the same result“ 
This is satisfied by the audit-trail within FClusterfs, provided it gathers enough information 
about the software used, including version number, FCluster should satisfy principle 3 of the 
APCO v5 guidelines. 
8.6.2.2 ACPO 2.2.4 
“In order to comply with the principles of digital evidence, wherever 
practicable, proportionate and relevant an image should be made of the 
device. This will ensure that the original data is preserved, enabling an 
independent third party to re-examine it and achieve the same result, as 
required by principle 3.” 
This is discussed in section 8.6.1.2, as it is an issue of integrity. 
8.6.2.3 ACPO 2.2.5 
“This may be a physical / logical block image of the entire device, or a 
logical file image containing partial or selective data (which may be 
captured as a result of a triage process). Investigators should use their 
professional judgement to endeavour to capture all relevant evidence if 
this approach is adopted.” 
This is the conflict between full imaging and selective data capture.  
8.6.2.4 ACPO 2.2.7 
“It is essential to display objectivity in a court of law, as well as the 
continuity and integrity of evidence. It is also necessary to demonstrate 
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how evidence has been recovered, showing each process through which 
the evidence was obtained. Evidence should be preserved to such an extent 
that a third party is able to repeat the same process and arrive at the same 
result as that presented to a court.” 
There are two aspects to this. Firstly, FCluster creates and maintains an audit trail of actions 
upon data stored within the system. The second is, largely, an issue with the tools used to 
recover information from the data and the decision of the investigator that it represents 
evidence. FCluster is designed to enable existing software to run and obtain access to data 
stored in FCluster without the need to any alteration to the software. This does mean that 
when software is run using FCluster it can be validated against the results of the same 
process running on non-FCluster platforms.  
8.6.2.5 How robust is the database behind FClusterfs 
Table 26 - inode table field updates by processing stage, on page 208, shows the 
progression of field updates as data is ingested into FClusterfs. 
Updates to the MySQL database behind FClusterfs are at the heart of the acceptable 
movement of data through the assurance zones. At each stage, multiple checks are made 
against the table fields that should be completed if the data item had successfully achieved 
the previous assurance zone. 
FClusterfs inherits a number of safeguards from MySQL. Firstly, MySQL is transactional in 
that when a number of Update or Insert commands are considered to be a batch to complete 
a job they are committed at the same time. In this way, partial transactions will always fail. 
Secondly, MySQL has a built in replication function that enables automatic duplication and 
failover functions. This also helps scalability and load balancing. 
 
 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster 237 | P a g e  
8.6.3 Against ISO 27037:2012 
The evaluation of FCluster will focus on the creation of a Gap Analysis against ISO 27037:2013. From the sections identified in section 3.5.3, a Gap 
Analysis table can be drawn up. 
ISO 27037:2012 defines the characteristics of a management system and the tools to identify, collect, acquire, preserve and analyse digital 
evidence. Not all sections of the standard are applicable when set against FCluster, which is limited to how the data is handled within a distributed 
processing environment. FClusterfs can be viewed as a management system to preserve digital evidence. The assessment is below in Table 32. 
Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 





5.3.2 Auditability To make it possible for the actions of 
DEFR and DES to be evaluated.  
Yes All significant actions within FCluster are audited 
without being either too intrusive, and so affecting 
system response, or too detailed as to be unreadable. 
5.3.3 Repeatability Given the same set of circumstances, the 
outcome of an event should be identical 
or that any variation must be explainable. 
Yes This is not really a function of FCluster as programs 
run under the control of the host operating system. If 
the host operating system provides repeatability 
assurance then it is inherited by FCluster. 
5.3.4 Reproducibility Given the same digital evidence, the 
same results should be capable of being 
reproduced using DIFFERENT tools. 
Yes This is not really a function of FCluster as programs 
run under the control of the host operating system. If 
the host operating system provides reproducibility 
assurance then it is inherited by FCluster. 
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Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 





5.3.5 Justifiability That the DEFR or DES should be able to 
justify their actions. 
No Not Applicable 
5.4.2 Identification Each digital evidence container should 
be uniquely identifiable in an immutable 
way. 
No In 5.4.2, the standard uses ‘identify’ in the sense that 
the DEFR’s task is to locate digital data at a crime 
scene in order for it to be secured. 
5.4.3 Collection That the DEFR should gather together 
ready for data acquisition.  
No This is viewed as a ‘human’ function outside of 
FCluster. 
5.4.4 Acquisition That a suitable method of acquisition is 
chosen and then executed correctly. 
Acquisition should be verifiable. 
Yes This is not provided by FCluster, rather it comes from 





ISO 27037 highlights the need to 
prioritise the collection of more volatile 
data.  
No Not Applicable 
6.9 Preservation of 
Potential Digital 
Evidence 
 Yes This is really part of data prioritisation in Jigsaw 
imaging. 
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Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 







Preservation Potential evidence should be preserved 
to ensure its usefulness. It is important to 
protect the integrity of the evidence. 
Yes FCluster uses MD5/SHA1 cryptographic checksums 
to record the initial state of the data at acquisition and 
throughout its existence in the FCluster system. The 
integrity id repeatedly checked at scheduled intervals 
and just before use. 
6.1 Chain of 
Custody 
The DEFR and DES should be able to 
account for all the acquired data at the 
time it is within the custody of the DEFR 
and DES. The chain of custody should 
contain at least: 
• Unique evidence 
Identifier 
• Who accessed the 
evidence and the date time it took place 
• Who check the 
evidence in and out 
• Why the evidence 
was check out 
• Any unavoidable 
changes to the evidence 
Yes FCluster provides a comprehensive chain of evidence 
audit trail from the MySQL database. Specifically the 
audit table contains the relevant information. 
Table 32 - Assessment against ISO 27037:2012 
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8.6.4 Against ISO 17025:2005 
This is the ISO standard intended for application in a ‘Testing facility’ and so is not expected to be truly relevant. We include the assessment, in 
Table 33, to be comprehensive. 
Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 




5.2 Human Factors Including competence, provision of on-going training, 
supervision, clearly defined tasks and responsibility. 





The working environment should be adequate to 
support the analysis work undertaken. There should be 
environmental monitoring. There should be separation 
between areas that have incompatible activities. There 
should be good housekeeping in the laboratory. 
No Not Applicable 
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Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 









There should be appropriate testing and calibration of 
equipment that meets the needs of the customers. 
These should be based on international standards 
and/or the manufacture’s own standards and 
procedures. Where formal methods do not exist, new 
methods should be established and validated. 
(cont) 
Methods used in analysis should be selected to meet 
the needs of the customers and be of a suitably high 
quality. There is provision for non-standard tests, in 
that they must be validated first. 
Selection of Methods 
 (5.4.2 of ISO 17025) 
Laboratory-developed methods 
 (5.4.3 of ISO 17025) 
Non-standard methods 
 (5.4.4 of ISO 17025) 
Validation of Methods 
 (5.4.5 of ISO 17025) 
Estimation of Uncertainty 
 (5.4.6 of ISO 17025) 
Control of Data 
 (5.4.7 of ISO 17025) 
Perhaps? Calibration does not seem to have 
a place in digital forensics. 
However, selection of methods 
does have it place but at the 
application program level, not at the 
operating system level. 
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Clause Title Control Objective*  
summarised from the ISO standard Text 




5.5 Equipment The laboratory should have equipment that is at least 
adequate for the job. It should meet the required 
accuracy. Equipment should be uniquely identified. 
Equipment operated outside of the nominal levels 
should be subject to further conformance testing. 
 
Yes Not so much to do with FCluster as 
the equipment it is run on. 
5.6 Measurement 
traceability 
Equipment should be calibrated as per the 
manufacturer’s and International System of Units’ 
instructions. The laboratory should use reference 
standards. 
No Not Applicable 
5.8 The handling of 
test and 
calibration items 
Test and calibration sample should be handled and 
protected in a suitable manner. 
No Not Applicable 
5.9 Assuring the 
quality of test 
and calibration 
results 
 No Not Applicable 
5.10 Reporting the 
Results 
 No Not Applicable 
Table 33 - Assessment against ISO 17025:2005 
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8.6.5 Against OAIS, ISO 14721:2012 
The characteristics of the “Space data and information transfer systems — Open archival 
information system (OAIS) — Reference model” were described in section 4.3.7. This 
standard was identified by the reviewers of the paper submitted to DFRWS EU 2014. The 
design of FCluster was conducted unaware of this standard but does surprisingly well when 
assessed against it as shown in Table 34. 
A system is said to conform if it “Supports the model of information described in 2.2” and 
“fulfils the responsibilities listed in 3.1” of ISO 14721:2012  
Feature Applicable Present in 
FCluster 
Notes 
Producer Yes Yes The DEFR 
Archive Yes FClusterfs  
Consumer Yes Yes The DES 
Management Yes Yes  
SIP Yes Yes Digital Evidence Containers  
AIP Yes Yes FCluster Storage Format 
DIP Yes Yes As a user available file 
Table 34 - Applicability of ISO 14721:2012 against FCluster 
FCluster certainly embodies the concepts described in ISO 14721:2014, section 2.2.1 – 
“Information Definition”, which is summarised in section 4.3.7.  
The definition of the information data and meta-data as it is stored in FCluster would 
probably not conform to the Information Package Definition in ISO 14721:2014, section 
2.2.2, but it is very close. In FCluster, at the stage that data is stored in Archive Information 
Package format (AIP), meta-data has been read from the digital evidence container (DEC or 
SIP) and is stored in the MySQL database used to organise data storage within the cluster. 
During the unpacking process, the meta-data is read from the DEC and written to a file with 
the same prefix but with a ‘.meta’ text attached as a suffix. There is no reason that a pointer 
to the metadata file could not be inserted into the database instead. 
With hindsight, it would have been better to store data within FCluster in such a way that the 
original meta-data was held together with its data, which is actually the structure of the DEC 
created by Jigsaw imaging. This would improve resilience to corruption as a ‘stray’ DEC 
could be fully identified back to its source. OAIS allows for variation in the storage format of 
data as it is submitted, archived and disseminated. The downside is that it would require the 
data to be unpacked every time it is requested. 
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8.6.6 Against Daniel Ayers’ criteria 
From section 4.2.7, on page 77, in his proposal for a second-generation forensic analysis 
system, Ayers blurs the boundary between operating system and application program 
describing it all as ‘the tool’. Some apply to one, some to both. 
He identifies a series of metrics, shown in Table 35, by which a system should be judged 




Absolute Speed measured by the time elapsed from 
start to finish 
X X 
Relative Speed a ratio between the read speed of 
the storage media and the 
processing speed 
X X 
Accuracy the proportion of results returned 
that are correct 
 X 
Completeness the proportion of evidence found  X 
Reliability that the tool does not crash and 
recovers from errors 
X X 
Table 35 - Ayers' general criteria 
And then a series of requirements, shown in Table 36, for second generation tools 






The tool must be able to use the 
computational resources of many 
separate processors (i.e. 
processors that do not share main 
memory or I/O bus bandwidth) so 
as to be capable of improved 





The tool must support a fault 
tolerant, high performance and 




The tool must be designed and 
coded to provide a high level of 
assurance that analysis results will 
be correct and software operation 
free from error under all 
circumstances. 
 X 
Auditability Source code for forensic analysis 
functions should be available for 
independent review by a qualified 
third party. 
X X 
Repeatability The tool must support the 
automation of all analysis functions 
and processes, except those 
where interactive human 
involvement is unavoidable. 
 X 
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Data Abstraction The tool must provide high-level 
abstrac-tions for at least the 
following types [_] Common data 
formats, 
 X 
Table 36 - Ayers' criteria for second-generation tools 
Selecting the characteristics that apply to the Operating System or Middleware, we see that 
FCluster certainly achieves parallel processing, scalable storage and auditability. Reliability 
is achieved by replication of data. The two criteria of absolute and relative speed fall into the 
same problem areas as previously identified by Roussev in that they are comparative with 
existing benchmark systems like FTK. All we can say is that prioritising high value evidence 
data improves delivery to the processing system, see Figure 106 on page 230, and that once 
in a distributed system, blocking of smaller jobs no longer hampers the processing of larger 
jobs. 
We feel that we have satisfied Ayers’ requirement that apply to the Operating system and 
Middleware. 
8.7 Evaluation against the project objectives 
We now return to section 1.3.5 and evaluate the original individual objectives of the 
research.  
8.7.1 Objective 1 was: 
“To derive a set of requirements to enable the development of a 
distributed management system specifically suited to forensic 
investigation.” 
In chapters 3, 4 we undertook extensive research into the standards that influence the 
practice of digital forensics, primarily in the UK but not ignoring the heavy influence of the 
practice in the USA. We considered current implementations practices and identified the 
presence of a chain of evidence in systems currently used for forensic analysis that failed to 
hold its integrity when employed in a distributed environment. This was distilled as a set of 
design requirements in chapter 5 and in Appendix A1. 
8.7.2 Objective 2 was: 
“To evaluate some prominent existing distributed management systems 
and assess their suitability to implement a prototype distributed forensic 
system.” 
In sections 4.3 and 4.4, we considered BOINC, Hadoop, HTCondor and a number of 
distributed file system such as AndrewFS, GlusterFS and PVFS. We found the each design 
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stems from a design criteria with objectives to solve specific problems. General purpose 
distributed systems could be employed in forensic processing but most lack either 
immediacy, such as HTCondor which sends data away to be processed on whatever 
platform is available at the time, or by the distributed file system which often splits files into 
strips or chunks to increase delivery speed or reliability. Our conclusion was that because 
none had been designed with the specific need of forensic processing in mind, none was 
effective in this use case.  
8.7.3 Objective 3 was: 
“To classify existing forensic investigation tools and assess the likelihood of 
running them in a distributed environment and so to derive a standard for 
new tools intended to run within a distributed environment”  
In section 4.3.5, rather than looking at specific software we instead looked at the way in 
which they operate in terms of batch mode that may, or may not, require user intervention. 
Because FCluster presents as a modified file system, using FUSE, a large amount of 
existing software will run unaltered. In fact, much software can be run across the cluster to 
leverage the distributed processing without any modification. The only exception is the type 
often found in Microsoft Windows environments where the code is integrated with the user 
interface. This software will run but cannot exploit the distributed processing. This is the 
same as existing software that runs on a single host and reads data from a file server. 
8.7.4 Objective 4 was: 
“To develop a robust design of a middleware framework to support 
processing digital forensic tools in a distributed environment.” 
In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we believe that we have conducted an extensive design assessment 
and have developed a middleware framework that supports a number of fundamental 
principles in digital forensics. In chapter 8, we assessed this system against several of the 
principle standards used in digital forensics and, on balance, believe it to have succeeded. 
8.7.5 Objective 5 was: 
“To evaluate the prototype system using representative case data.” 
Aware of Garfinkel’s observation we wanted to use realistic data in our assessment. We 
used two disks one of 256GB and one of 500GB. These were several times larger than the 
largest available in Garfinkel’s Corpus. Arguably, we could have used even larger disks. The 
University of South Wales uses 2TB disk as a standard media in all of its machines for 
students but these do not store any user data, instead user data is stored on a data storage 
warehouse facility. The disk we used were the largest, most realistic available. 
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8.8 Evaluation against the research hypothesis 
From 1.3.4 the hypothesis is: 
“It is possible to facilitate the timely handling of large-scale digital 
evidence for professional computer forensic investigations, whilst still 
maintaining an appropriate chain of evidence, through the design of a 
suitable acquisition and processing methodology, implemented within 
distributed middleware architectures.” 
We started this research knowing, from examples in Hadoop, HTCondor and GRID, that 
distributed processing usually only yields its potential after the data has been distributed. In 
so many systems, the penalties incurred by distributing the data negate the gains of being 
able to process data in parallel. We saw it in forensic systems like FTK when setup of 
distributed processing and this also is true of FClusterfs if taken in isolation. 
However, by extending the principle of concurrency out to the acquisition process, we were 
able to deliver DECs as soon as they became available from Jigsaw imaging. This happens 
during the acquisition stage at the same time as the image is being created. As a result, 
FCluster is able to start distributing and therefore processing, well ahead of the conventional 
practice of linear imaging and processing on a single host. This was achieved without 
significant impact on the overall time spent imaging using a more conventional linear 
approach. 
Further to this, we proposed a priority system that pushed the acquisition of potentially 
higher value evidence to the fore. The scoring system used can be customised by the DEFR 
to suit the case profile. 
We evaluated the component parts of the system. We can demonstrate by providing a 
prototype that Jigsaw imaging works and the non-linear nature has little effect on overall 
processing times. Further, we demonstrated, by explanation, that prioritisation does achieve 
its objectives. We evaluated the chain of evidence within FClusterfs from the point of view of 
an auditor when faced with an audit against an ISO standard where the auditor would extend 
the SoA and Gap Analysis conducted by the organisation being audited and consider it to 
have passed an audit. 
In our objectives, we stated that we would need to derive a standard for new tools intended 
to work in this environment. The implementation of an assurance framework by using a 
FUSE file system negated this entirely. We believe no additional skills or programming 
practices would be needed to access the distributed processing power via FCluster. 
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We believe that FCluster does provide an appropriate chain of evidence for distributed 
forensic processing of data and that Jigsaw imaging combined with prioritisation does 
provide timeliness to the overall process. 
As Ayer’s observed, as to whether this is accepted by the ultimate customer, the legal 
profession remains to be answered. 
8.9 Published papers 
During the course of this research there were three papers published. The main paper, 
“Information Assurance in a distributed forensic cluster”, was presented at Digital Forensics 
Research Workshop EU 2014, in Amsterdam and subsequently published in Digital 
Investigation. 
• 2008 – Pringle N., Sutherland I., “Is a Computational Grid a Suitable Platform for 
High Performance Digital Forensics?”, 8th European Conference on Information 
Warfare and Security, University of Plymouth, UK. 
• 2014, Pringle, N., Burgess, M., “Information Assurance in a distributed forensic 
cluster”. Digital investigation (11), S27-S35,  doi:10.1016/j.diin.2014.03.005 
• 2014, Digital Forensics Research Workshop US 2015, Denver, USA. Short 
presentation 
8.10 Conclusions 
In chapter 8, we reported on our evaluation of the project. We described the evaluation 
strategy and proceeded to evaluated it on Jigsaw imaging, Prioritisation, the Digital Evidence 
Container and FClusterfs. Sometimes we were able to conduct quantitive, timed, evaluation 
and sometimes use a qualitative approach by assessing its conformance to various 
standards we had identified in chapters 1, 3 and 4. 
The chapter was concluded with the associated publications and an assessment of this work 




Conclusions, Applications and Further Work 
Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster  249 | P a g e  
9 Conclusions, Applications and Further Work 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, 3 and 4, we presented both the non-technical and the technical 
background to the problems associated with the increased volume of data that need be 
analysed for forensic investigators. This led on to a design brief, in chapter 5, in which we 
stated the solution requirements. Chapter 6 described FCluster and its component parts. In 
chapters 7 and 8, we tested and evaluated our design. 
We set out to provide a solution to what is probably the biggest problem facing digital 
forensics since it started two decades ago. It has been said that all of the gains of the last 
two decades could be lost if our investigators simply cannot keep up with the volume of data 
they are expected to process in a manner acceptable to the legal system. The consequence 
of continued use of existing architectures will result in our inability to process huge volumes 
of data and so either create pressure to lower our standards of evidence in digital matters or 
simply the adoption of a triage approach where ‘lower level’ crimes are not investigated and 
prosecuted. 
Here we draw together all of the work from the previous chapters and present our 
conclusions and our deliverables. 
9.2 Summary of our analysis 
The increase in evidential data was first apparent about 15 years ago. In response to this, 
Roussev proposed a system called DELV, recounted in section 4.3.2, that involved moving 
data from a data store to the processing nodes. This is the architecture used in HTCondor 
and is currently in use in Accessdata’s FTK Forensic version. Our own first attempt at solving 
this problem used Grid computing to mimic Roussev’s work and proved that it was not too 
bloated to be discounted from the solution set but was certainly not rich in features that 
would make it acceptable for use within the legal process. These designs highlighted the 
conflict between a conventional forensic image of media and the overhead or moving data 
around for processing. In the intervening years, there have been a few proposals for systems 
but few have progressed past the stage of a broad outline of a proposal. The National 
Forensic Institute in Holland and Lightbox in the United States have both used Hadoop in 
their designs. Neither has published their work and so it is only possible to speculate on their 
success. Because of the problems associated with the lack of random access within the 
Hadoop File system, we speculate that they are extracting data using very high-powered 
single PCs and storing forensic information from the source data in some form in the Hadoop 
architecture. We surmise that they must base further processing on this abstracted data. We 
feel there is a danger that in abstracting it is possible to loose information present in the 
original. This approach also makes re-processing of historic data rather inefficient as the 
originals would most likely need to be retrieved from some long-term archival system. 
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9.3 Our Offering 
FCluster is the first example of a middleware specifically designed for the distributed storage 
and processing of large amounts of data that addresses the need for processing in a 
forensically sound manner. The data acquisition, ingestion, storage and processing 
techniques were designed with forensic soundness as a primary objective from the start. 
FCluster is designed as a series of interlocking zones that, although connected, have clear 
divisions and embody a progression of data as it passes through a series of checks and 
controls that provide assurance that the data acquired at imaging time is the same as is 
available to whatever program is tasked to process it. 
9.4 Contributions to Research 
Prior to this project, no one had addressed the problem of massive processing of data for 
forensics in a way that tried to acknowledge the need for assurance of the chain of evidence 
in digital forensics. Roussev had created DELV and Ayers had created a broad criterion by 
which a system would be judged. We introduced chain of evidence to their work. 
9.5 As part of a research thread 
Despite being identified by several surveys as one of the most pressing problems within 
digital forensics, there has been relatively little research on this particular problem area. 
Quick & Choo’s review (2014) of the whole subject area confirms this with only eight papers 
directly identified as mentioning “Distributed Parallel”. The eight included 2 concerned with 
GPUs and and 2 review papers. This leaves just 4 papers working directly on distributed 
parallel processing. 
Roussev’s original proposal for DELV a decade ago was mirrored in a Grid in our own paper 
in 2008. A year later, it was developed upon by Ayers’ publication in 2009. Ayers’ article 
included plans for system he intended to build but it seems he never did. There have been 
three attempts at similar solutions in the last 5 years. Accessdata have provided distributed 
processing in their FTK product since version 4. However, this still relies upon a central file 
server that stored whole images of data. Two other projects have been identified, the first by 
Lightbox and the second by the National Forensic Institute in the Netherlands. Both seem to 
be based on a design where meta-data is extracted or created from the original material and 
the meta-data is stored within an Hadoop based system, perhaps with HBase. There is little 
information available about either of these systems. The most recent publication is was ours 
in 2014. 
FCluster takes the original observations by Roussev and Richard and then overlays Ayers’ 
more detailed thoughts about the characteristics of such a system and how it should be 
judged. It brings in the influences of the more recent thinking about Digital Evidence 
Containers that did not exist when Roussev created DELV and tied them all together with a 
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file system that included an inherent chain-of-evidence. In terms of data storage, we took the 
notion from Hadoop to have local processing of data at the point of storage, and the ability to 
modify a file system with FUSE to create access to this distributed storage for legacy 
software. 
FCluster successfully draws together several recent threads into a solution that, we believe, 
provides an original approach to a serious problem. 
9.6 Immediate Applications – Impact 
9.6.1 Patent Application 
This work is current to subject of a patent application shown in appendix D and a proposal 
for Horizon 2020 funding over the next few years.  
9.7 Future Work 
There are a number of avenues of research that could develop from this work.  
9.7.1 On the question of priorities 
In this work, we introduced a Bayesian scorecard approach to choosing which data would be 
best to process as having a high potential value of yielding actual evidence.  This leads to 
the question, is it possible to identify certain targets by the characteristics of the crime being 
investigated. It seems little work has been done within digital forensics on the behaviour of 
suspects when they commit certain types for crime. Work by Hong et al., Horsman and 
Rogers are seen in isolation. The behavioural characteristics of suspects are well 
researched in other areas. This work repeats Rogers’ call for more data to be generated on 
criminal behaviour and their personalities in a cyber-environment. 
9.7.2  On the question of job queuing 
Connected with the previous issue is the question that with a limited amount for processing 
power is better to process 10,000 smaller files or a handful of larger files. 
9.7.3 A portable cluster based on small ‘System On a Chip’ boards. 
What has become clear during the research his that this architecture can be applied both at 
the macro and the micro scale. It was imagined that FCluster would be manifest as a cluster 
of i7 PCs but during the course of the research, a number of “System On a Chip” (SoC) 
devices have become available. 
The Benchmarks shown in Table 37 give an indication of the relative processing power and 
the relative electrical power consumption. 
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Processor Floating Point MIPS 






CubieTruck Cortex A7 454 ( x 1) 1856 ( x 1) 0.5 W ( x 1) 
Atom 1700 ( x 3) 2600 ( x 1) 2.0 W ( x 4) 
Intel i3 2160 ( x 4) 6751( x 3) 80W ( x 160) 
Intel i7 2980 ( x 6) 10112 ( x 5) 150-250 W ( x 400) 
Xeon X3220 14567 ( x 32) 57752 ( x 31) 250W ( x 500) 






WD 2” Hard Disk on 
SATA 
75 412 6w 
Crucial-M SSD on SATA 115 424 1w 
WD 2” hard Disk on USB 27 397 6w 
Crucial-M SSD on USB   1w 
Table 37 - Relative Benchmarks 
During 2014, Cubietruck boards had an A7, 2-core processor and cost about £80. Only 6 
months later the Raspberry Pi 2 has an Armv7 A20 4-core processor and costs less than 
£30. 
As an addition to the LiveDVD we could also offer a small system based upon a Cubietruck 
device. 
This poses the possibility of a scene of crime portable distributed system that could regain 
the “Golden Hour” identified in section 4.7. 
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Why is it a problem? Origin 







Chapter 8 and 9 
1 Linear imaging 
is ‘blocking’ in 
nature and 
needs A to 
complete 








As we found, conventional Linear 
Imaging does not easily align with 
parallel processing, as it needs 
imaging to finish before any 
processing can take place. We 
seek an alternative method of 
acquiring the potential evidence set 
in a timely manner so that 
distributed storage and processing 
can be fully utilised. 
Current Forensic 
Imaging Formats 
Growth of Media 
File Sizes 
Parallelisation 
The end of the 
Image 
Replace linear imaging 
with a new paradigm – 
Jigsaw Imaging.  
Jigsaw Imaging reads 
data off the source in 
Digital Evidence 
Containers that are 
processed as they are 
created rather than 
waiting until the whole 
image is complete. 
However, while Jigsaw 
Imaging is reading each 
cluster needed to build 
the DECs, it is also writing 
out the sectors that form 
the cluster to a 
corresponding sector on a 
target drive. 
6.3 8.3 
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Chapter 8 and 9 














Data transfer over gigabit Ethernet 
is typically 100MB/s. AccessData’s 
FTK can process about 2MB/s on a 
single core of an i7 processor. If the 
data is stored on a central file-
server, it is possible to supply data 
to occupy only 50 cores or about 
seven i7 hosts with each host 
having 8 cores each. 
3.5.5 Hadoop 
Roussev 2013 
The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system exploits ‘data 
locality’ by implementing 
an architecture where 
whole files are stored on a 
remote host and a method 
of initiating a task on that 
remote host is provided 
6.7.2.5 Future Work 9.7 
 
3 We do not 
want to waste 
time 
processing 









Not all files are equally interesting 
in terms of their likelihood to host 
evidence. If we spend time 
processing low value data, we are 
wasting time. It would be better if 
the system directed the processing 
power to the most effective 
application of the power. 




Prioritisation is based on 
a user defined points 
score system that 
attempts to attach a 
potential evidential value 
to each file. Files that 
score higher values are 
processed first, with lower 
value files processed later 
or may even be ignored. 
6.5 8.3.7 
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Large jobs, for example creating 
thumbnails on ever key-frame in a 
video can be very time consuming 
and may block the progress of 
processing other data. 
 As data is replicated 
across the cluster, a 
blocked process can be 
run on a host that holds 
one of the data replicas. 
Big tasks still run 
exclusively to their 






Future Work 9.7 
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When we copy data, 
understandably, it does not usually 
carry the meta-data about its 
original location on the source 
media. When we take a forensic 
image, this meta-data is inherent in 
the structure of the image. If we 
adopt DECs, we need to collect and 
store the meta-data so that that it is 
available to the host investigative 
system. 
3.5.2 
ACPO v5 - 2.2.5 




ACPO v5 - 2.2.7 
Integrity of 
evidence 
The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system holds the 
extended meta-data 
required in a forensic 
investigation.  
A digital forensic 
investigation is surely the 
only activity that requires 
that the original file data 
and location of the original 
file data on the storage 
media meta-data be 
recorded. However, other 
types of users do require 
similar types of 
information relevant to 
their domains. This meta-
data is stored in the core 
database and so cannot 
be separated from the 
rest of the data stored on 
a cluster. 
6.7.2.12 8.4.5 
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Chapter 8 and 9 
6 Access to raw 
data and 
evidence 











If the system is to be accessed by 
multiple agencies then a 
corresponding granular access 
control system needs to be in place 
to support this.  
Investigators, including software, 
will need to be able to identify 
themselves so that the system can 
use this information to allow and 
restrict access accordingly, even 
down to individual file level. The 
Take-Grant security system used in 
NTFS is a good example of this 
fine-grained access control.  
From the forensic computer system 
design, this poses particular 
problems when the exchange of 
evidence and the information 
derived from investigations have to 
cross jurisdictions. Ideally, there 
should be a separation between the 
data itself and the results derived 
from processing it. In a similar way 
to the release of a cryptographic 
hash database of illegal data, 
typically photographs, allows 
sharing of a key characteristic of 
the data but not the data itself. 
3.7 Cross media 
forensics 
4.4 Multi Agency 
Access 
The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system controls all access 
to the data. We solve this 
by employing a database 
table containing access 
identification, 
authentication and asset 
management.  
Granular access to data 
will allow the system to 
satisfy the requirements 
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Chapter 8 and 9 
7 We should not 
waste the 
programming 
efforts of the 










During the course of the last 20 
years a large corpus of software 
has been developed and it would 
be desirable if as much of this as 
possible is still able to run on the 





The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system controls how the 
data is presented to 
users. The contents of 
Digital Evidence 
Containers present as 
‘ordinary’ files that require 
no further unpacking by 
the application program.  
6.7 8.6.1.3 
















Writing new software should not 
require too many new skills to 
exploit the advantages of 
distributed processing. The need to 
understand and adopt a new 
paradigm for software development 
and data access is a barrier to 
future developments. 
4.3.1 The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system unpacks the 
Digital Evidence 
Containers on demand. 
They will present as 
conventional files to any 
application program that 
needs access. There is no 
need for additional 
procedures or libraries to 
be added to new 
application programs. 
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Chapter 8 and 9 














The RCFL Reports (US Department 
of Justice FBI 2012) over the last 
few years has shown media size 
and the number of individual items 
of media are increasing within a 
single investigation. Ideally, a 
system should be sufficiently 
scalable that it could be sufficiently 
scalable to allow several hundreds 
of file-systems to be processed. 
3.2 The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system stores file and file-
system metadata in an 
SQL database allows the 
middleware to address 
large numbers of files. 
Filters can be applied to 
increase or decrease the 
evidence presented to a 
processing host. 
6.7.2.3 8.6.6 
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10 We do not 














The nature of the data held within 
this system requires high levels of 
confidentiality to be maintained at 
all times. Data transmission is a 
particular risk point. 
Although there are wider issues of 
Governance, there is no technical 
reason that processing data at 
forensic standards should be 
restricted to a closed environment, 
as is the current practice.  
3.5.3 
ISO 27037 - 6.9.4 
The FCluster allows wide 
area, multi organisational 
access to data.  
All communication links 
are encrypted. Encryption 
should ideally be suitably 
strong, typically AES-256 
or 3DES, and ‘End-to-
End’ with the data being 
encrypted during 
transmission and storage 
on the media. SSH is an 
obvious choice. The 
design can use protocols 
such as HTTPS and SSH 
in all communications 
links. However, PKI, 
digital certificates and 
tunnelling of application 
level protocols over SSH 
may introduce a level of 
complexity in a prototype. 
It is better to avoid this. 
Subsequently we may 
need to employ an inferior 
protocol in the proof of 
concept implementation. 
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If our forensic processing used 
cloud services it could offer us an 
elastic facility able to accommodate 
variable work-loads but there is a 
risk that residual data traces may 
remain even after the most rigorous 
cleansing. Any data stored on 
remote media must be encrypted to 
maintain its confidentiality after use 
and closedown of the cloud facility. 
3.5.3 
Extension of 
ISO 27037 - 6.9.4 
Cloud Storage and 
Processing 
The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system is built upon the 
eCryptfs fuse file system 
that seamlessly encrypts 
and decrypts data on the 
media. Encryption is 
strong, typically using 
AES-256 standard. 
6.7.2.6 8.6.3 













We can expect that this system will 
be subject to external challenge 
within the legal system and 
validation by organisations such as 
NIST to establish its suitability in 
the legal process.  
Complexity makes it difficult to 





The system uses Open 
Standards and Open 
Source Code practices 
allowing the system to be 
more accessible for 
auditing. 
6.2 8.6.1.3 
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The system should record all 
processing actions in enough detail 
to satisfy an audit but this should be 
achieved without application 
programs being aware of this 
monitoring and not requiring special 
coding practices. 




The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system is built upon the 
Loggedfs fuse file system 
that records all file 
interactions without 
modification of the 
application programs. 
The level of monitoring 
strikes a balance between 
the inevitable speed 
reduction that will occur if 
auditing is too intrusive 
and the detail of 
information collected.  
All ‘File Open’ action is 
recorded but not 
individual cluster reads 
within files. The audit trail 
identifies data such as 
date, time, user, 
application program used 
and host ID. Data is 
tracked from its authority 
to be captured through to 
its destruction or removal 
from the system. 
6.7.2.8 8.6.1.4 
8.6.3 
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Chapter 8 and 9 
14 Users/Investig
ators must not 
be able to alter 







Data access should be read-only 
but further than this, it may be 
desirable to prevent uncontrolled 
replication of the data. 
3.5.2 ACPO v5 
Imaging 2.2.4 
The FClusterfs FUSE File 
system is built upon the 
ROfs fuse file system that 
eliminates the code that 
allows application 
programs to write to files. 
In effect creating a Read-




15 The integrity of 







Loss of integrity of the data leaves 
it worthless for presentation in court 
as evidence. 
3.5.3 ISO 17025 Using cryptographic 
hashes such as MD5, 
SHA-1 and SHA-2 
establishes an initial 
record of the state of the 
data as it leaves the 
original media. Including 
the cryptographic hash 
within the Digital Evidence 
Container’s design and its 
later ingestion into the 
SQL data as part of the 
file meta-data means it 
can be accessed 
periodically and used to 
verify the integrity of the 
file. 
6.7.2.13 8.6.1.2 
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Chapter 8 and 9 
16 Running one 
instance of a 
program on 
one instance 













Usually because of the complexity 
of a system, running what appears 
to be the same hardware/software 
combination does not always 
perform in exactly the same way. 
This puts processing assurance in 
question. 
3.5.3 (ISO 17025) 
3.5.3.3 (ISO 27037 
5.3.3 and 5.3.4) 
Processing assurance 
increases if a task runs on 
a variety of differing 
machines. It is of 
advantage to write the 
system in a manner that 
can run on as wide a 
range of host operating 







the Prototype  
 
17 Evidence 








Confusion over the identity of a 
DEC and subsequently its source 
would be a severe impairment to its 
claim to integrity assurance. When 
there are more than 100,000 files in 
what was a single forensic image 
we need a rigorous method of 
uniquely identifying each DEC. 
3.5.3.3 (ISO 27037 
- 5.4.2) 
Each DEC has a unique 
identification that cannot 
be lost or changed without 
detection. It should also 
be able to allow the 
original media to rebuild it 
as a replica of the original. 
6.5 8.6.1.2 













Involving the investigator/operator 
in triggering tasks forms a block on 
the progress of the overall task.  
 Involving the 
investigator/operator in 
triggering tasks forms a 
block on the progress of 
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A2 - General Requirements of Distributed Systems 
Principle Description 
Access Transparency: where local and remote resources are access using identical operations. 
Location transparency; enables resources to be accessed without knowledge of their location. 
Concurrency transparency; enables several processes to operate concurrently using shared resources without 
interference between them. 
Failure transparency; enables the concealment of faults. This is often solved by replication or redundancy. 
Heterogeneity; service interfaces should be designed in a way so that clients and server software can be 
implemented for different operating systems and hardware. 
Replication transparency; enables multiple instances of resources to be used to increase reliability and performance 
without the knowledge of the users or their applications. 
Mobility transparency; allows the movement of resources within a system without affecting the operation of users 
and programs. 
Performance transparency; allows the system to be reconfigured to improve performance as loads vary. 
Scaling Transparency; allows the system to be reconfigured in scale without affecting the operation of the users. 
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A3 - Data Processing Priority 
File Count, Data Size and Fragmentation 
Start Tue Mar 18 15:01:57 GMT 2014: File Fragmentation
                         Frags <=1 Frags <=5 Frags <=10 Frags <=20 Frags <=100 Frags <=200 Frags <=500 501<=Frags Total by File Size Category
   zero <= FileSize <= 10k No of Files 202,313 599 0 0 0 0 0 0 202,912 62%
                           Size of Data 486,712,874 3,879,626 0 0 0 0 0 0 490,592,500 0%
    10k < FileSize <= 100k No of Files 72,900 2,809 36 10 0 0 0 0 75,755 23%
                           Size of Data 2,553,634,176 123,362,104 2,035,953 643,457 0 0 0 0 2,679,675,690 2%
    100k < FileSize <= 1MB No of Files 30,959 3,761 321 36 26 1 0 0 35,104 11%
                           Size of Data 10,389,629,237 1,167,471,243 112,039,969 14,167,358 12,893,502 897,412 0 0 11,697,098,721 7%
    1MB < FileSize <= 10MB No of Files 9,372 783 171 81 89 11 5 2 10,514 3%
                           Size of Data 25,876,566,318 2,143,396,886 490,593,375 231,404,156 281,984,320 52,400,768 20,072,859 12,941,473 29,109,360,155 17%
   10MB < FileSize <= 50MB No of Files 767 66 16 15 20 8 3 2 897 0%
                           Size of Data 14,458,254,072 1,208,560,953 298,684,064 362,346,744 331,774,002 178,152,649 84,180,663 25,434,112 16,947,387,259 10%
  50MB < FileSize <= 500MB No of Files 115 4 6 8 9 6 2 2 152 0%
                           Size of Data 10,855,180,461 323,314,990 831,284,595 550,628,747 1,290,896,255 738,276,422 132,403,534 475,665,995 15,197,650,999 9%
   500MB < FileSize <= 1GB No of Files 7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 9 0%
                           Size of Data 4,715,775,968 713,097,216 0 0 650,616,832 0 0 0 6,079,490,016 4%
No of Files
            1GB < FileSize Size of Data 6 9 7 1 1 2 1 2 29 0%
                           27,578,482,684 22,516,486,702 17,058,845,022 2,500,290,671 2,501,437,843 5,015,816,024 2,504,397,605 6,263,515,906 85,939,272,457 51%
Total No of Files 316,439 8,032 557 151 146 28 11 8 325,372 100%
Total Size of Data 96,914,235,790 28,199,569,720 18,793,482,978 3,659,481,133 5,069,602,754 5,985,543,275 2,741,054,661 6,777,557,486 168,140,527,797 100%
As Fragments 97% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Fragmented Volume 17% 11% 2% 3% 4% 2% 4%  
Table 38 - File Sizes and Fragmentation 
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From the previous Table 38 - Information Summary 
325,372 files total, 68,048 known 'ok' files against NIST database of 32,122,997 records 
96GB, 316,000 files, 97% not fragmented, 
8GB, 8,000 files, 2% fragmented less than 5 fragments, 
7GB, 8 files, 1% fragmented more than 5 fragments 
3GB, 275,000 files, 85% of files by number with less than 100k (25 clusters) 
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A4 - The Design Argument 
• Hard disks are getting bigger, there is more data to capture and analyse 
• This takes longer and is hampering investigation and so prosecution of crime 
• There is an urgent need to reduce the timescale of collection, processing 
and analysis 
Q: There is a data overload problem in digital forensics. What are the 
alternative solutions? 
Several things can be done.  
Q: Why don’t we wait for Intel to develop faster computers? 
A: Because the criminals are buying them as well and thereby generate more data, which 
takes longer to process and the status quo continues. What we need is leverage over the 
criminals that they don’t want to get or can’t get. This also applies to ‘Intel is bringing out an 
amazing chip next year. It’s a revolution’. 
Q: We could use a mega PC with 64 cores and SSD RAID 5 arrays  
A: These are disproportionately expensive. 
Q: Why not use GPUs?  
A: GPUs need specific programming. This would mean either throwing away all those 
existing tools or at least not being able to use them fast. Also this still requires the data to be 
read from the disk at 100MB/s for hard disk, 500MB/s for SSD 
Q: Can we do data processing triage?  
A: You mean selectively ignore stuff that might be evidence of guilt or innocence. Is this 
really a good approach? 
Q: What about “Data Reduction”? 
A: Research in “Data Reduction” is aimed at discarding ‘low value’ data and focusing on data 
that is likely to yield evidence. Of all the approaches, so far this sounds most promising. 
There is no doubt that a DLL file is less likely to yield evidence than a JPG. In fact, 
investigators have always done this. 
Q: Forensics isn’t about investigating loads of data just very clever analysis.  
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A: It may be true for clever consultants with PhDs. You tell that to the run of the mill DC in a 
local digital forensic lab when they have yet another 2TB drive to analyse and only have 1 
day’s pay in their budget to spend on that analysis. 
Q: Could new clever algorithms be developed?  
A: Clever algorithms often end up with more processing not less. A law of diminishing returns 
applies. In addition, there would need to be hundreds of victories, one for each technique, 
not just one. 
Q: What about Distributed Processing, like the sort of thing that has been so 
effective in Big Data? 
A: This could give provide huge leverage in the processing available to law enforcement over 
their suspect’s capabilities. Distributed parallel processing is scalable and provides cheap 
bang for the buck. M
2
COTS are understandable, can run existing legacy software, and does 
not exclude GPUs or clever algorithms. Hey, let’s do it!  
Q: Does AccessData FTK have distributed processing already? 
A: FTK uses a central file server to store all the images. When the system is used, a 
bottleneck develops in the file store network connection. If a 4TB image is stored on a file 
server and sections of it are copied out to half a dozen workstations, it results in copying 4TB 
along a 1 gigabit Ethernet cable. It will take about 11 hours. That is not too bad but that is 
just one investigation at a time. If there are several going on at the same time it becomes 
very slow. 
This was the approach taken by Vassil Roussev in 2004 in Breaking the Performance Wall 
and DELV. 
What is need is distributed storage and processing just like Hadoop. This is based on 
distributing the data storage and processing the data in locality. Distributed processing has 
been around for many years. Distributed storage and processing is what makes Hadoop and 
Map/Reduce so effective. 
The trouble is that distributed storage is a direct contradiction to ‘imaging’ which is a very 
centralised technique. 
Q: So what about imaging. It is one of the founding principles of best practice 
in digital forensics. 
A: I cannot help but conclude that ‘forensic imaging’ has a limited life expectancy, With more 
data being stored ‘in the cloud’ and more evidence within individual investigations coming 
from difference sources, it’s hard to see how we can continue to successfully collect it in ‘one 
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big file’. In addition, in the US, there have been challenges on the issue of privacy when an 
image is taken and data is collected that is not ‘owned’ by the suspect and is not relevant to 
the case being investigated. Taking an image is increasingly being seen as a violation of the 
Human Right to privacy. I am not the first see this. Guidance software has introduced their 
‘Logical Evidence’ file format in which individual files, and collections of files, can be stored. 
AFF format has always had this facility. 
Q: So why not just take a selection of files, AFF bag them, copy them up on a 
memory stick, then copy them onto a PC and have a look? 
A: Even though we may not have an image we should at least try to uphold some process 
that would be considered forensically sound from outside the domain. 
Q: What is forensic soundness? 
A: Well that a good question. Up to now, we have treated digital evidence in much the same 
way as analogue evidence. It is collected and ‘bagged’ as an ‘image’ with an identifiable tag. 
A device, such as a hard disk or memory stick, has been considered to be one single item of 
evidence. It may contain many artefacts that will yield much information but in terms of the 
chain of evidence it is a singular item. When it is moved, or copied, a record is kept. 
Typically, an evidence store is a locked room in a Police station. In most cases, it is a single 
place. A computer has been treated in the same way. It is considered a single place or 
perhaps the evidence is considered to be in the custody of an investigator. In most cases 
this has been manifest in the use of either EnCase or FTK on a workstation running 
Microsoft Windows and, more recently, connected to a local area network with a central file 
storage system. I think this breaks down when ‘the’ computer is a distributed cluster of, 
perhaps, thousands of computers. If we do not move to a distributed approach we will just 
loose more ground to the increase in data to be analysed. To move to a distributed system 
we need to improve chain of evidence within the computer system. 
Q: Hadoop is flavour of the month! Then why don’t you use Hadoop? 
A: Hadoop works best with a small number of very large files rather than a very large number 
of small files. This makes it sound as if it is ideal for processing forensic image files. 
However, Hadoop uses a storage technique in common with many distributed file systems – 
striping. To attain much higher data read speeds, distributed file systems often spread the 
contents of a single file across many storage hosts. This is rather like RAID but on a grand 
scale. Distributed file systems stripe in two ways. Ceph, for example, stripes like RAID 5, in 
that it spreads the bits within a byte, across different storage hosts. On the other hand, 
Hadoop File system keeps complete bytes but chops up whole files into chunks, so sections 
of a file are held together on a storage host but the rest of the file is spread across many 
other storage hosts. This is ideal when processing sections of sequential files that reside 
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within the same chunks but does not work with random access files that require the file 
pointer to jump around the file. It the pointer stays within the chunk it works but this cannot 
be guaranteed. If a large file with a random access is processed on an Hadoop file system 
there would be loads of data transfer from other storage nodes as each part of the whole file 
was needed. This would neutralise any advantage gained from the MapReduce algorithm 
that is based upon locality in processing. Unfortunately, a forensic image is in effect a very 
large random access file. Hadoop holds its directory database in RAM on a Namenode and 
so has a finite limit, as it will fill RAM. If the individual files from within an image are stored on 
Hadoop then the maximum number of files will soon be reached as the directory is filled well 
before the storage space is filled. Hadoop does have a compression and packing facility, 
much like ZIP, but this involves unpacking data which extends the processing time. Catch 
22. 
Q: So what are Lightbox and the Dutch NFI doing? 
A: They won’t give details of their work so I can’t be specific but I can guess from one or two 
comments that were said when I visited the NFI in 2014. I believe they are using multiple big 
PCs with 64 cores to process the original images and then store the results within Hadoop. 
They then process the results using Hadoop and HBase etc. It is difficult to estimate their 
budget but with a permanent, devote development staff of about 35 it must be approaching 
£25m pa. They can afford this because they are a government organisation. They say that 
their objective is to provide the whole of Dutch Law enforcement, and associated agencies, 
with a national system. The Netherlands is also the host for The International Court of 
Justice, The International criminal Court, Europol and Eurojust. These are all hosted in The 
Hague, hence the city has become known as the World’s Legal Capital and The Netherlands 
has aspirations and a budget to match.  
Q: So what’s wrong with this? 
A: It a question of layers of abstraction. The NFI approach seems to be that they process the 
original data to create a set of data which they store in Hadoop hBase. That data is then 
processed to obtain ‘information’. However, if the original data extraction is wrong or can be 
improved by re-processing then they would have to return to the original files and reprocess. 
It would be much better if the original data was stored in a more usable form that would allow 
it to be processed at any time. 
Q: Why not jump on the Hadoop bandwagon and start modifying it? 
A: To adopt Hadoop is to start with a simple assumption that because Hadoop is distributed 
and processes data, it must be good at the distributed processing of all data. This does not 
acknowledge that there is variation in data types and that these variations lead to differing 
optimum solutions. In Breaking the Performance Wall, Vassil Roussev rejected existing 
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systems as ‘bloated’ because they have to cater for as wide a usage as possible. However, 
starting from scratch to build an entire operating system and file system would be equally 
prohibitive. I think Google’s approach to build middleware upon a well-established base, ie 
Linux, is the most likely to yield results. Hadoop has been in development for a decade. 
HDFS and the NameNode software is about 6.5 million lines of code. Although this might be 
a good route in a commercial environment, it is not appropriate for my purpose. 
Q: What are the different approaches? 
A: The fundamental problem is keeping track of data objects within a wide area storage 
system and organising its processing across many hosts. Keeping track of the filenames 
sounds like a database problem. This is about storing regular delimited or fixed length 
records about lists of files. In fact, it is a directory system. Should this be sql or non-sql? Well 
the file contents will vary (3V) but the characteristics of the filenames and meta-data will not.  
• We could store an entire forensic image, as a single field, within a 
database. One record per image with one BLOB field as a massive binary. – Clean but not 
really practical when an image could be many tetrabytes. 
• We could store the entire filesystem, including file contents, in a 
database. Some fields to store metadata and one BLOB to store the file contents. – Not 
unreasonable. The database system would then make the choice of the media location of 
the data. Not sure this is a good idea. 
We could store the directory entry, including metadata, and a then pointer to the file in the 
file system. The file could be an image, a DEC or a file. – Better, we still retain control of the 
actual data location but the directory, held in the SQL can be replicated to load balance. 
It sounds like SQL. SQL relational database technology is very mature. Existing software like 
Oracle, MySQL, Postgres and MariaDB can handle billions of records and the new Innodb 
indexing makes it incredibly fast. These databases have a whole host of facilities like fall-
over, replication and distributed storage then FCluster would just inherit. The only problem is 
that ever application program would need to be modified or written to be database aware. 
This means amending existing programs and new programs having to adopt new practices. 
Any amendments to the database schema in future versions would have to be applied very 
carefully to be retrospective. This is not a very good solution. What we need is a layer that’s 
completely transparent but it is everywhere across the system. A distributed file system 
designed specifically for forensic data processing. 
Q: So what are the specifics of the approach you have taken? 
A: I’m proposing three things. Firstly, I’ve looked at Hadoop and a number of existing 
distributed file-systems and designed a distributed file-system specifically to provide facilities 
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which can be used to ensure forensic soundness in the handling of data. Secondly, I’ve 
proposed an improved imaging process by basing it around digital evidence bags while still 
retaining backwards compatibility by producing an image at the same time. Thirdly, I’ve 
introduced prioritisation of data acquisition and processing. This means that data with a high 
potential is delivered to the distributed system in a forensically sound manner before the 
imaging process has ended. 
Q: More specificallyO. 
A: Corresponding to the HDFS File-system within Hadoop, I have designed a file system 
called FClusterfs. Mimicking the way HDFS is implemented as a middleware between 
application program and the native EXTx file system, FClusterfs is implemented as a 
middleware. I have chosen to use the FUSE file-system technique rather than write from 
scratch as with Hadoop. The key difference is that individual files within a file system are 
stored as complete, whole, files across a multitude of remote locations. The proximity of two 
file names in a directory listing does not imply any proximity in their storage locations. I have 
devised a novel technique for imaging forensic data which tracks through the media which I 
have called Jigsaw Imaging. It does not work by cluster or LBA sequence, but by tracking 
through the files. As it does this it simultaneously writes each block to a corresponding 
location on an output device to form an image. Finally the order that the files are processed 
within Jigsaw Imaging is determined by a priority system which assigned a simple numeric 
value to each file, sorts them all, and works through the list in descending order of potential 
value. 
Q: Hasn’t all this been done before? 
A: Although there are similar developments none are quite suitable. I guess the main 
evidence that they do not exist is that if they did, then why is the Digital Forensic Community 
struggling to cope with the problem of data volume?  
Q: How can we see this? 
A: I have implemented this in three forms. Firstly, as a series of virtual machines hosted 
within VMWare Desktop. Secondly, as a LiveCD which can be used to boot a host without 
affecting it’s installed operating system. The LiveCD attempts to mount any local hard disk 
and use it for storage but any data is stored in an AES-256 encrypted form so nothing is left 
in an interpretable form when the system reboots to its normal function. Thirdly, it is 
implemented as a cluster of six Cubietruck SoC minicomputer boards.  Each has a 500GB 
hard disk, 2 cores, 2GB of RAM and a 1 Gigabit Ethernet connection. This is controlled by a 
10” touch screen. This mini-cluster runs Debian Wheezy operating system. 
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1. A method for copying data from an original resource to a plurality of target 
resources, the method comprising: 
prioritising the data copying, based on the prioritising, at least some of the data to a 
plurality of target resources. 
2. A method according to claim 1, the method further comprising: 
 
reading, from the original resource, data indicative of the structure of data in the 
target resource; 
copying,  from  the  original resource  to the  plurality  of  target  resources, data 
representing a directory of the original resource; 
prioritising, based on the data representing the directory, files of the original 
resource for copying; 
copying,  based  on  the  prioritising,  at  least  some  of  the  files  of  the  original 
resource to the plurality of target resources. 
 
3. A method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein at least one target resource, as 
a result of the copying, comprises a forensic image of the original resource. 
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4. An apparatus for copying data from an original resource to a plurality of 
target  
resources, wherein the apparatus is configured to carry out the method of any of 
claims 1 to 3. 
 
5. A method of analysing data originating from an original resource, the method 
comprising: 
receiving data from the original resource; 
distributing the received data to one or more second resources; and 
processing the data at the one or more second resources. 
 
6. A method according to claim 5, wherein receiving the data further comprises: 
receiving data indicative of metadata associated with the received data. 
 
7. A method according to claim 5 or 6, wherein one or more copies of the data 
is stored at one or more of the second resources. 
 
8. A method according to claim 7, wherein the method further comprises: 
verifying the data stored at one of the second resources based on data stored at 
one or more other resources. 
 
9. A system for analysing data originating from an original resource, wherein 
the system is arranged to carry out the method of any of claims 5 to 8. 
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A6 - FOI Response Details from Gwent Police 
All requests for information to Gwent Police under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 are 
routinely published on the Gwent Police web site 
(http://corporate.gwent.police.uk/foi/foiresponses/). There have been two that provide us with 
useful information relevant to this research. 
Cybercrime 
 Added:  25 September 2014       Category:  Crime  
 Reference:  17145 
Disclosure  
Q1. What training is available to:  
 
(a) officers  
 
(b) civilian staff to improve digital skills and for the purpose of investigating cybercrime and 
cyber-enabled crime?  
 
A1. Cyber training package for open source internet investigation is being delivered to 
selected front line Detectives and Intelligence officers to improve the Force response 
to cyber enabled crime investigation. 
 
This training is the pre cursor to more enhanced training to in house experts in 
relation to sophisticated cyber- crime related offences. 
 
Q2. How many full time equivalent:  
 
(a) officers  
 
(b) civilian staff have completed training in cyber or digital skills in the last 12 months up to 
August 2014?  
 
A2. Hi-Tech Crime Unit (HTCU) Staff have attended the following courses 
a) Three Police Officer have attended Encase Transition to Version 7 course 
b) One Support Staff has attended Encase Transition to Version 7 course 
c) Three Support Staff attended Specialist Encase Mackintosh Examination course 
d) Two Support Staff attended Access Data FTK Beginners course 
e) Two Support Staff attended XRY Examination course (Beginners) 
f) Two Support Staff attended XRY Examination course (Intermediate) 
 
 
Q3. How many:  
 
(a) officers  
 
(b) civilian staff are assigned to the cybercrime (or equivalent) unit?  
 
If there is no unit specifically focussed on cybercrime, how many full time equivalent:  
 
(a) officers  
 
(b) civilian staff are dedicated to investigating cyber and cyber-enabled crime?  
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A3. There are no dedicated cyber/cyber-enabled crime officers or support staff within 
the HTCU, however all HTCU members can be assigned to deal with such matters 
 
Q4. How many investigations have been initiated by the cybercrime (or equivalent) unit in the 
last 12 months up to August 2014?  
 
A4. Nil. The Unit is reactive to crime reported by the public or submitted by divisional 
police officers 
 
Q5. What is the (a) name and (b) budget for each of the last 5 years for the cybercrime (or 
equivalent) unit?  
 







Q6. Does the process for recording and passing cybercrimes to prosecutors differ from non-
cybercrime? 
 
A6. Crime recording is not a function of the HTCU. 
 
Additionally, Gwent Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information 
relevant to your request by virtue of the following exemption: 
 
Section 23 Information relating to the Security bodies; 
 
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the 
public interest in this case.  
 
Confirming or denying the existence of whether information is held would contravene the 
constrictions laid out with Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this 
stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain 
Security Bodies.  
 
Seized Computers 
 Added:  4 August 2014       Category:  Information Technology  
 Reference:  17057 
Disclosure  
Q1. Does your force have specialists to analyse seized computers and if so, how many 
specialists do you have?  
A1. Seven 
Q2. If the computers are sent externally who are they sent to? 
A2. None are sent externally.  
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Abstract: The size of computer storage media continues to 
increase at an exponential rate. In the summer of 2007, UK 
retailers are selling 500GB drives for £99 and 
manufacturers are starting to offer terabyte scale raid 
storage aimed at domestic market users who want to store 
and backup video, music and images. If we use current 
forensic tools on media of this size analysis time will 
increase to unacceptable levels; our analysis tools are only 
marginally more powerful than the application programs 
owned by the suspects. Most solutions under development 
offer speed improvements of, perhaps, ten times over 
current performance. To enable us to deliver prompt 
responses to investigations we need to improve the speed 
of the order of hundreds, if not, thousands of times greater 
than currently available. We have set ourselves the task of 
developing a high performance forensic system suitable 
for a regional crime facility. In this search for a practical 
solution we are assuming a budget of about UK £30,000. 
In this paper we review several alternatives and choose 
grid computing as the most promising. We offer a small 
grid primer and assess which parts of grid computing are, 
and are not, suitable for the processes in digital forensics. 
We assess developments when implementing grid systems 
in other disciplines and consider the advantages of 
adapting their technology and experiences to our needs. In 
answer to the important question “Is a grid system too 
bloated?” we offer our own benchmark testing. 
1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Size and quantity of media 
In the last 30 years the increase in computing power 
available to ‘ordinary’ users has been quite incredible. In 
1980 standard storage was a single 160k floppy disk. In 
2007 manufacturers are starting to offer terabyte storage.  
While the capacity of the media has increased by about 5 
million fold, the I/O rate has increased from .6MB/s to 
300MB/s, an increase of 600 fold (Wikipedia 2008). This 
presents no problem to the end user, who is normally 
satisfied providing the applications run in an appropriate 
manner, but it does create a problem for forensic 
investigators in assessing and duplicating large volumes of 
data.  
1.2 Timescales 
It is accepted, as best practice, that we image the entire 
drive before analysis can start and then it is normal to run 
some analysis/indexing programs. From our own 
experience imaging a 500GB hard disk takes about 24 
hours (at a typical speed of 10MB/s, depends on 
equipment, we can attain 24MB/s from specific 
equipment); the analysis of this data falls somewhere 
between two extremes. Sometimes we are asked to locate 
very specific information, perhaps an email sent at a 
specific time. In this case we can go straight to the PST 
file and search; the other extreme is a more complex 
search for interrelated information of evidential value. On 
500GBs of media this is an awesome task. In these 
circumstances pre-processing is essential but this could 
take weeks. Forensic Tool Kit (Accessdata 2008) 
processes 1GB/hr on our slower equipment. Ironically, the 
more powerful computers become, the longer it will take 
us to access ‘the whole of the media’. 
1.3 Recent cases 
Digital devices are surprisingly good sources of evidence. 
People often develop a very intimate relationship with 
their ‘little toys’ and mistakenly believe any secrets will 
remain so. Subsequently many people store information on 
their PCs, notebooks in particular, that they would not 
dream of committing to paper. Investigators are tending to 
turn to digital media as a primary source of evidence.  
During the summer of 2006 when there was the potential 
for a terrorist bombing campaign against transatlantic 
flights the security clampdown caused huge confusion for 
travellers and financial loss for the travel industry. During 
a televised press conference DCC Peter Clarke stated that 
the Metropolitan Police had made 27 arrests and 
subsequently seized 400 PCs, 200 mobile phones and 
8,500 items of digital evidence (presumably CDs, DVDs, 
memory sticks etc) (BBC 2006). The disclosure went 
further to estimate this represented 6TB of data. If this 
estimate was true the PCs must have been fairly old and 
most of the extra media must have been floppy disks or 
perhaps CDs. If the PCs were on average only a couple of 
years old and had 40GB drives this would total, perhaps, 
15TB of media. In a couple of years time there might be 
100TB of media. In a verbal statement, broadcast on BBC 
radio on 15
th
 June 2007 after the successful conviction of 
the terrorists, Peter Clarke praised the efforts of the digital 
investigative team saying that some officers, drawn in 
from the whole of the UK, spent the nights during the 
investigation in sleeping bags on the office floor such was 
the pressure of work to complete a substantial amount of 
the investigation with 14 days before the suspects had to 
be charged or released.  
1.4 Big tasks – analysing video, data mining 
Current forensic software is fairly basic. At most the 
software attempts to recover lost or deleted file and then 
organise these files into some classification to ease the 
manual search that follows; perhaps with regular 
expressions and some search software allows indexing and 
fuzzy logic and stemming, but we are some time away 
from semantic machine understanding. We can compare 
files by MD5 analysis but software that analyses images 
and recognises faces or places in some kind of automatic 
intelligent way is currently not available to the average 
investigator..  
1.5 Establishing a processing gap between 
investigators and suspects. 
Whatever the future presents we can be assured it will 
require more computer power than is available today. 
Unfortunately we cannot simply wait for more powerful 
PCs; as we acquire them so will the suspects. More 
powerful PCs mean more powerful capabilities; this will 
allow developers to create more rich experiences for the 
users. This will inevitably lead to yet more data. We are in 
a performance arms race. Digital forensics requires an 
advantage in terms of processing power over that of a 
potential suspects system. This all needs to be within a 
budget of a reasonable regional forensic facility. For this 
purpose we set an arbitrary figure of £35,000. 
2 SIMILAR WORK 
2.1 Breaking the Performance Wall 
Surprisingly very little work has been published in the 
field of high performance forensic systems. It appears a 
single paper addresses the issue using distributed 
processing Roussev and Richard (2004) designed and built 
their own custom system stating that, in their opinion, 
existing distributed processing systems were too bloated to 
deliver the sort of performance they desired. Their system 
was intended to provide an investigator with the ability to 
make interactive searches of about 6GB of data with 
UNIX regular expressions (rather than pre-indexing). 
Their system passed files from a file server out to 8 hosts 
via a gigabit network. By placing the data in the RAM of 
each worker host they achieve significant improvements in 
performance. They chose not to use any higher-level 
protocols and wrote their system in C and TCP/IP 
bypassing facilities like SSH or RSH.  
 
Even with the passing of just 3 years their target data set of 
6GB seems rather trivial. We can now buy 16GB USB 
memory sticks! Their research was aimed at maximising 
pure interactive speed. We feel that this is desirable but we 
believe that sophisticated processing that would somehow 
rank the results to aid the investigator would be more 
useful. 
 
Nonetheless we see the developments and subsequent 
experiments in their paper as a benchmark for distributed 
forensics systems. As we will see, in section 6, a grid 
system stands up well to the accusation of bloat made in 
this paper. Our own design and experiments with a grid 
performed well with the same architecture but improved 
significantly when we re-design the system. 
3 SOLUTIONS WITHIN EXISTING 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
There are a number of ways we can improve performance 
on existing systems. Here we outline several and explain 
why they do not provide satisfactory solutions. As we 
assess them we must bear in mind we are looking for 
performance improvements of the order of hundreds or 
possibly thousands of times. When assessing their 
suitability we should remember our self-imposed budget of 
£35,000. 
They are, in no particular order: 
3.2 Multiple processors, multiple core processors 
and graphics processor units 
We currently see hardware manufacturers designing with 
more powerful processors. Dual core and 64-bit 
technology are becoming standard as equipment on 
domestic machines. The cost of multiple processor systems 
grows exponentially with the number of processors [SGI 
2008]. Systems like the SGI Altix 4700 system can have 
up to 512 sockets for dual core Itanium 64 bit processors 
that can address up to 128TB RAM, however they start at 
£8,000 for a dual processor blade module with 10GB 
RAM. Based on these figures it suggests a top 
specification system would be in the order of 256 times 
that price at about £2.5m which is out of our budget range. 
The use of multiple Graphic Processing Units has recently 
been explored (Marziale 2007). 
3.3 Improved media I/O rates 
Ideally we would simply increase I/O rates. Some kind of 
super Serial SCSI capable of Gigabytes of data transfer per 
second together with multi-core multi processor, but if 
sold commercially then this equipment could be acquired 
and used for illegal activity – furthering the performance 
arms race. 
3.4 Increased numbers of investigators 
The current, best, solution seems to be to have lots of PCs 
with lots of operators. This was the only solution available 
to the Metropolitan Police in 2006. People are flexible but 
are often the most expensive and increase the potential for 
human error so this cannot be classed as a best solution. 
This approach has problems of analysis quality control, as 
humans are liable to interpret information differently and 
considerable problems of co-ordination and cross-
referencing. 
3.5 Optimising existing hardware and operating 
systems 
Working in our own forensic lab we found that storing the 
images and results on a RAID array attached to a central 
server and then processing the information on workstations 
connected by a Gigabit network was up to 10 times slower 
than local processing on the workstations. Moving the data 
closer to the processing i.e. on the local disk rather than a 
network shared drive on a server via a Gigabit network has 
a significant performance benefit. We lost some of the 
ability to group all of our images together and therefore 
process from any workstation, but gained a 10-fold speed 
improvement. This is an inexpensive, but limited, 
performance improvement. 
3.6 Clever problem solving 
There is always an argument for clever problem solving. 
These solutions will always improve performance because 
they can be applied to any system. Ultimately we would 
have to balance gains against development cost but in 
general these are not a problem to researchers. There are 
efforts at the present time to improve the performance of 
carving tools (DFRWS, 2006).  
3.7 Beowulf clusters, MPI and PMV  
Parallel processing on a system scale has been developing 
since the late 1950s mainly as a reaction to the costs of 
solutions considered in 3.2. Several techniques have been 
used starting with exotic hardware solutions, through to 
Messages Passing protocols of tightly clustered hosts. 
These systems are often used to deal with closely 
interrelated data, for example, flow modelling in fluid 
dynamics where fluid is divided into blocks, often called 
atoms that interact with those surrounding them. As the 
simulation moves forward many variables are passed 
between processes running on other hosts. But Digital 
forensic analysis presents a different problem, tasks are 
largely discrete. The creation of an MD5 hash on one file 
has no bearing on the same process on another file. The 
same is true for image analysis, text searching and other 
forensic processes. The parallel processing community call 
discrete distributed processing embarrassingly easy 
parallelisation as it does not require the programmer to 
deal with the complexities of synchronisation. One 
advantage of this solution is that it is very scalable. 
Beowulf clusters of many thousands of machines have 
been built, for example, the NCSA’s Abe cluster of 1200 
Dell PowerEdge 1955 hosts (Meneu et al, 2007). As they 
compose of conventional Mass Market Commodity PCs 
(M
2
COT) costs are relatively low and they largely run 
common operating systems like Linux, as does Abe. 
3.8 Grid systems 
Ultimately unique, custom-made systems would provide 
the greatest performance as they could be specifically 
tailored to the task but the development cost of custom-
built systems would surely be prohibitive in both time and 
money, and there would not be the benefit of the support 
of the wider development community. If we adopt a 
solution that comes, in at least part, from mainstream 
developments we can, perhaps, gain from developments in 
other fields. The current progress in the area of High 
Performance Computing is something that may benefit the 
forensic community. 
 
Grid computing is the latest area of development in 
distributed HPC. Mainly driven by the needs of Physics, 
grid computing uses the standard technologies and 
protocols that drive the Internet to loosely couple huge 
numbers of PCs together in virtual organisations that span 
the entire world. The design tends to provide processing 
power to discrete tasks. Latency is a problem in these 
systems. Firstly a host willing and able to take the job has 
to be located, the data must then be available either by link 
or actually copying and then the results must be returned to 
the initiator or a location of their choosing. On small jobs 
there is a risk that the latency can exceed the job execution 
time. Because of this grids are often associated with tasks 
that require considerable processing time. 
3.9 Conclusions 
Alternatives such as the development of a super-chip or 
revolutionise, in secret, I/O speeds for memory devices for 
forensic purposes is unrealistic. It seems clear to us that 
adapting and adopting grid technology would be a good 
strategy benefiting from cross fertilisation of ideas and 
developments. Our conclusion is that distributed 
processing using grid architecture is the only viable way 
forward. 
4  A TYPICAL GRID 
We feel it would be useful at this stage to offer a very 
small and simple example of a grid computing.  
4.1 Introduction 
Grid computing has grown out of the drive for cheaper 
HPC over the last 20 years. It is built on the observation 
that the mass of processing power now exists in the unused 
clock cycles of ordinary PC rather than the mainframe 
environments. More often than not, ordinary PCs provide 
the storage and processing units linked by common 
protocols in a similar same way as the World Wide Web. 
Resources and users are linked by specific middleware 
tailored to the specific needs of the task.
 
 
A simplistic Grid structure 
5 UNUSUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
FORENSIC DATA 
Digital forensic has several unique features. 
•We work on many files. 100,000 is typical on a 
single PC. 
•They vary greatly in size from 1k to 2GB 
•They have many formats. Fixed record, ASCII text, 
encoded, encrypted. 
•We need meta-data about the file itself. 
•We would like corroboration of results from multiple 
processing sources. 
•Access Control restrictions to evidence at a highly 
granular level. 
6  IS A GRID TOO SLOW FOR 
FORENSICS? 
The major difference between processing on a single PC 
and a Grid is data transfer. It is important to establish 
whether the time spent transferring data is greater than the 
advantages of parallel processing. To determine if a grid-
based system would be slower than Roussev & Richard’s 
(Roussev 2004) custom system we attempted to run a 
series of comparative tasks on similar equipment running 
Globus 4. 
6.1  Roussev & Richard’s equipment setup 
 Roussev & Richard’s (2004) test rig comprised of a Dual 
Processor Xeon 2.4GHz with a 500GB SCSI (Ultra 320?) 
RAID 5 Array to store the original image. A Gigabit 
Ethernet network connected this to 8 x 2.4GHz Pentium IV 
hosts with 1GB RAM in each. They did not use the local 




They used a 6GB NTFS image from a Windows 2000 
machine with about 110,000 and 8,000 directories. 
Roussev & Richard (Roussev 2004) state that they ignored 
files over 20MB (to be more representative of a real world 
task) their experiment did not detail the exact number of 
files. Our sample suggests about 5000. 
 
They performed 3 tasks 
 
Task 1 - CACHE – the controller (the first of the 8 
workstations) draws files, one at time, from the file 
server and then copies them back out in a round robin 
fashion to the other 7 nodes where they are stored in 
RAM. As they had 1GB of RAM available this 
suggests that they loaded the RAM until it was nearly 
full. This is effectively a sequential test to set a 
benchmark. The nodes wait for files to be sent to 
them, the controller does all the processing. 
Task 2 - LOAD – the nodes, each independently, draw 
off a subset of files from the file server and stores 
them in its local RAM. This achieves the same result 
but divides the task between the nodes. In reality the 
nodes would need to know which files to grab and tell 
the other nodes that they have the file and not to both 
then grab it again; more management. 
Task 3 - ‘Viagra’ search v[a-z]*i[a-z]*a[a-z]*g[a-z]*r[a-
z]*a  This is a simple benchmark task. There should 
be a near linear benefit from running this in parallel. 
6.2  A comparable test rig 
It was difficult to match the original equipment exactly but 
we replicated the experiment on  7 x Xeon 2.3GHz hosts 
each with 1GB RAM and an 80GB SATA 150 disks 
connected by Gigabit networking. We ran Debian Linux 
with Globus 4. We obtained a 20GB image of a Windows 
95 FAT disk with about 40,000 files on it. Roussev & 
Richard’s (2004) state that they only selected files less 
than 20MB and presumably filled the RAM on each node 
i.e. about 650MB. For us this meant between 758 and 978 
files sent to on each machine. 
6.3  Benchmark using NFS mount & copy 
As a base we set up 6 of the hosts to share an NFS export 
on the ‘File Server’. We used a simple Unix cp command 
to distribute the files sequentially by sending to host H001, 
then H002, then H003 etc. Having distributed the data we 
them used ‘grep’ to search on the individual hosts. After 
the first search the disk cache will leave most, if not all, 
the recently searched data in RAM. We chose to distribute 
data totalling about 60% of the RAM installed in each host 
to utilise the caching feature. 
 
 















H001 859 660 39  16 2.6 
H002 978 648 36 17 3.1 
H003 826 669 37 17 3.3 
H004 758 654 33 19 3.1 
H005 822 670 36  17 2.3 
H006 838 664 37 19 3.4 
Total 5081 3965 218 105 17.8 
 
When we analyse the results we can deduce 3 base figures 
for the activities in this test  
 
NFS Copy time  
3965 MB in 218 secs = 18 MB/s 
HD Search time  
3965 MB in 105 secs = 38 MB/Sec 
RAM Search time 
3965 MB in 17.8 secs = 222 MB /Sec 
 
These results are in line with Roussev & Richard’s (2004) 
results so we feel confident that we are working on similar 
equipment. This clearly demonstrates that if you divided 
the data out onto separate hosts and then searching in 
RAM it is about 8 times faster, as was reported by Roussev 
& Richard (2004).  
6.4  Parallelising the task for a Grid 
A system design within the constraints of one language or 
architecture does not usually translate to another without 









To transfer the data we used one of the command line 
utilities included in Globus 4 - globus-url-copy. One 
of the limitations with this utility is the time the program 
takes to authenticate. This highlights a difference in 
implementation, rather than the option of scanning the 
source and sending each file separately invoking a separate 
authentication, in round robin fashion as Roussev & 
Richard (2004) did, it is better to scan through the source 
collecting source candidate file names and submit this list 
as a batch file to globus-url-copy using just one 
authentication. So the program structure is: 
 
1.  Mount the image 
2.  Use linux ‘du’  to select candidate files 
3.  Compile 6 files containing source and destination 
file names for each host. Aim for 650MB per 
machine. 
4.  Run 6 instances of globus-url-copy with the 
files as a parameters 
5.  Use globusrun-ws to run the search program 
Job File for globusrun-ws in XML format 
 
Results with sequential gsiftp copy, h001 then h002 
then h003 and so on are 
 















H001 859 660 94  16 2.6 
H002 978 648 114 17 3.1 
H003 826 669 88 17 3.3 
H004 758 654 90 19 3.1 
H005 822 670 88  17 2.3 
H006 838 664 97 19 3.4 
Total 5081 3965 571 105 17.8 
 
This is worse than our NFS benchmark. Gsiftp copy 
time has increased to 571 seconds from 218 with NFS. 
Clearly we are paying the price for distributing the data. 
This is because we are failing to take the opportunity to 
run globus-copy-url in parallel. 
 
6.5 Parallel distribution. 
If we repeat Roussev & Richard’s (2004) second test by 
initiating the copying and searching independently on each 
node we get noticeably different results. With the NFS 
copy benchmark, the 6 copies complete in 192 seconds; 
only slightly faster than if we had run the copying in 
sequence. If we repeat the globus-copy-url copying 
in parallel the whole copy completes in only fractionally 
more than the time taken to copy just 1 host in 119 
seconds. Clearly the Gsiftp is more efficient than NFS 
when under load. 
6.6  System analysis 
For a distributed system to show advantage the penalties of 
file distribution must be outweighed by the advantages 
gained from parallel processing. As distribution requires 
the data to be read from the original disk, transferred 
across the network and stored on the remote host, either in 
RAM or on the local hard disk, the advantages cannot be 
expected from a trival operation like a one pass search. 
6.7  Batch processing 
Firstly we should be considering batch bulk processing of 
the files. If the target files were the subject of a number of 
operations such as all of the following then the data 
transfer would be worth the time and effort: 
• MD5 calculations  
• Statistical analysis for steganographic information  
• Image analysis for facial recognition  
• Data carving  
• Semantic analysis  
• Writing style analysis  
• Digital photograph noise analysis.  
6.8  Distributed evidence 
In our tests we worked from an image of the original 
evidence because we intended to mimic the work 
undertaken by Roussev & Richard (2004). This effectively 
doubles the workload, as we would have had to read the 
original to create the image and the read the image to 
distribute the data. In a working system based on grid 
architecture, it would be more efficient to distribute the 
data as digital evidence packages across the grid straight 
from the original; with the data already in place the node 
would volunteer to process the files in its possession.  
 
Having distributed the data and run the initial search we 
clearly saw subsequent work was many times faster. In our 
tests, once distributed and loaded into RAM, we were able 
to perform grep searches on 3.6GB of data in about 3 
seconds. At times it was down to 1.6 seconds. 
 
We have a very well known precedent for this technique; 
Google. Google achieve their spectacular response speed 
by distributing parts of the database, called shards, across 
the RAM of the 15,000 base model PCs that make up a 
Google cluster (Barroso 2003). 
7 OUTLINE OF A DISTRIBUTED 
FORENSIC SYSTEM. 
It is not unrealistic to consider in the near future that tasks 
faced by a forensic system may include the average home 
system with 2TB storage, Within our budget of £35,000 
perhaps we could assemble a Grid of 400 hosts, with the 
current trend of decreasing cost perhaps less than £100 
each in 2015. This system could have nearly a Picabyte of 
data storage and 10 Terabytes of RAM. 
 
What would a grid forensic system look like?  
 
In a physical sense it would probably be a series of rack 
mounted servers, either blade or small tower depending on 
our budget. The vast majority of these would be ‘standard’ 
build PCs although some may contain special hardware 
designed for specific tasks like cracking encryption. This 
systems would be accessed by a series of PCs running an 
end user program or a portal program in a web browser on 
either Windows or Linux. 
 
Evidence would be introduced to the grid from a data 
acquisition node. This would be one of many PCs on the 
grid equipped with write blockers and PKI encryption. It 
would either read the original evidence, or a duplicate 
image, and extract and convert the files and sectors of the 
original evidence into a tagged evidence format. It would 
distribute them throughout the grid storage facility adding 
provenance data to the package header. Multiple copies 
would be stored across perhaps 4 or 5 nodes to enable data 
redundancy and corroboration of results. The presence of 
an evidence packages would be registered only with the 
local node that holds the data; this is a decentralised 
system. A standard sequence of tasks, MD5 hash 
generation and validation, thumbnail generation, text 
indexing etc would be run on each evidence package while 
cached in memory. The abundance of processing power 
could allow advanced semantic analysis extract meaning 
from the data. This software might come from work on the 
humanities grid. **REF to support this statement 
Photographic image analysis software could be used to 
match the contents of images, not in a simple pattern 
matching but by true image interpretation. This software 
might come from grids used in the film industry.*REF to 
support  All these results would be stored in the evidence 
database on each node as part of a distributed database 
system.  
 
Client analysis software would create XML job 
descriptions that ask for specific tasks to be carried out on 
specific files and send them to one of several job managers 
running on the grid. These would first query the evidence 
results database to see if the task had already been run. If 
so, it would immediately report back with these results, 
perhaps ultimately offering results of similar requests 
based on some kind of artificial intelligence analysis. If the 
job manager decides there are no useful results in the 
evidence database it would add the entry to a job database. 
Nodes could query the database for any task to be 
processed on data they possess. If they have the data they 
take the job. If not, they will take the job after a time-out 
when no other node has taken the job. The node may then 
have to acquire a copy of the data. . Ultimately the results 
would be added to the evidence database for future use. 
The data would be returned to the initiating client for 
human analysis. 
 
Meanwhile a data-mining program would constantly sift 
through the database collating data with relationships that 
the investigator did not consider. 
 
Grid computing is generating such great interest by such a 
huge and diverse community that if we too adopt grid 
technology for future large forensic systems it may be that 
we can benefit from the next generation of distributed 
software tools designed for other subjects.  
8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have explained that over the next few 
years the sheer quantity of data needing examination will 
present huge problems for the current generation of 
software forensic tools. There appears to be a lack of 
research in this area with the authors finding only one 
paper published on Distributed Forensic Systems (DFS). 
 
After we considered the nature of forensic tasks, we 
assessed existing architectures and considered their 
appropriateness to solving the task of investigation. Grid 
computing was selected as a likely candidate because of 
low cost, favourable characteristics of scaling and 
suitability to the discreet nature of the forensic task. 
 
Appreciating that Grids are not familiar territory for 
forensic investigators we then offered a Grid primer. We 
acknowledged some similar middle-ware and considered 
how middle-ware designed for forensic analysis might be 
different. 
 
Having selected a most promising solution we addressed 
the issues raised in the only paper yet published addressing 
Distributed Forensic Systems and from our own testing 
concluded that the main accusation, of management bloat, 
seems unfounded. After redesigning the DFS to suit grid 
architecture we highlighted the key differences, namely 
distributed data. Finally we described a potential DFS.
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When digital forensics started in the mid-1980s most of the software used for analysis
came from writing and debugging software. Amongst these tools was the UNIX utility ‘dd’
which was used to create an image of an entire storage device. In the next decade the
practice of creating and using ‘an image’ became established as a fundamental base of
what we call ‘sound forensic practice’. By virtue of its structure, every file within the media
was an integrated part of the image and so we were assured that it was wholesome
representation of the digital crime scene. In an age of terabyte media ‘the image’ is
becoming increasingly cumbersome to process, simply because of its size. One solution to
this lies in the use of distributed systems. However, the data assurance inherent in a single
media image file is lost when data is stored in separate files distributed across a system. In
this paper we assess current assurance practices and provide some solutions to the need to
have assurance within a distributed system.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
The notion of using distributed processing to address
the increasing scale of forensic investigations was first
considered in “Breaking the performance Wall” in 2004
(Roussev and Richard, 2004). Despite being revisited
several times since, (Ayers, 2009; Beebe, 2009; Garfinkel,
2010; Pringle and Sutherland, 2008; Richard and Roussev,
2006; Richard et al., 2007), this has not been developed
and adopted as a workable solution. There has been a
resistance to the idea of using an architecture where the
data is moved and stored on a multitude of hosts for pro-
cessing. In this paper we briefly consider the technical is-
sues but conclude that the most important reason is the
lack of a forensically sound approach to ensuring infor-
mation assurance within a distributed system. This is
required to ensure evidence management is regulated and
clearly accountable for the legal community..
uk (N. Pringle).
vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWWe will introduce our design for a middleware distrib-
uted processing solution, FCluster, which is specifically
designed to provide assurance for the integrity of data.
Background
As digital forensic investigation methodologies have
matured to accommodate the developments in technology,
crime and investigative capabilities over the last 20 years,
internal controls have been introduced to provide assur-
ance standards required by the legal process.
Within our expectations of assurance there are a rela-
tively small set of acceptable and ‘trusted’ investigative
tools. FTK and EnCase are two of the most popular and
trusted tools for digital media forensics. We know from
more than a decade of use that their design endows con-
fidence in the investigative process, and this is supported
by these tools being tested for forensic appropriateness by
NIST. In particular, the risk of ‘mixing up data’ between the
evidence media and the host computer is negligible. There
is no realistic way that data from another image could be
introduced because there is no mechanism, other than
operator error working on the wrong image, for this toS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Audit (noun)
1. an official examination and verification of
accounts and records, especially of financial
accounts.
2. a report or statement reflecting an audit;
a final statement of account.
Assurance (noun)
1 a positive declaration intended to give
confidence; a promise.
synonyms: word of honour, word, guarantee, promise, pledge, vow,
avowal, oath, bond, affirmation, undertaking, commitment
2 confidence or certainty in one’s own abilities.
synonyms: self-confidence, confidence, self-assurance, belief in
oneself, faith in oneself, positiveness, assertiveness,
self-possession,
self-reliance, nerve, poise, aplomb, presence of mind, phlegm,
level-headedness, cool-headedness
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applications as they were intended, the system is inher-
ently assured. The designers consciously choose not to have
a write-ability, not because it’s just easier that way but
because we have a special need to protect the data under
investigation.
Assurance standards applicable to digital forensics
Unfortunately there are no explicit rules to define Infor-
mation Assurance for processing Forensic data. Forensic ev-
idencemust adhere to the Daubert principle and the Federal
RulesofEvidence in theUS,ACPOguidelines in theUK(ACPO,
2012) and corresponding criteria elsewhere. ISO 27037 (ISO
27037:2012, 2012) addresses the acquisition and preserva-
tion of digital evidence but uses language such as “protected
as far as possible” and that “evidence should be stored in an
evidence facility that applies physical security controls”.
Standards like ISO17025:2005, intended for ‘chemical’ lab-
oratories, have been the basis of digital forensic facilities but
the translation from the analogue to the digital world is not
always easy. ISO 27001:2013 defines characteristics of a
management system that provides assurance, but not
assurance itself. PCI-DSS (PCI Security Standards Council)
does provide a more prescriptive standard but doesn’t map
well to digital forensics. When these are appropriate, un-
fortunately they are generally based upon the vague notion
of ‘best practice’ and ‘the accepted norm’ in the particular
field. It is difficult to apply in a rapidly developing domain,
such as digital forensics, as technology changes are naturally
always ahead of ‘best practice’ developments.
Internal controls in digital forensics
Inpractical terms, these reveal themselves in someof the
characteristics of an existing system when, for example, a
newitemof evidence is introduced into the lab. Itwouldfirst
be recorded in some formof log.When theevidence image is
copied onto the storage facility its success or failure needs to
be validated, perhaps with a cryptographic hash digest, for
example SHA-1, and this is recorded in the log book. The
hash digest is an inherent property of the image. If the
validation fails, the operator would investigate the process
or equipment and make remedies and rerun the copy. This
time, hopefully, it would succeed and the task is complete.
Its success, and theprevious failure, shouldbothbe recorded
on the log book. In a paper system, the log book should have
certain characteristics. The pages should be numbered and
bound together. Anything written should be in ink. Lines on
the page should either have writing or be lined through. If
the log book is implemented on a computer system there
should be an external verification, for example a time date
stamp encrypted by PKI, that is beyond the capabilities of
the operator to amend. These sorts of controls are common
and should be familiar to any investigator.
All these processes should be subject to an Audit. By
Auditing, we are checking that the systemworked. Themain
problem with Auditing is that it is reflective and it often
implies a protracted period of time passing before the audit.
External audits are often annual, internal audits are perhaps,
quarterly. It addresses issues that occurred in the past,assesses their conformanceornon-conformance and should
trigger changes in the system to prevent further breaches.
This was the case in the quality control employed in
most industries in the Western World after the Second
World War. Generally, goods were manufactured and were
subject to quality control as a final stage where a sample set
was tested for conformance. Those non-conforming were
removed and either reworked or scrapped. The audit would
trigger a period of reflection and perhaps modification to
the production system to reduce the failure rate. Regret-
tably, there was an acceptance that a percentage of non-
conformances would get through the system.
From audit to assurance
During the 1960s the Japanese introduced the idea of
total quality assurance. The most important aspect of this
was that controls were introduced before that action took
place, not after.
The dictionary definitions give a sense of the retro-
spective nature of an audit (Dictionary.com, 2014) and the
future intent of AssuranceJapanese production lines did not produce faulty goods
because faulty components were not allowed to enter the
production line. The effect of this change on the industrial
base of the western world is a matter of history. During the
1970s and 1980s products from Japan surged leaving their
North American and European competition behind, being
viewed as unreliable. Modern management systems like
Total Quality Management and Six-Sigma have their focus
on controlling inputs and processes during the
manufacturing process. Increases in quality, and customer
satisfaction, are natural consequences of this approach.
Assurance in current computer systems
Most digital evidence from storage media presented in
court is the result of analysis conducted using FTK or
EnCase. This is so much a de-facto standard that we rarely
question it but both systems are based on the same prin-
ciples and on more than a decade of acceptance and pre-
cedence. At its heart is the idea of always presenting
evidence originating ‘from the image’.
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either sections of data or the whole media. When the
investigator copies the image onto the laboratory storage
facility they should run a program to create a new crypto-
graphic hash digest and compare it to the original to confirm
the data is unchanged. There are a number of imaging pro-
grams used with varying assurance. The dd utility has no
internal check-summing facility; both Expert Witness
Format (EnCase) and Smart use file structures within their
images to checksum every block, typically 64 KB. We are
assured of the integrity of the data because it is seen as one
complete, wholesome entity and is internally consistent.
It is largely left to the administrative system built
around the computer system, as outlined in section 4, to
provide assurance with existing tools that store or process
these images.
Concepts like “Chain of Evidence” or Provenance have
existed in legal proceedings for some time. Although users
will take care of their data, the legal profession does pride
itself on its highest possible standards in this matter. The
ACPO guidelines describe this as a key task of the forensic
practitioner.Distribution of both data and processing
Current systems largely assume that the investigator
will be handling a relatively small number of media items.
In many investigations this might be only one or two
forensic images. This is changing because case volumes are
increasing (Justice FBI, 2012). To cope with this, it has been
suggested that the next generation of forensic software
could adopt a distributed processing model.
At this point we should make a distinction between
distributed processing with centralised storage and
distributed processing working with distributed storage.
Having a distributed processing architecture that relies on a
central, non-distributed, store of forensic images (Fig. 1)
implies that the data has to be distributed to the processing
nodes before it can be subjected to processing.
This is the case with FTK’s ‘distributed’ processing.




Fig. 1. The most common current architecture.connection between the switch and the file server which
rapidly becomes overloaded and limits scalability. We can
mitigate this to some degree by building a storage facility
based on fast SSD storage (450 MB/s), SATA III (600 MB/s)
interfaces and even 10 Gb (1000 MB/s) Ethernet
networking but this can be prohibitively expensive. Even
this has limited capabilities in scaling out to even tens of
processing hosts. Assuming we can make this investment it
can still take many hours just to read the image off the
storage media. If we wanted to conduct simultaneous
analysis of several images held on the same storage facility
it would have a significant impact on data dispersal time
and so overall processing time.
Digital forensics is not the only domain that has
encountered this type of problem. Recently, Google solved
their huge data problem by developing and applying a truly
distributed data storage and processing model called
Hadoop/MapReduce (Dean and Ghemawat, 2004).
Although Hadoop/MapReduce provides distributed storage
and processing it lacks the levels of assurance we require in
processing data for presentation as evidence in legal pro-
ceedings. Distributed systems like Hadoop, Condor (Thain
et al., 2005), Nimrod (Abramson et al., 1997), Weka (2014)
and Globus (2014) have been slow to incorporate infor-
mation assurance. Most have some access control but the
users are more interested in getting their data processed
than the nature of the environment in which it is stored.
This is changing. Hadoop, for example, has been extended
by commercial enterprises like Cloudera (2014), who real-
ise that commercial acceptance now requires security but
these are designed and built with general commercial
markets in mind. In these systems it is often up to the user
to exhibit diligence in the processing of a job. It is quite
acceptable to not know where a file is stored or where it is
processed; in fact it’s a feature of Cloud Computing. There is
some audit trail but rather like event manager inWindows,
it is intended for performance and debugging issues rather
than assurance. Information Assurance has greatly
improved within Hadoop since Cloudera released CDH3 in
April 2011 but it is unlikely that it will ever be extended to
the exacting requirements of the legal process.
In all of these cases, information assurance has been
added on as an after-thought. The assurance inherent in the
legally established idiom of one investigator, one machine,
one image would not be upheld in any current distributed
storage/processing system. It’s entirely understandable
why software vendors don’t support true distribution. It’s
doubtful that anybody would buy the product.
It would be much better if we could adopt a truly
distributed storage and processing approach but built on a
foundation of an assurance system rather than amend the
existing systems.
Images, digital evidence bags and SIPs
The practice of acquiring a digital crime scene in the
form of a ‘forensic’ image has served uswell over the last 20
years but it is now under considerable pressure because of
the size of media needing to be imaged. We feel this will
lead to an increasing adoption of smaller units of storage.
Well known formats such as AFF (AFFLIB) and DEB (Turner,
<metadata ntfs>
This contains detailed information about the 
directory entry and details of which clusters the file 




This contains UUencoded version of the data 
that was encrypted with AES-256 with the 
acquisition authority key
</data>
Fig. 2. FCluster SIP structure.
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collectively using a term taken from the ISO 14721, Open
Archival Information System (OAIS) (OAIS, 2014), Submis-
sion Information Package (SIP).
Assurance in distributed storage
As soon as we split ‘the image’ into the SIPs that are
needed to enable distributed processing we lose most of
the inherent integrity of the ‘oneness’ of the image. Sud-
denly we have, perhaps, hundreds of thousands of SIPs to
validate. In what way could assurance be re-established?
Information Assurance while processing SIPs could be
provided in practice using some of the following methods:
 By a Property of an object: making and testing Check-
sums, Check digits, size, Control totals.
 By the Position/Location of the object: the fact that a file
is in a certain location further enhances our faith that it
is the correct one.
 By Loops of Authority and Acknowledgement: only
accepting data from a device that was authorised to pro-
vide it.
 By Access control: allowing and denying.
 By Separation of process: having functionality provided
by more than one program and clearly separating stages
by function.
 By Audit trail: requiring independent sequential stamp,
indelible records, recording with an authority.
 By Checklist: testing to see if previous checks have been
completed and recording them in a table.
Introducing FCluster
FCluster is a middleware that provides an environment
to allow forensic data processing to proceed with assur-
ance. It is a means by which data integrity can be
controlled; it is not an application program.
The design is based on the following assumptions, derived
from current practice and technological developments.
 Media will continue to grow in capacity and quantity.
 That ‘cross drive’ forensics will be of increasing impor-
tance as individuals have many storage devices, crime is
becoming more organised and forensic analysis systems
will increasingly have to address multi agency interests.
 That multi-agency investigation will increase but will
experience problems sharing and transferring large
datasets.
 That, because of the above, the notion of the ‘image’ is
becoming untenable but will be required for some time
as a legacy. Instead evidential datawill need to be stored
as separate files across the system. Consequently we
must expect tens, if not hundreds of millions of files in a
system that stores the contents of many forensic images.
 That in most investigations, the evidence is found in ‘the
obvious place’ and that most investigations are a case of
locating and recording data found.
 The system should allow existing legacy software to run
where possible. This new system should not require Guru
programming skills with knowledge of devices like GPUsto gain access to huge processing power. However if such
programs are developed it should allow these as well.
 That quantity of data requires the development of more
automated tools. These can be simple reporting or
correlating tools but need to run against large datasets.
The FCluster architecture
FCluster is a peer-to-peer middleware for a network of
heterogeneous host computers. The prototype is built on
Ubuntu Linux with future development planned for Win-
dows and MacOS. Most of the code is either in C or Bash
scripts. It uses MySQL, libcurl, ftp servers and ntfs-3g.
FCluster SIPs
FCluster includes a design for an SIP with a simple struc-
turewhich onlyworkswithNTFS file-systems. Thiswas done
for the sake of simplicity when developing the prototype.
An FCluster SIP comprises of 2 parts (Fig. 2). An exten-
sive header section contains XML delimited meta-data
about the file’s place on the original evidence media. This
includes data from the file’s entry in the NTFS $MFT and
also a list of cluster numbers the file originally occupied on
the source file-system together with an SHA1 for each of
the clusters. The data section holds the file data which is
encrypted using AES-256, with the key sent from FCluster,
and then UUencoded to reduce problems in portability.
The SIPs themselves are named in a regular manner,
[VolumeID]-[SHA1].meta. When the SIP is finally unpacked,
decoded anddecrypted on the FCluster the resultingfilemust
have the same SHA1 as its filename suggests and is included
within the header section of the SIP. To achieve this it must
have been generated on the imagingdevice authorised by the
key created by the FCluster when it authorizes imaging (see
section 14.1) or it will not decrypt when it is ingested into the
FCluster file system. These form two assurances, one of a
property of the file, the name and the ‘double entry’ of the
success of the encryption/decryption key.
FCluster subsystems
Applying a principle of separating processes, FCluster
comprises of 4 sub-systems (Fig. 3).
These are explained in more detail in section 14.
Acquisition Ingestion Distribution Processing
Fig. 3. The 4 subsystems with FCluster.
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Each host in the cluster might fulfil all the FCluster
functions listed below, but it is likely that most hosts will be
allocated just three or four roles.
 Acquisition Authority
That creates the cryptographic keys used to authorise
imaging.
 Imaging
That creates the directory metadata SIPs, file data SIPs
and Image files.
 FClusterfs file-system metadata storage
The heart of FCluster is a multi-featured File System in
User Space (FUSE) file system (Filesystem using MyS, 2013)
based around an SQL database.
 SIP Ingestor
That locates expected new evidence SIPs and triggers
ingestion.
 Load Balancer
That chooses which storage/processing host should hold
the primary copy of the data based on its workload.
 Replicator
That makes sure there are enough copies of the SIPs to
ensure redundancy and also verification that the data is still
valid.
 Data Storage server
That actually holds the data.
 Processing
Which actually does the processing. Almost always
combined with the storage role.
We believe our proposed system provides assurance at
every stage in such a way that the next stage cannot
commence if the previous assurance is not satisfied. The
core of this assurance is embodied in the use of FUSE file-
system specifically designed for our purpose.FClusterfs
We have observed that Map/Reduce implements a new
file system, HDFS, as a base for its processing. This has been
implementedasamiddlewareon topof thenativefile-system
used by the operating system.We follow the same approach.
The use of FUSE to build custom file systems has been
proposed within the digital forensics domain (Richard
et al., 2007). FClusterfs advances the notion and uses the
technique to provide a solution that addresses the key is-
sues of Assurance in a distributed processing environment.
It merges together several existing FUSE file systems to
form a new file system.
FClusterfs is based on MySQLfs (Filesystem using MyS,
2013). MySQLfs employs an SQL database consisting of 3
tables to completely replace the native file system. The
‘inodes’ table provides storage for file metadata like names,
dates/times, size, access rights etc usually seen as a
‘directory’. The ‘tree’ table stores the hierarchical structure
of folders and filenames found in the file-system. The 3rd
table ‘data_blocks’ stores the actual data as a series of bi-
nary large objects (BLOBs) replacing the clusters of the disk
format.
In FClusterfs we use the tree and inodes tables found in
MySQLfs. FClusterfs provides read-only access and so we
never need to manipulate directories. We have a table
called ‘meta-data’ to store the meta-data from the original
location of the data. This is a variable length, large text field
and so is better in a table of its own.
A single FClusterfs database can store many file-
systems. We have a table, VolumeInformation, which con-
tains a record of each file-system stored within the inodes
table. We have added a field ‘VolumeID’ to inodes to
identify which file-system the entry relates to.
We substitute the functionality of the ‘data_blocks’ table
in MySQLfs with the ability to read data stored on remote
servers. We have chosen to connect to the remote servers
using the ftp protocol because of the features of another
existing FUSE file-system curlFTPfs (Robso, 2013). curlFTPfs
allows the user to mount a connection to an ftp server and
make it appear to be part of the host’s file system. curlFTPfs
attains much of its power and flexibility because it is based
in the libcurl library and can support not only ftp but SSH,
SFTP, HTTP, HTTPS but, despite known security issues with
unencrypted data transfer, we have chosen ftp as a simple
base for a prototype. In a real world scenario, SSH would be
a more robust protocol. curlFTPfs only allows one ftp server
per mounted file system. In FClusterfs we have enhanced
this to be able to access individual files on any ftp server on
a file by file basis. The corresponding server details are
stored in the file’s record in additional filds we have added
to the ‘inodes’ table. When the user sees a directory listing
in their user space it appears as a continuous list drawn
from the ‘inodes’ table but in reality each file’s data will be
on a ftp server which is most likely remote. Each file is held
in its entirety on the ftp server. In the prototype the entire
file is transferred and held in cache in memory. In curlFTPfs
128 MB chunks are transferred just once and, if the file is
over 128 MB, a mosaic is built in a cache in local memory.
It is important to realise that although FClusterfs does



















Fig. 4. ftp via 127.0.0.1 localhost loopback.
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locally on its own ftp server. Whenwe use the term ‘passes
across the network’ it should be taken as via 127.0.0.1, the
localhost loopback connection (Fig. 4).
FCluster is also peer to peer and so any node can mount
a directory that can reference files on any server (Fig. 5).
Further, data held on this multitude of ftp servers is
encrypted and uses techniques from ecryptfs (Hicks et al.,
2013) to decrypt data on-the-fly. After it leaves the ftp
server media, it passes across the network and is decrypted
in the user’s host before being held in cached space in RAM
in their Virtual File System.
As previously mentioned, FClusterfs is read-only. There
is no code to provide functions like write/delete/chown/
chmod. This is a fundamental requirement of a forensic
system and, fortuitously, greatly simplifies the code.
FCluster has auditing which it draws from Loggedfs
(Flament, 2013). Loggedfs’ audit is felt to be too granular for
our purposes and instead we choose to record only signif-
icant actions like SIP movement, unpacking and theFig. 5. FCluster mounts peer to peer.opening of data-files for processing. Recording access to
parts of a file is felt to be unnecessary and would only slow
the system and make the logs unreadable. All audit records
are stored in a table ‘audit’ recording date/times, users.
Although the data location url information is available
to the user eg ftp://myserver.com/, the username and
password needed to login to the ftp server and gain access
the data is not. It is held in another table ‘serveraccessinfo’
and is retrieved on-the-fly during a read request by
FClusterfs. Users can only access evidence via the FClusterfs
file-system which provides data from the ftp servers.
FClusterfs is intended to completely replace any need
for network shares like NFS or SMB but to emphasise,
although FCluster provides access to the file-system under
investigation and will work over a network connection it is
not the most effectiveway towork. It is intended to process
local data by the host of the ftp server holding each of the
files. The location, url, of the ftp server hosting the data is
part of the ‘inodes’ table extending the fields used by
FClusterfs and so the ‘locality’ of the file can trigger the
processing task to be initiated within the host.Mounting the FCluster file-system
The behaviour of an FClusterfs file system is defined










Multiple file systems can be mounted on the user’s host
system and multiple SQL servers can provide storage for
FClusterfs file-system databases.
Functional overview – dataflow
Having established the component parts of FCluster we
can now demonstrate its operation by following data as it is
gathered and passed into the system.
The initial imaging process has three deliverables:
1 a SIP containing directory metadata.
2 a collection of SIPs, one each for each file that falls into
a ‘high value’ criteria set by the image acquirer.
3 a conventional ‘forensic image’, for reference and later
extraction of further data.
The selection of files to be packaged as SIPs takes a
prioritised triage approach collecting only file types ex-
pected to have a higher likelihood of containing evidence
depending on the case type.
The first stage of ingestion into FCluster is when the SIP,
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Fig. 7. The 4 zones of assurance.
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terfs. At this stage a directory skeletonwill exist but no data
is available within FCluster.
The file data, in the form of a number of SIPs, is imported
as it becomes available. This starts a process of ‘filling out’
the evidence file system with data associated with each
directory entry. The data is distributed across the Datan-
odes according to a load balancing algorithm which bases
its allocation on benchmarking previously created by
running a known set of approved programs against typical
data files.
When a SIP arrives on its storage host, it is unpacked and
its contents are verified in a number of ways. Only if it is
proven to be valid is it then accepted andmade available via
the distributed file system, FClusterfs. Upon approval at its
storage location, a defined list of tasks is invoked and
automatic process is conducted, for example generating
text indexing or thumb-nailing images.
To provide redundancy and secondary load balancing, a
replication agent firstly ensures constant and routine vali-
dation of data by applying an SHA 1 checksum to each file;
it can then ensure that there are multiple copies of the data,
normally three, held on separate hosts within the cluster.
The SIPs at image time will have, most likely, captured
only part of the evidence. Subsequently a ‘Bag it on de-
mand’ system can trigger an on-the-fly acquisition of data
that was initially deemed of secondary interest within the
image once it has been completed and is available to the
cluster. This data is validated and placed in the same
assured manner as the rest of the system.
How FCluster is configured as a network system is up to
the administrator but it can form a local or wide area
network. The prototype successfully uses a VPN to connect
the nodes. We’ve extended it to use nodes on AmazonWeb
Services. Whenever data is transferred between nodes is it
always in anencrypted formandso canbe considered safe in
a technical sense but thismaynot be acceptable onprinciple
within a legal environment. The primary objective, and the
core of any speed improvement, is that processing takes
place locally on the datanode holding the data. In a similar
way to the use of SHA1s to identify ‘Bad’files, the systemcan
be used without the actual files being accessed. Results are
transferred across the network but not normally the data.
FCluster by stages of assurance
FCluster has 4 ‘zones’ of assurance as shown in Fig. 7. We
now step through then in more detail.
Acquisition assurance
The first assurance in the system is one of the “Loops of
Authority and Acknowledgement” type in which authority
is granted to an imaging device to take an image and then
FCluster only accepts data that was gathered with that
authority Fig. 6.
The FCluster administrator generates an ‘Authority to
image’ in the form of a file which will be issued to a specific
device. This file contains a reference number and a
randomly generated key which will be used at acquisition
time to encrypt the data stored in the SIPs. The reference
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table in FClusterfs. Multiple keys can be created and issued
to multiple imaging devices to form a ‘stock of authorities’
to be used over a period of time, the keys have an ‘expiry
date’ associated with them as an added control.
As previously explained, in section 13, the imaging process
has three outputs. The SIP containing file-systemmetadata is
the first to be imported. The reference number under which
the cryptographic key was recorded is located in Vol-
umeInformation table. If it is present, has not expired or has
not been previously fulfilled, the import can proceed. The
contents of the SIP is read and the directory meta-data is
decrypted and records for each file are created in the inodes,
tree and metadata tables. These include fields that describe
the full path andfilename,file size,MACdates and times etc. If
the key is not present in the VolumeID table, the import
cannot proceed.
At the end of this process a complete ‘framework’ of the
directory structure and filenames will have been created in
the FClusterfs database. It is actually possible to mount this
FClusterfs structure and traverse the directory but as the
import of file SIPs that contain file data has not been carried
out there is no actual data to analyse in the files.
Ingestion assurance
We now use a series of “checklists” to control the import
of the details and contents of the data-file SIPs.
The SIP staging directory, where SIPs are placed ready to
be imported, is scanned and any SIPs which form part of a
Volume that is expected to be imported are found and the
header is read to extract details of the VolumeID, path,
filename and size. The inodes table of FClusterfs is searched
to see if this SIP is expected, ie there is an entry previously
made by a file-system SIP import. At this stage, various
fields like the original file’s SHA1 and staging directory url
should be empty. If there is a record that satisfies these
criteria then the fields in the inodes table are populated
with the meta-data extracted from the data-SIP. If there is a
record in the inodes table and it shows it has already been
imported it will not be considered again.
Distribution assurance
This stage has three components. Load Balancing, Mov-
ing SIPs to their primary destination and unpacking them.
Load balancing
Having ingested the volume directory metadata the
system is now primed to expect the SIPs of data that
makeup that file system. The selection of the primary
storage of the data is the first task of the loadbalancer. It
allocates a storage server to hold the data held within the
SIP and records this in the FCluster inodes table. Allocation
is based on the available capacity of the host, its processing
power and its estimated time to finish its current task list.
The movefile daemon
The movefile daemon also uses “checklist” type assur-
ance by constantly scanning the inodes table of FClusterfs
for any SIP that has been allocated a datanode, not beenmarked as being ‘in place’ and where the evidence SIP is
staged in a local directory. If these conditions aremet the SIP
is transferred to the storage datanode as allocated by the
loadbalancer. If, and only if, the transfer is successful does
movedata update the inode table with ‘primarystoragein-
place’ set to true. Movedata is the only mechanismwhereby
actual data can be moved around the system. It can only
operate when all the preconditions from Ingestion Assur-
ance are met. It does not simply scan an evidence folder and
move whatever SIPs are present; it moves only expected
SIPs, as recorded in the FCluster inodes table, from a folder.
The unpack daemon
Unpacker daemon constantly scans the inodes table to
see if there are any SIPs that are on their local server but not
unpacked. It takes the entry from the database and looks to
see if the files are on its ftp host, as should be the case from
the entries in inodes, not the other way round. A file that
simply arrives on the server without an entry in inodes
would be ignored.When a suitable SIP is identified it is split
into header and data sections. The header, containing the
metadata is inserted into the ‘meta_data’ table and the
header file erased. The data section is undecoded and the
data decrypted with a key stored in the VolumeListing
table. This was the key first created and issued by the
FCluster and used to encrypt the data in the SIP at acqui-
sition time. If the key does not work, the file cannot be
decrypted and so unpacking would fail. Only if the file
decrypts and the resulting file has an SHA1 checksum that
matches both the name of the file itself and the SHA1 as
recorded in the inodes table is the datafile finally accepted.
Processing assurance
The task daemon scans the tasks table to see if any job is
required for a file that it holds locally. Because all file access
must take place by utilising the enhanced FClusterfs file-
system the file must be the correct file and must have the
original content that was collected at imaging time. FClus-
terfs also gives us fine grained access control to the files
within a file system. We could, if we wished, control which
users can process specific data with specific programs.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated that by ensuring a rigorous
protocol when importing SIPs into a distributed cluster we
can provide a level of assurance in data transfer and storage.
Additionally, by adopting the same approach as Hadoop we
have created a prototype of a middleware specifically
designed to address the assurance requirements required in
the legal process while providing effective distributed pro-
cessing. As to whether this does achieve an acceptable level
we offer this design for further debate. It should be clear
that this design draws upon knowledge frommany domains
and so there is no single criteria set that can be applied.
Speed concerns
AprimaryconcernwithFClusterfs is speedbut inpractice
this has not proven to be a significant problem. Firstly, file
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connection via SMB andNFS shares. FCluster does this in the
samewaybutusing the ftpprotocol. These are roughlyequal
or perhaps slightly slower. Secondly, as we havemade clear,
FCluster is read-only and so has no record or file locking
code. As a result, even when FCluster draws from a remote
ftp server data is cached locally in RAM and never needs to
refer to the source for updates or changes. Thirdly, the sys-
tem is designed so that each storage host should process its
own local data, so the network issue completely disappears.
All distributed systems suffer from a management
overhead. This management issue exists in single host so-
lutions but is exacerbated when management data has to
be passed in messages across relatively slow network
connections rather than using local memory. This limits
scalability but in our initial test we find that the effective-
ness of clusters of about 50 hosts on a local Gigabit network
does not degrade significantly.
As of Spring 2014, the FCluster prototype is almost
complete and we are starting full assessment. We intend
this to be availablewhen complete viawww.fcluster.org.uk.
Future work
There are many areas in this design that present the
opportunity for further research. Our own priorities would
include rearranging the database structures to implement
the principle of division into subsystems so that the
assurance subsystems are reflected in the arrangement of
data within the tables. On network security the use of ftp,
only used as a protocol for ease when building a prototype,
should be replaced with, for example, SSH and use digital
certificates as authentication. Issues of Governance and
Chain of Custody need to be assessed including compari-
sons with standards like ISO 27037 and OAIS. The design
was always intended to allow existing, legacy, software to
run without alteration. We need to consider how we can
achieve data abstraction above the middleware.Acknowledgements
This work is part-funded by the European Social Fund
(ESF) through the European Union’s Convergence pro-
gramme administered by the Welsh Government.References
Abramson D, Foster I, Giddy J, Lewis A, Sosic R, Sutherst R, et al. The
Nimrod computational workbench: a case study in desktop meta-
computing. Australian Computer Science Communications 1997;19:
17–26.
ACPO. ACPO good practice guide for digital evidence http://library.npia.
police.uk/docs/acpo/digital-evidence-2012.pdf; 2012.
AFFLIB – the advanced forensic format. http://afflib.sourceforge.net/.
Ayers D. A second generation computer forensic analysis system. Digital
Investigation 2009;6:S34–42.
Beebe N. Digital forensic research: the good, the bad and the unad-
dressed. Advances in Digital Forensics 2009;V:17–36. Springer.
Cloudera. http://cloudera.com/; 2014.
Dean J, Ghemawat S. MapReduce: simplified data processing on large
clusters. In: OSDI ’04: 6th symposium on operating systems design
and implementation. USENIX Association; 2004.
Dictionary.com. http://dictionary.reference.com; 2014.
FUSE Filesystem using MySQL as storage.http://mysqlfs.sourceforge.net/;
2013.
Flament R. LoggedFS – filesystem monitoring with Fuse http://loggedfs.
sourceforge.net/; 2013.
Garfinkel S. Digital forensics research: the next 10 years. Digital Investi-
gation 2010;7:S64–73.
Globus. https://www.globus.org/; 2014.
Hicks T, Kirkland D, Halcrow M. eCryptfs, a cryptographic stacked fil-
esystem for Linux http://ecryptfs.org/; 2013.
ISO 17025:2005. General requirements for the competence of testing and
calibration laboratories. ISO; 2005.
ISO 27001:2013. Information technology – security techniques – infor-
mation security management systems – requirements. ISO; 2013.
ISO 27037:2012. Information technology d security techniques d
guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition, and preservation
of digital evidence. ISO; 2012.
Justice FBI, U.D. of. Regional computer forensics laboratory annual report
for fiscal year 2012 http://www.rcfl.gov/downloads/documents/RCFL_
Nat_Annual12pdf; 2012.
OAIS. http://public.ccsds.org/publications/archive/650x0m2.pdf; 2014.
PCI Security Standards Council. https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
index.php.
Pringle N, Sutherland I. Is a grid a suitable platform for high performance
digital forensics?. In: The 7th European conference on information
warfare and security; 2008.
Richard III G, Roussev V. Digital forensics tools: the next generation.
Digital Crime and Forensic Science in Cyberspace; 2006:75–90. Idea
Group Publishing.
Richard III G, Roussev V, Marziale L. Forensic discovery auditing of digital
evidence containers. Digital Investigation 2007;4:88–97.
Robson BA. CurlFtpFS – an FTP filesystem based on Curl and FUSE http://
curlftpfs.sourceforge.net/; 2013.
Roussev V, Richard III G. Breaking the performance wall: the case for
distributed digital forensics. In: Proceedings of the 2004 digital fo-
rensics research workshop; 2004.
Thain D, Tannenbaum T, Livny M. Distributed computing in practice: the
condor experience. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and
Experience 2005;17:323–56.
Turner P. Selective and intelligent imaging using digital evidence bags.
Digital Investigation 2006;3:59–64.
Weka. Waikato environment for knowledge analysis http://www.cs.
waikato.ac.nz/ml/index.html; 2014.
